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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Motivations: 
The last several decades have witnessed increasing risk, increased competition 
and deregulation in the banking industry. These factors have resulted in the foundation of 
off-balance sheet (OBS) activities. These activities generate a new fee income source that 
is beyond a bank’s balance sheet activities. Off-balance sheet activities have developed 
into one of the major income generators for banks as they have become more widely 
used, they now overweight banks on-balance sheet notional amounts. Another reason 
banks engage in these activities is to avoid regulatory costs and taxes since these 
activities are not shown on bank’s balance sheet under current accounting standards. 
Banks also engage in these activities as a risk management instrument against increasing 
credit risk, interest rate risk, and foreign exchange risk. The increasing usage of OBS 
activities can be seen from the numbers reported in table (2-1) which provides evidence 
about OBS activities in U.S. commercial banks. For example, for the U.S. banking 
system in 2005 the notional value of on-balance-sheet items was $9.0 trillion compared to 
$108.5 trillion of OBS items in the same year. Further, OBS activities grew from $10.2 
trillion in 1992 to $108.5 trillion in 2005, a rate of change of 341.2%.  
OBS activities have both risk-reducing as well as risk-increasing attributes and 
the net impact of the risk will depend on the ability to manage the risk resulting from 
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engaging in these activities. The use of derivatives contracts accelerated during the 1992–
2005 period and accounted for much of the growth in OBS activities.1 For example, the 
notional amount of derivatives increased from $8.7 trillion in 1992 to $101.9 trillion in 
2005. The significant growth in derivative securities activity by commercial banks has 
been a direct response to the increased interest rate risk, credit risk, and foreign exchange 
risk exposure they have faced, both domestically and internationally. These contracts 
offer banks a way to hedge these risks without having to make extensive changes to their 
on-balance-sheet activities. 
The global financial system always attempts to move with the trend, especially 
when we consider the revolution of globalization. As an important part of this global 
integration, the financial systems for each party must directly or indirectly follow the 
innovation trend in the system or they will not be able to get at least the minimum 
benefits from globalization. One of these innovations that we have seen in the last two 
decades is OBS activities, which were adopted by almost all financial systems in the 
world. Like the banks in the United States of America this adoption was very extensive 
and noticeable in different regions of the world. However, globally the extent of OBS 
activities remains below the level of U.S. commercial banks. The reasons that each bank 
is engaging in OBS activities are the same as those for U.S. commercial banks. Banks 
engage in OBS activities hoping to earn additional fee income to compensate declining 
margins or spreads on their traditional lending business and/or to avoid regulatory costs 
or taxes since reserve requirements and deposit insurance premiums are not levied on 
OBS activities. Given the fact that OBS activities are being used extensively in almost all 
                                                
1 See figure (3-1) & (3-2) and refer to table (3-2) for more evidence. 
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banking systems in the world and given that each region in the world has its own 
political, technological and economic characteristics, we believe that the determinants of 
bank’s OBS activities will be different from one region to another based on the 
distinguishing characteristics of each region. For example, given the differences between 
the banking system in Africa and the banking system in Europe, different factors will 
affect the banks’ decision about the use of OBS activities in both regions. 
1.2. Off-Balance Sheet Activities in Brief: 
Off-balance sheet (OBS) items are contingent assets and liabilities that may 
affect the future status of a financial institution’s balance sheet.  Although OBS activities 
are now an important source of fee income for almost all banks and bank holding 
companies (BHCs), they have the potential to produce positive as well as negative future 
cash flows. OBS activities include issuing various types of guarantees, commitments, and 
derivatives: 
Letters of Credit (LC): banks deal with two types of LC, Commercial Letters 
of Credit (CLC) and Standby Letters of Credit (SLC). The LCs are essentially guarantees 
to underwrite performance that a depository institution sells to the buyers of guarantees, 
causing the depository institutions to add to their contingent future liabilities. Although 
both CLCs and SLCs have the same type of risk exposure, default risk, they are different 
in the severity of the risk exposure. In the case of commercial letters of credit, the bank’s 
role is to provide a formal guarantee that payment for goods shipped or sold 
internationally or do mestically will be forthcoming regardless of whether the buyer of 
the good defaults on payment. While the bank’s role with standby letters of credit is to 
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provide a formal guarantee of payment to cover contingencies that are potentially more 
severe and less predictable like bond performance SLCs, which means a higher level of 
default risk exposure. At the same time LCs also have a risk reducing impact through the 
diversification effect. 
Commitments: a loan commitment agreement is a contractual commitment by 
a bank to loan to a customer a certain maximum amount at given interest rate terms. The 
commitment contracts also define the period over which the customer will be able to 
utilize his contracted loan. It is true that the banks will generate fee income for making 
these commitments to the borrowers, but it will also generate more credit and liquidity 
risk. 
Derivatives: derivatives contracts that are being used by banks and included in 
this study are futures, forwards, options and swaps contracts. Banks can be either a user 
of derivatives contracts for trading purposes (hedging and other purposes) or dealers 
(non-trading purposes) that act as counterparties in trades with customers for a fee.  
Contingent credit risk is likely to be present when banks expand their positions 
in futures, forwards, options, and swaps contracts. This risk relates to the fact that the 
counterparty to one of these contracts may default on payment obligations, leaving the 
bank unhedged and having to replace the contract at current interest rates, prices, or 
exchange rates, which may be relatively unfavorable. In addition, such defaults are most 
likely to occur when the counterparty is losing heavily on the contract and the bank is in 
the money on the contract. This type of default risk is much more serious for forward 
contracts than for futures contracts. This is because forward contracts are nonstandard 
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contracts entered into bilaterally by negotiating parties, such as two banks, and all cash 
flows are required to be paid at one time (on contract maturity). Thus, they are essentially 
over-the-counter (OTC) arrangements with no external guarantees should one or the other 
party default on the contract. By contrast, futures contracts are standardized contracts 
guaranteed by organized exchanges such as the NYSE. Futures contracts, like forward 
contracts, make commitments to deliver foreign exchange at some future date. If a 
counterparty were to default on futures contracts, however, the exchange would assume 
the defaulting party’s position and payment obligations. 
Options contracts can also be traded over the counter or bought/sold on 
organized exchanges. If the options are standardized options traded on exchanges, such as 
bond options, they are virtually default-risk free.  If they are specialized options 
purchased over the counter, such as interest rate caps, some elements of default risk exist. 
In swaps contracts, two parties contract to exchange interest rate payments or 
foreign exchange payments. If the interest rate or foreign exchange rates move a good 
deal, one of the two parties will face considerable future loss exposure, creating 
incentives to default. Similarly, swaps are OTC instruments normally susceptible to 
default risk. In general, default risk on OTC contracts increases with the time to maturity 
on the contracts and the fluctuation of underlying prices, interest rates, or exchange rates. 
Derivative contracts also have a favorable impact on total bank’s risk when 
they are used to hedge against the future uncertainty of interest rates and exchange rates. 
Several studies have reported a favorable impact of swaps on a bank’s total market risk. 
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Moreover, derivative contracts will have another favorable impact on a bank’s risk when 
they are treated as diversification in the bank’s asset portfolio2.  
1.3. Literature Review: 
An extensive body of literature related to OBS activities exists, in which 
several hypotheses have been considered to explain the OBS activities phenomenon. 
These hypotheses are: 
i. The regulatory tax hypothesis: this hypothesis shapes a positive relation between 
a bank’s OBS activities and the regulatory taxes on on-balance-sheet assets and 
liabilities. The regulatory taxes usually impose a constraint on a bank’s reserve, 
deposit insurance premia, and capital. These constraints will encourage banks to 
substitute off-balance sheet activities for on-balance sheet activities. 
ii. The moral hazard hypothesis states that banks with high breakdown probabilities 
have greater moral hazard incentives and therefore more incentive to engage in 
OBS activities. It proposes that both underpriced, fixed-rate deposit insurance and 
capital requirements provide incentives to increase financial leverage through the 
issuance of OBS activities that are not subject to regulation. This hypothesis 
argues that capital-constrained banks are projected to engage in more OBS items 
than less constrained banks. Moreover, banks that are about to be unsuccessful 
will prefer to have OBS items that are out of accounting rules consideration which 
allow them to book income from these activities immediately, whereas income 
from the on-balance sheet items cannot be booked until the interest is earned. 
iii. The market discipline hypothesis argues that because OBS activities are uninsured 
dependent future claims which are related to other claims on the banks, banks 
with safer positions will engage in more OBS activities which will reduce the 
                                                
2 Definitions of OBS items are taken from, FDIC website: 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section3-8.html} 
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banks risk. Bank customers will value these claims more when banks are safer, 
therefore those banks which are already OBS items issuers will have an incentive 
to decrease their risk position and issue additional OBS items. 
1.3.1. U.S. Research: 
Following are summaries of the most important literature. Pavel and Phillis 
(1987) examine the determinants of commercial loan sales activities. They conclude that 
diversification, capital, binding capital constraints, and reserve requirements all have an 
important impact on loan sales. Moreover, this study proposes that banks start selling 
loans when capital ratios are low and charge-offs are high. Avery and Berger (1988) 
support the moral hazard hypothesis and they suggest that standby letters of credit have a  
positive impact on banks’ risk exposure. 
Benveniste and Berger (1986, 1987) maintain that as banks approach failure, 
SLC issuance decreases. In addition to the market discipline hypothesis they also support 
the regulatory hypothesis by stating that there is a positive relation between SLCs and 
leverage. 
Pavel (1988) declared that there is no relation between loan sales and bank 
risk. Koppenhaver (1989) considered more OBS activities (loan commitments, SLCs and 
CLCs) and studied the determinants of OBS activities employing Logit models. The 
results suggest that bank size, amount of reserves, and loan losses are important factors 
for banks to engage in OBS activities, while capital constraint factors are insignificant for 
banks’ OBS activities decisions. 
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Berger and Udell (1990) and Avery and Berger (1990) conclude that there is a 
negative relationship between loan commitments and bank risk. Avery and Berger (1991) 
consider more risk measures and suggest that SLCs have a positive impact on small 
banks’ risk, and a positive impact on large banks’ risk. This result supports the market 
discipline hypothesis for large banks.  
Berger (1991) examines actual bank performance instead of stock market 
prices to counter for the equity effect of disciplining banks’ risk-taking. The results reveal 
that higher capital ratios for both small and large banks are related to higher future 
earnings, lower probability of bankruptcy, and better bank performance.  
Koppenhaver and Stover (1991) claim that the existing empirical research 
encounters a simultaneous equation bias, and they employ a granger causality test. They 
find that SLCs have a positive impact on bank leverage, while their leverage has a 
negative impact on SLCs. 
Hassan (1992) studied the riskiness of CLCs from the stockholders and 
bondholders point of view. The results suggest that stockholders consider CLCs as bank 
risk-reducer while debtholders are indifferent about CLCs activities. This suggests that 
more constrained capital requirements are not appropriate for some of OBS activities for 
large commercial banks. Hassan, Karels and Peterson (1994) used a contingent valuation 
model to test the market discipline hypothesis of OBS activities for bank subordinated 
debt. Their results support the market discipline hypothesis for most OBS activities, and 
suggest that debtholders and equityholders regard OBS activities as bank risk reducers.  
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1.3.2. International Research: 
The empirical evidence on OBS activities in international banking systems is 
not extensive. The existing international evidence is mainly concerned with the market 
discipline hypothesis. 
Hassan, Lai, and Yu (2001) studied the risk implications of Canadian banks’ 
letters of credit by employing several market measures of risk from one-factor and multi-
factor models. Their results indicate that the various market measures of risk and letters 
of credit are negatively related. Also, banks with greater portfolio risk, measured in terms 
of equity and asset risk, as well as high leverage and interest rate risk, are less likely to 
issue letters of credit. 
Khambata and Hirche (2002) describe OBS credit risk of the top 20 European 
commercial banks. Their results suggest that loan commitments are the largest source of 
credit risk among traditional OBS instruments. However, the notional amounts of 
derivative activities make up around 95 per cent of the total OBS exposure. An analysis 
by country of origin points to national differences in the use of derivative leverage. In 
comparison with U.S. commercial banks, European banks use fewer OBS activities as a 
multiple of on-balance sheet assets. In a similar paper Khambata and Hirche (2003) 
repeat the descriptive study on OBS credit risk across the top 20 Japanese banks. The 
results suggest that financial derivatives were heavily used by the top four banks and that 
loan commitments are the largest source of credit risk among traditional OBS 
instruments. The notional amounts of derivative contracts make up 92 percent of total 
OBS activities. As compared to U.S. and European banks, Japanese banks use fewer OBS 
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instruments as a percentage of their assets. This implies that Japanese banks are in 
general more conservative and risk averse than their U.S. or European counterparts. 
Lieu, Yeh and Chiu (2005) implement a stochastic cost curve method to 
inspect the influence of OBS activities on the cost efficiency of Taiwan’s banks. They 
estimate and compare cost inefficiency with or without OBS outputs of 46 Taiwanese 
commercial banks during the period 1998 through 2001. Their results suggest that 
omitting OBS outputs in estimating the cost frontier function of banks results in an 
underestimation of bank efficiency by approximately 5 percent. Also, cost efficiency and 
OBS usage are positively related with bank size. Banks with higher employee 
productivity are also more cost efficient. Finally, their results support the existence of 
economies of scale in both models with and without OBS specification in Taiwan’s bank 
system. And they conclude that economies of scope between loans and OBS outputs are 
also practical. 
Angelidis, Lyroudi (2005) investigate the impact of banks’ OBS activities on 
the productivity of decision-making units. Their study covers 11 European countries for 
the period 1995-2002. They also employ the data envelopment approach to calculate the 
Malmquist indices of total factor productivity change. Their results indicate that 
productivity varies according to both approaches (with and without OBS) since for some 
countries productivity is enhanced while in some other countries it is worsened. 
However, when OBS items are not included as an additional variable the predicted total 
factor productivity indices fit better than the actual total factor productivity indices. 
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Sinha (2006) compares Indian commercial banks (public and private banks) 
with respect to their ability to generate income out of off-balance-sheet activities by using 
the Data Envelopment Approach. Moreover, the author employs a panel data framework 
to test the impact of operating efficiency, capital adequacy and NPA incidence on OBS 
risk-taking behavior of Indian commercial banks. The results show that public sector 
commercial banks are lagging behind the private sector commercial banks in terms of 
OBS activities. Almost all the commercial banks exhibited decreasing returns to scale, 
which is not very encouraging for the banking sector. Moreover the results indicate that 
OBS activities are positively related to operating profit ratio and negatively related to 
NPA ratios, which reinforces the market risk hypothesis. 
1.4. Research Questions: 
1) What are the motivations behind the usage of OBS activities in the U.S. and 
international banking systems? Is it the regulatory tax hypothesis? Is it a risk 
reduction tool? Are they bank specific characteristics? Are they 
macroeconomic factors? 
2) In the U.S. commercial banking system, are OBS usage motivations different 
between OBS guarantees and OBS derivatives? 
3) In the global commercial banking system, are OBS usage motivations 
different between developed and developing countries? 
4) Do OBS guarantees and derivatives follow the financial innovations diffusion 
model in the U.S. and global commercial banking systems? 
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5) How do market participants evaluate OBS activities in their market risk 
evaluations? Are OBS guarantees risk reducing (increasing) factors? Are OBS 
derivatives risk reducing (increasing) factors? 
6) Does bank size matter when the market evaluates OBS activities’ impact on 
systematic and unsystematic risk? 
7) What is the impact of on-balance sheet variables on market risk? 
1.5. Research outline: 
Chapter two will discusses the determinants of OBS guarantees activities in 
U.S. commercial banks. We will employ the logistic diffusion model developed by 
Mansfield (1961)in order to test the regulatory hypothesis and check whether OBS 
guarantees are considered financial innovations or not. Chapter three will utilize the same 
logistic diffusion model to examine the determinants of OBS derivatives contracts for the 
U.S. commercial banking industry. 
In chapter four there will be two levels of investigation. First, we will check 
the determinants of OBS activities in the global banking industry represented by the 
major regions and classified into developed regions (North America, Europe, etc.) and 
developing regions (The Middle East, Africa, etc.). Second, we will look at the impact of 
some other quantitative variables like political environment and technological 
endowments for each region in the decision to use OBS banking activities. 
Chapter five deals with the risk exposure of OBS guarantees by large bank 
holding companies (BHCs) in the United States of America. In this part a two-stage 
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analysis will be developed. In stage one we will estimate our dependent variables, which 
include three market risk measures (1) the systematic market risk (from CAPM, β), (2) 
the standard deviation of a bank’s equity return (σE), and (3) the implied asset volatility 
from the Ronn-Verma option model (σV). The second stage will be to regress these 
dependent variables on the on- and off-balance-sheet risk variables using panel 
econometric techniques for the bank holding companies (BHCs) sector. 
Chapter six will follow the same models and analysis to study OBS derivatives 
contracts (futures, forwards, options, and swaps) in U.S. BHCs. In this chapter a two 
stage analysis will be employed as in chapter five. Finally, chapter seven includes a 
discussion of the most important conclusions and gives some policy implications from 
these conclusions. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The Determinants of OBS Guarantees Activities in U.S. Commercial 
Banks 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This study employs the logistic diffusion model of financial 
innovations. In order to trace the determinants of OBS guarantees 
we consider that OBS guarantees in the banking industry as a 
financial innovation follows a time diffusion trend. In addition to the 
time trend factor we include a regulation pressure factor to test the 
bank regulatory hypothesis and non-regulatory bank-specific factors 
to test the market discipline hypothesis.  We also include 
macroeconomic factors to test for the general economic notion 
impact on U.S. banks’ OBS guarantees. The results reject the 
regulatory tax hypothesis and conclude that regulations have no 
major impact in determining banks OBS guarantees usage. Another 
major result is that banks OBS guarantees are decreasing over time 
and it is no longer considered as a financial innovation in the U.S. 
banking industry; banks seem to have replaced guarantees with 
other OBS activities like derivatives. While the banks’ regulatory 
factor is not a major determinant of OBS guarantees, bank’s non-
regulatory and macroeconomic factors are significant in determining 
OBS usage. 
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The Determinants of OBS Guarantees Activities in U.S. Commercial 
Banks 
2.1. Introduction: 
During the last few decades banks started generating a new fee income source 
that is beyond their balance sheet activities. Off-balance sheet activities have developed 
into a major fee income generator for banks, as they have become more widely used, they 
now overweight banks on-balance-sheet notional amounts. Another reason that banks 
engage in these activities is to avoid regulatory costs and taxes since these activities are 
not shown on a bank’s balance sheet under current accounting standards. Banks also 
engage in these activities as a risk management instrument against increasing credit risk, 
interest rate risk, and foreign exchange risk. The increasing use of OBS activities can be 
seen from the numbers reported in table (1) which illustrates OBS activities in U.S. 
commercial banks. In 2005, the notional value of on-balance-sheet items was $9.0 trillion 
compared to $108.5 trillion in OBS items for the U.S. banking system. Further, OBS 
activities grew from $10.2 trillion in 1992 to $108.5 trillion in 2005, a rate of change of 
341.2%. 
OBS activities include issuing various types of guarantees, like letters of credit, 
which often have a strong insurance underwriting element, and making future 
commitments to lend. Both services generate additional fee income for banks. OBS 
activities also involve engaging in derivatives transactions, such as futures, forwards, 
options, and swaps. A loan commitment is a contractual commitment to loan a certain 
maximum amount to a borrower at a given interest rate over some period in the future. A 
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letter of credit is a guarantee that banks sell to underwrite the future performance of the 
buyers of guarantees. A commercial letter of credit is used mainly to assist a firm in 
domestic and international trade. The bank’s role is to provide a formal guarantee that it 
will pay for the goods shipped or sold if the buyers of the goods default on its future 
payments. Standby letters of credit cover contingencies that are potentially more severe, 
less predictable or frequent, and not necessarily trade related. Loans sold are loans that 
banks originate and then sell to other investors that (in some cases) can be returned to the 
originating institution in the future if the credit quality of the loans deteriorates. 
Derivatives are a position taken in the form of swaps, options, futures, and forwards 
contracts by the banks for hedging and trading purposes3.  
This study will focus on OBS guarantees activities in the banking industry. 
The model specification and empirical exploration will follow. In section three and four 
we will have the data source and empirical results. And section five will conclude the 
study.  
2.2. The Model 
Mansfield (1961) shows that the adoption pattern of real innovations often 
follow a logistic time curve, and these innovations will grow over time until they reach a 
100% occupancy. Many of the financial activities have been considered as an innovation 
and were studied using the Mansfield model. Since OBS activities are one of the major 
banking activities during the previous two decades, I follow Jagtiani et al. (1995) by 
                                                
3 Definitions of OBS items are taken from, Anthony Saunders and Marcia Millon Cornett, “Financial 
Market and Institutions, a Modern Perspective”, Second Edition, Mc Graw Hill, Irwin, 2004. 
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considering OBS activities as real financial innovations and test the determinants of these 
innovations following the Mansfield model. 
This study differs from Jagtinai et al. (1995) in several aspects. They consider 
only SLCs, loan sales from OBS guarantees and three other derivatives items. Here in 
addition to SLCs and loan sales we will consider CLCs, both unused commitments and 
participations. The latter includes loans sales and some other items.4 Second, we will 
employ the regulatory pressure concept - Jacques and Nigro (1997) - to measure for 
capital regulations, rather than considering dummy variables to present the important 
changes in capital requirements during the period of study. (A detailed discussion of the 
regulatory factor will follow). Third, Jagtinai et al.’s (1995) study is old relative to the 
long period of OBS guarantees existence. We will consider a more recent period that will 
cover the period of 1996 to 2005, which will check the trend of OBS guarantees in U.S. 
commercial banks. Fourth, in addition to the capital requirement factor and bank specific 
features we will add macroeconomic conditions as a determinant of OBS activities. 
Moreover, bank-level panel data is constructed and panel estimation techniques are used. 
One of the main benefits of panel data is that it enables us to identify and measure effects 
that are not determined in pure cross-section or pure time-series data. 
2.2.1 The Logistic Diffusion Model: 
Mansfield (1961) introduced a deterministic model to answer two questions: 
Why firms were so slow to install some innovations and so quick to install others? What 
factors seem to govern the rate of imitation? His model assumes that the number of firms 
                                                
4 Refer to the table (2-7) at the end of this chapter. 
 18
adopting an innovation between time t and time t+1 depends on several factors. First, the 
number of firms that have previously adopted the innovation. The increases in the 
proportion of firms already using an innovation would increase λij(t). As more 
information and experience accumulate, it becomes less risky to begin using it. 
Moreover, competitive pressures mount and “bandwagon” effects occur. Second, the 
profitability of installing the innovation would also be expected to have an important 
influence on λij(t). the more profitable this investment is relative to others that are 
available, the greater is the chance that a firm’s estimate of the profitability will be high 
enough to compensate for whatever risks are involved and that it will seem worthwhile to 
install the new technique rather than to wait. Third, for equally profitable innovations, 
λij(t) should tend to be smaller for those requiring relatively large investments. One 
would expect this on the grounds that firms tend to be more cautious before committing 
themselves to such projects and that they often have more difficulty in financing them. 
Finally, for equally profitable innovations requiring the same investment, λij(t) is likely to 
vary among industries (depending on the risk aversion attitude in each industry). Below is 
the formal derivation of Mansfield (1961) model. 
Let nij be the total number of firms which adopted the jth innovation in the ith 
industry, mij(t) be the number of these firms having introduced the innovation at time t, πij 
be the profitability of installing this innovation relative to that of alternative investments, 
and Sij be the investment required to install this innovation as a per cent of the average 
total assets of these firms. λij(t) is the proportion of “hold-outs” (firms not using this 
innovation) at time t that introduced it by time t+1, i.e., 
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Add another assumption, as we go backward in time, the number of firms having 
introduced the innovation must tend to zero, i.e., 
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Thus, the growth over time in the number of firms having introduced an 
innovation should conform to a logistic function. The logistic time curve, equation (9), 
predicts that the proportion of the population which has already adopted the innovation 
will increase at an accelerating rate until 50 percent adoption achieved, this is attained at t 
= -(α/β). Thereafter, the adoption will increase at a decelerating rate and 100 percent 
adoption is approached asymptotically. 
If equation 9 is correct, it can be shown that the rate of imitation is governed 
by only one parameter ijβ . Assuming that the unspecified terms in (7) is uncorrelated 
with πij and Sij and that it can be treated as a random error term, then it follows from 9 
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where Pit is the ratio of OBS items (in nominal terms) to the nominal value of total assets 
(defined as on-balance sheet assets + OBS items) of bank i at time t. this definition 
follows Jagtiani et al. (1995) which enables us to counter for the scale on which bank 
introduce OBS items. 
2.2.2. The Empirical Model: 
Starting from equation (10), I add two factor vectors, one to encounter the 
bank-specific characteristics and the other to capture the macroeconomic conditions. The 
choice of these factors is based on both theoretical literature and from policy discussions. 
Accordingly, equation (11) is the modified econometric model from equation (10). 
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where i = 1,2,3,….,N denotes the number of banks and t = 1,2,3,…T denotes 
the number of time periods. The dependent variable, LGTOGUARit is the logistic 
transformation of Pit, where Pit is the ratio of OBS items (in nominal terms) to the 
nominal value of total assets (defined as on-balance sheet assets + OBS items) of bank i 
at time t. this definition follows Jagtiani et al. (1995) which enables us to counter for the 
scale on which banks introduce OBS items. The explanatory variables are the time trend 
(t) which accounts for the autonomous diffusion, Xit is a vector of bank-specific 
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characteristics, Yit is a vector of general macroeconomic conditions, and the intercept α is 
a bank-specific constant.5 
Bank-specific characteristics are classified into regulatory and non-regulatory 
variables. The non-regulatory factors are bank size, loan ratio, profitability, and the net 
charge-off. The anticipated effect of bank size has a two-side effect and the net effect of 
these two determines the net impact of firm size on OBS activities. On the one hand, a 
bank has to be of a certain size in order to get involved in OBS activities and get the 
benefits of the economies of scale. Moreover, large banks may be the only banks that 
have a highly qualified risk management and specialized staff. And sophisticated clients 
who are more likely to engage in OBS activities may not consider small size banks as an 
option as they believe that large banks are too big to fail. On the other hand, as the bank 
size gets bigger then probably the bank is more risk-diversified and there will be fewer 
incentives to engage in OBS activities. 
The impact of the loan ratio (the ratio of loans to total assets) on the usage of 
OBS activities seems to be positive. Angbazo (1997) shows that a higher loan ratio will 
increase the interest rate risk which will create an incentive for banks to hedge using OBS 
activities. Another reason for this positive relation is that in the process of approving 
loans banks get access to their customers’ investment information which will facilitate 
the offer of relevant OBS risk management tools. 
A positive relation is expected between profitability and OBS activities. 
Profitability is considered a measure for the creditworthiness as viewed by customers. 
                                                
5  Refer to table (2) for a summary of the variables and their proxies, predicted signs, and the rational of the 
relation. 
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Profitability will increase the customer valuation for that bank which in turn will give 
more incentive to work with profitable banks rather vis-à-vis. 
The net charge-off is a proxy for the non-performing loans that banks assign 
for bad debt loans. The predicted impact of non-performing loans is negative, so as the 
amount of non-performing loans increases, the bank’s creditworthiness decreases, and 
that will decrease the amount of OBS activities. One may argue that as the charge-offs 
increase, then the default risk for that bank increases and a risk management instrument 
might be needed to hedge against this risk. Therefore an increase in the charge-off 
amount might have a positive impact on OBS activities. 
With regard to regulatory factors, following Jacques and Nigro (1997), I will 
consider the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) to proxy for the capital requirement 
regulations. CAR is a measure of a bank’s capital. It is used to protect depositors and 
promote the stability and efficiency of financial systems around the world6. There are two 
possible effects of CAR on the diffusion pattern of OBS items. On the one hand, as the 
bank has a higher CAR its creditworthiness will increase which in turn will increase the 
incentives of the bank’s customers to work with this bank’s OBS risk management items. 
On the other hand, higher CAR reduces a bank’s marginal gain from increasing the risk 
in the asset portfolio (Furlong and Keeley, 1989). As a bank’s capital increases, the 
ability to assume risk increases, but the need for OBS products to hedge risk exposure 
may decrease.  
                                                
6 CAR can be expressed as
edAssetsRiskWeight
talTierIICapialTierICapitCAR += . It is also called the capital to risk 
weighted assets ratio (CRAR). 
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I also examine the response of the banks to the 8% well-capitalized total risk-
based capital (RBC) standards on capital ratios. I classify the banks into two groups 
CARL, CARH as a signal to the degree of regulatory pressure brought about by the risk-
based capital standards on capital ratio, because banks with total CAR above and below 
the 8 percent regulatory minimum may react differently. Specifically, the low regulatory 
pressure variable (CARL) equals the difference between the inverse of the bank’s actual 
CAR and the inverse of the regulatory stipulated CAR of 8 percent, i.e., CARL equals 
(1/CAR-1/8) for all banks with a total risk-based capital ratio less than 8 per cent, and 
zero otherwise7. The high regulatory pressure variable (CARH) equals the difference 
between the inverse of the regulatory stipulated CAR of 8 percent and bank’s actual 
CAR, i.e.,  CARH equals (1/8-1/ CAR) for all banks with a total risk-based capital ratio 
greater than 8 percent, and zero otherwise. High regulatory pressure with respect to 
capital implies low creditworthiness and can be expected to translate into lower OBS 
activity. On the other hand, low regulatory pressure, as implied by CRAL, signifies a 
comfortable capital position and (accompanied with a high credit rating) makes a bank an 
active supplier of OBS products (Koppenhaver and Stover, 1991). Alternatively, low 
regulatory pressure reduces the marginal propensity of a bank to increase the risk in its 
asset portfolio (Furlong and Keeley, 1989). Therefore, banks with high capital ratios 
(implying low regulatory pressure) can be expected to take less OBS risk and hence, 
supply a smaller volume of OBS items. 
                                                
7 Risk – Based Assessment System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC. They specified three 
groups in terms of RBC standards, Group 1 - "Well Capitalized." Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio equal to 
or greater than 10 percent. Group 2 - "Adequately Capitalized." Not Well Capitalized and Total Risk-Based 
Capital Ratio equal to or greater than 8 percent. Group 3 - "Undercapitalized" Neither Well Capitalized nor 
Adequately Capitalized.  
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The macroeconomic vector includes four categories; first, a general economic 
performance measure (the real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP)), second, price level 
measures (shares price, consumer price index) the share prices measured by the S&P 500 
price index, third, interest rate measures (the difference between the long and the short-
term interest rate (INTSPRD)8, short-term interest rate, mid-term interest rate, and long-
term interest rate), and fourth, balance of payment measures (total trade in goods, total 
trade in services, total trade income, total transfers, and total capital transactions). 
Real GDP captures the effects caused by fluctuations in general economic 
activity. Two arguments can be made about the impact of the real GDP and the usage of 
OBS activities. First the demand for OBS products reacts positively to the business cycle 
due to a transactions motive. Second, business risk decreases in economic boom periods, 
which leads to less demand for risk management techniques (OBS activities). The interest 
rate spread also encounters two arguments. First, a high and positive interest rate spread 
signals a high degree of uncertainty about future interest rates and that short-term interest 
rates are expected to rise in the future. High interest rate risk and future interest rate rises 
imply a relatively high demand for OBS products. Second, when the spread between 
short term and long term is high and positive, then bank managers have the incentive to 
engage in traditional on-balance sheet activities and take advantage of low short-term 
interest rate funding and high long-term interest rate lending. As a result a bank’s 
manager will be less attracted to engaging in OBS activities. The effect of the interest rate 
variables (short, mid, and long–term rates) will depend on whether we are considering the 
customer’s point of view or the bank’s point of view, and also the investment horizon for 
                                                
8 The long-term interest rate is proxied as the interest rate on long term Government bonds. The short-term 
interest rate is proxied as the interest rate the short term Treasury Bills. 
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both of them (short term or long term). For example, for a short term investor the word 
investors can be viewed as a bank or individual, and will increase his lending when the 
short term rate increases. That will affect OBS activities negatively, while a long term 
investor will prefer not to lend on the current interest rate and will prefer to go to OBS 
activities.  
With respect to price level variables, the CPI variable may affect OBS 
activities negatively as it will affect the purchasing power in the economy and then the 
saving level in the economy and all the banks’ activities in general (on and off balance 
sheet). When the purchasing power of the customer decreases, aggregate demand in the 
economy decreases which in turn reduces all the trade transactions domestically and 
internationally, negatively affecting OBS activities. The share price effect may be 
positive or negative. The positive argument is that when share prices rise, then the 
domestic corporations’ market values will increase leading to expansion of operations, 
and that will increase OBS transactions. The negative impact is that when the share prices 
increase, investors will increase their investment in the stock market and will reduce 
saving and thus banking and OBS activities. All balance of payment variables are 
expected to increase the usage of OBS activities as more international transactions will 
increase the need for OBS activities. 
2.3. Data Sources: 
The data are sourced from the report of income and condition-schedule RC-L 
reported to the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation for all commercial banks in the 
U.S. from March 1996 to December 2005. Balanced panel data sets are constructed for 
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CLCs, SLCs, and Unused Commitments. The number of banks is mainly based on the 
availability of OBS items data. We have 114, 145, 162 banks included for CLCs, SLCs, 
Unused Commitments, respectively. An unbalanced data set is formed for participations 
because of the small number of banks continuously engaged in this activity. This data set 
is formed as follows: 15 banks have a full data set of 40 quarters, 8 banks with only 32 
quarters, 8 banks with only 31 quarters, and one bank with 37 quarters. However the data 
availability begins in March 1996 for all banks. Banks with discontinuous data were 
omitted from the data sets which will reduce the noise in the estimate. OBS guarantees 
are calculated as the logistic transformation of the ratio of the notional amount of each 
item to total assets. Total assets are defined as the summation of the on-balance sheet 
total assets and OBS total assets. This is to counter for the scale on which banks 
introduce OBS items. The on-balance sheet variables are also collected from the call 
report by the banks with the FDIC. The macroeconomic variables are collected from the 
IFS database. The interest rate spread represents the difference between the 10-year 
Treasury bond yield rate and the 3–month Treasury bill yield rate. The short term rate is 
measured by the short term Treasury bill, the mid-term rate is measured by the mid-term 
Treasury bill rate and the long term rate is measured by the long term Treasury bill rate. 
The share prices are the S&P 500 price index. The total trade in goods is the sum of the 
total exports and imports of goods, the total services is the total exports and imports of 
services, total trade income is the sum of the total credit and debit income, total transfers 
is the sum of the total credit and debit transfers, and total capital is also the sum of the 
credit and debit sides of the capital account. 
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2.4. Empirical Results: 
Tables (3 - 6) present the estimates for four OBS guarantees (CLCS, SLCS, 
Participations, and Unused Commitments). 
Time Diffusion Speed: It is interesting that the time trend coefficients are 
statistically significant and negative for all OBS guarantees except for SLCs which are 
insignificant. This suggests that OBS guarantees appeared as banks’ activities long 
enough before our study period which indicates that OBS guarantees are no longer 
considered financial innovations. It seems that other financial innovations have taken 
place instead of guarantees, like derivatives activities. 
Non-Regulatory Bank Specific Factors: A bank’s size, profitability and loan 
ratio are not always significant which suggest that although OBS guarantees are 
influenced by bank specific characteristics, they are not a major factor for OBS 
guarantees usage. More specifically, a bank’s size has a significantly negative effect on 
SLCs, Participations, and the Unused Commitments which can be justified as these items 
are more related to a bank’s risk, which should decrease with the bank’s size. Bank size is 
statistically insignificant for CLCs contracts which suggest the bank’s size is not 
considered when banks make a decision to participate in this type of guarantees. 
Banks Loan Ratio has a significantly positive impact on the usage of CLCs and 
Unused Commitments, which indicates informational economies of scope between loans 
and OBS activities, and banks will participate more in OBS activities to reduce their risk 
resulting from loans. However, it is statistically insignificant for SLCs, and significantly 
negative for participations, indicating that participations are a substitute for a bank’s 
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traditional activities (loans) and not used to decrease the risk arising from loans lending 
activities.  
Banks’ profitability significantly and positively affects SLCs and CLCs, and 
significantly negatively affects OBS participations and unused commitments. This 
suggests that SLCs and CLCs contracts are derived from profitability consideration, 
while less profitable banks are more likely to engage in participations and unused 
commitments contracts. The charge-off ratio has a significantly negative impact on OBS 
guarantees except for participations and unused commitments since it was insignificant. 
This implies that banks with larger non-performing loans (proxied by the charge-off 
ratio) may have been disadvantaged in adopting guarantees (CLCs and SLCs) due to a 
lack of credibility. 
Regulatory Banks Specific Factors: Recent evidence suggests that bank 
regulatory factors have no major impact on OBS diffusion pattern. This is supported in 
this study where an insignificant relationship is found between bank capital adequacy 
ratios (CAR) for both groups of banks (below and above the minimum risk-based capital 
standards). Though there is a significantly positive effect of high regulatory pressure on 
unused commitments contracts. This implies that as banks become more capital 
constrained, they will issue more commitments to avoid this capital regulatory constraint. 
The relationship is weakly significant (10% level of significance) and negative in some 
cases of participations. However, as the banks become more capital constrained they 
issue less participations in order to reduce the risk incurred by OBS participations 
contracts. 
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Macroeconomic Factors: It appears that macroeconomic factors have a role to 
play in determining the usage of OBS guarantees. Real GDP has a significantly positive 
impact on the usage of guarantees contracts, which suggests that OBS guarantees 
activities follow the business cycle of the economy and it moves with the size of the 
economy. OBS guarantees will increase when economic growth is high and decrease 
when the economy is slowing down. Interest rate variables seem to play a role in the 
usage of OBS activities. This role comes from the effect of the interest rate spread on the 
usage of OBS guarantees, but the rates themselves (TB, LLY, and LMY) do not affect the 
usage of OBS guarantees. They are all insignificant except for participations. The effect 
of the interest rate spread is significantly negative for all OBS guarantees except for 
SLCs it is insignificant. This suggests that banks engage more in traditional banking 
activities instead of OBS activities when the spread is high, i.e., they will benefit from 
lending at high long term interest rates and borrowing at low short term rates. For 
decisions concerning SLCs banks do not appear to value uncertainty about future interest 
rates. Price level variables also have a role in determining OBS guarantees activities. 
There is a positive relation between share prices and both participations and unused 
commitments, and a negative relation between the consumer price index and both CLCs 
and unused commitments. The balance of payments variables have no major role in 
determining the usage of OBS guarantees; however, the total trade level has a 
significantly positive impact on participations and the total transfer level has a positive 
impact on CLCS and a negative one on participations. 
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2.5. Concluding Remarks:  
This study joins the set of recent studies by rejecting the regulatory tax 
hypothesis and having no major impact on determining banks’ OBS guarantees usage. 
We also conclude that banks OBS guarantees are decreasing over time and that they are 
no longer considered as a financial innovation in the U.S. banking industry. Banks seem 
to have replaced guarantees with other OBS activities such as derivatives. While the 
banks’ regulatory factor is not a major determinant in OBS guarantees, bank’s non-
regulatory factors and macroeconomic factors are at work in determining OBS usage. 
The results also suggest that OBS guarantees follow the business cycle and 
usage decisions might be considered like traditional bank activities. OBS guarantees are 
profit-driven activities and they increase with banks’ profits. Bank size affects OBS 
guarantees negatively which is inconsistent with the market discipline hypothesis and the 
usage of guarantees decreases with bank risk. Finally, a lack of credibility is presented as 
non-performing loans decrease the usage of OBS guarantees in general. 
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Table (2-7): OBS Items’ Definitions10: This table represents OBS guarantees activities 
by products and their brief definitions. It includes four guarantees products (Unused 
Commitments, CLCs, SLCs, and Participations). 
I. Unused Commitments: Includes the following 
1- Unused Commitments - Revolving, Open-End Lines Secured By 1-4 Family Residential Properties: 
Includes the unused portions of commitments to extend credit under revolving, open-end lines of credit 
secured by 1 to 4 family residential properties. These lines, commonly known as home equity lines, are 
typically secured by a junior lien and are usually accessible by check or credit card. 
2 -Unused Commitments - Credit Card Lines: Includes the unused portions of all commitments to extend 
credit both to individuals for household, family, and other personal expenditures and to commercial or 
industrial enterprises through credit cards. Excludes home equity lines accessible through credit cards. 
Banks or bank holding companies may report unused credit card lines as of the end of their customers' last 
monthly billing cycle prior to the report date or as of the report date. 
3- Commercial Real Estate, Construction, And Land Development: Commitments To Fund Loans Secured 
By Real Estate: Includes the unused portions of commitments to extend credit for the specific purpose of 
financing commercial and multifamily residential properties (e.g., business and industrial properties, hotels, 
motels, churches, hospitals, and apartment buildings), provided that such commitments, when funded, are 
reported as either "Loans Secured by Multifamily Residential Properties", or "Loans Secured by Non-farm 
Nonresidential Properties". Also includes the unused portions of commitments to extend credit for the 
specific purpose of financing land development (i.e., the process of improving land - laying sewers, water 
pipes, etc.) preparatory to erecting new structures or the on-site construction of industrial, commercial, 
residential, or farm buildings, provided that such commitments, when funded, would be reported as loans 
secured by real estate in "Construction and Land Development". For this item, "construction" includes not 
only construction of new structures, but also additions or alterations to existing structures and the 
demolition of existing structures to make way for new structures. Also includes loan proceeds the bank or 
bank holding company is obligated to advance as construction progress payments. 
4- Unused Commitments - Securities Underwriting: Includes the unsold portion of the reporting bank's or 
the reporting bank holding company's own take down in securities underwriting transactions on a 
consolidated basis. Also includes note issuance facilities (NIFs) and revolving underwriting facilities 
(RUFs). 
                                                
10 These definitions are taken from the FDIC. 
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5- Unused Commitments-Other: Includes commitments to extend credit through overdraft facilities or 
commercial lines of credit and retail check credit and related plans. Also includes commitments to purchase 
securities or other assets. 
II. Standby Letters of credit: Includes the following 
1- Financial Standby Letters Of Credit And Foreign Office Guarantees: A financial standby letter of credit 
irrevocably obligates the bank to pay a third-party beneficiary when a customer (account party) fails to 
repay an outstanding loan or debt instrument.  
Minus; 
Amount Of Financial Standby Letters Of Credit Conveyed To Others: Includes that portion of the bank's 
total contingent liability for financial standby letters of credit. Also includes that portion of the reporting 
bank's financial standby letters of credit that are backed by other banks' financial standby letters of credit, 
as well as the portion that participating banks have re-participated to others. Participations and backings 
may be for any part or all of a given obligation. 
2- Performance Standby Letters Of Credit: A performance standby letter of credit irrevocably obligates the 
bank to pay a third-party beneficiary when a customer (account party) fails to perform some contractual 
non-financial obligation. 
Minus; 
Amount Of Performance Standby Letters Of Credit Conveyed To Others: Includes that portion of the bank's 
total contingent liability for performance standby letters of credit that the bank has conveyed to others. Also 
includes that portion of the reporting bank's performance standby letters of credit that are backed by other 
banks' financial standby letters of credit, as well as the portion that participating banks have re-participated 
to others. Participations and backings may be for any part or all of a given obligation. 
III. Commercial Letters of Credit: Includes the following 
Commercial And Similar Letters Of Credit: Includes the amount outstanding and unused as of the report 
date of issued or confirmed commercial letters of credit, travelers' letters of credit not issued for money or 
its equivalent, and all similar letters of credit, but excluding standby letters of credit. Legally binding 
commitments to issue commercial letters of credit are reported in this item. 
IV. Participations: Includes the following 
Participations In Acceptances Acquired By The Reporting (Nonaccepting) Bank, Branch Or Agency Or 
Bank Holding Company: Includes the amount of all participations acquired by the reporting (nonaccepting) 
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bank or bank holding company or its consolidated subsidiaries in the acceptances of other (accepting) 
banks or unaffiliated banks that are outstanding, whether acquired from the accepting bank or from others, 
regardless of the nature of participations agreement and regardless of the system of debits and credits used 
to reflect the agreement on the reporting (nonaccepting) bank's or bank holding company's books. Thus, 
participations in acceptances acquired by the reporting (nonaccepting) bank or bank holding company or its 
consolidated subsidiaries includes both those that provide for participations in the risk of loss in the event 
of default by the account party at the time of maturity and those that provide for participations in putting 
the holder of the acceptance in funds at the maturity of the acceptance.  
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Chapter Three 
 
The determinants of OBS Derivatives activities in U.S. Commercial 
Banks 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to test the tax regulatory hypothesis and market discipline 
hypothesis in determining OBS derivatives activities of U.S. commercial 
banks during the period 1996-2005. We employ Mansfield’s (1961) logistic 
diffusion model and we consider OBS derivatives activities as real financial 
innovations following a time trend diffusion curve. The model is modified to 
include regulatory and non-regulatory bank-specific factors in addition to 
macroeconomic factors. The results reveal that OBS derivatives activities 
are real financial innovations that are increasing over time. Another major 
finding is that the regulatory tax hypothesis is not a factor in determining 
OBS derivatives activities by U.S. commercial banks. The results also 
suggest that OBS derivatives do not follow the business cycle notion and the 
usage decision does not depend on economic conditions. OBS derivatives 
follow the economies of scale notion since they require higher qualifications 
and these are more likely available in large size banks. The substitution 
effect is dominant in the case of OBS derivatives and the loan ratio factor. 
Lack of credibility will reduce OBS derivatives activities. While OBS 
derivatives are more likely to be an innovation, they are determined by 
some other factors like technology and learning.  
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The Determinants of OBS Derivatives Activities in U.S. Commercial 
Banks 
3.1. Introduction: 
The last two decades have witnessed an extraordinary increase in the usage of 
OBS activities by financial institutions in general, and in the banking industry more 
noticeably. In 2005, the notional value of on-balance-sheet items was $9.0 trillion 
compared to $108.5 trillion in OBS items for the U.S. banking system. Further, OBS 
activities grew from $10.2 trillion in 1992 to $108.5 trillion in 2005, a rate of change of 
341.2%11. Banks engage in OBS activities hoping to earn additional fee income to 
compensate for declining margins or spreads on their traditional lending business. 
Secondly, they seek to avoid regulatory costs or taxes since reserve requirements and 
deposit insurance premiums are not levied on OBS activities.  
OBS activities have both risk reducing as well as risk increasing attributes and 
the net impact on risk will depend on the ability to manage the risk resulting from 
engaging in these activities. The use of derivatives contracts accelerated during the 1992-
2005 period and accounted for much of the growth in OBS activities. (See figure 1 & 2 
and refer to table 2 for more data evidence). Observe that the notional amount of 
derivatives increased from $8764.91 billion in 1992 to $101914.0 billion in 200512. The 
significant growth in derivative securities activities by commercial banks has been a 
direct response to the increased interest rate risk, credit risk, and foreign exchange risk 
exposures they have faced, both domestically and internationally. These contracts offer 
                                                
11 Refer to table 1 for more detailed data evidence 
12 Same Source. 
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banks a way to hedge these risks without having to make extensive changes on the on-
balance sheet items. 
3.2. The Determinants of OBS Derivatives Activities: 
Following Jagtiani et al. (1995), I employ the logistic model. Mansfield (1961) 
has shown that the adoption pattern of real innovations often follow a logistic time curve. 
OBS derivatives activities (swaps, options, futures, and forwards) will be considered as 
an innovation following the time diffusion pattern. 
This study differs from Jagtinai et al (1955) in several ways. First, they 
consider the important changes in capital requirements during the period of their study by 
imposing dummy variables representing the occurrence of each of the capital requirement 
changes. I will measure the capital requirement factor in line with the analysis of Jacques 
and Nigro (1997) by introducing the concept of regulatory pressure in regard to banks’ 
capital adequacy ratios (CARs). (A detailed discussion of this factor will follow). Second, 
the period of their analysis was limited to 1984 and 1991. I study a more recent time span 
of 1996 to 2005, which includes the most recent regulatory pressure effects. Third, in 
addition to the capital requirement factor and bank specific features, I will add 
macroeconomic conditions as a determinant of OBS derivatives activities. Moreover, 
bank-level panel data is constructed and panel estimation techniques are used. One of the 
main benefits of panel data is that it enables us to identify and measure effects that are 
simply not determined in pure cross-section or pure time-series data. 
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3.3. The Model: 
3.3.1. The Logistic Diffusion Model: 
Mansfield (1961) introduced a deterministic model to answer two questions: 
Why firms were so slow to install some innovations and so quick to install others? What 
factors seem to govern the rate of imitation? His model assumes that the number of firms 
adopting an innovation between time t and time t+1 depends on several factors. First, the 
number of firms that have previously adopted the innovation. The increases in the 
proportion of firms already using an innovation would increase λij(t). As more 
information and experience accumulate, it becomes less risky to begin using it. 
Moreover, competitive pressures mount and “bandwagon” effects occur. Second, the 
profitability of installing the innovation would also be expected to have an important 
influence on λij(t). the more profitable this investment is relative to others that are 
available, the greater is the chance that a firm’s estimate of the profitability will be high 
enough to compensate for whatever risks are involved and that it will seem worthwhile to 
install the new technique rather than to wait. Third, for equally profitable innovations, 
λij(t) should tend to be smaller for those requiring relatively large investments. One 
would expect this on the grounds that firms tend to be more cautious before committing 
themselves to such projects and that they often have more difficulty in financing them. 
Finally, for equally profitable innovations requiring the same investment, λij(t) is likely to 
vary among industries (depending on the risk aversion attitude in each industry). Below is 
the formal derivation of Mansfield (1961) model. 
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Let nij be the total number of firms which adopted the jth innovation in the ith 
industry, mij(t) be the number of these firms having introduced the innovation at time t, πij 
be the profitability of installing this innovation relative to that of alternative investments, 
and Sij be the investment required to install this innovation as a per cent of the average 
total assets of these firms. λij(t) is the proportion of “hold-outs” (firms not using this 
innovation) at time t that introduced it by time t+1, i.e., 
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Assume that the number of firms having introduced an innovation can vary 
continuously rather than only one integer value, and assume that λij(t) can be 
approximated adequately within the relevant range by Taylor’s expansion that drops third 
and higher order terms. Assuming that the coefficient of )
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Thus, 
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Assuming that time is measured in fairly small units, we can use as an approximation the 
corresponding differential equation 
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Where ijα is a constant of integration, ijθ is the sum of all terms in (3) not 
containing
ij
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n
tm )(
, and ijβ  is the coefficient of 
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Add another assumption, as we go backward in time, the number of firms having 
introduced the innovation must tend to zero, i.e., 
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t
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Thus, the growth over time in the number of firms having introduced an 
innovation should conform to a logistic function. The logistic time curve, equation (9), 
predicts that the proportion of the population which has already adopted the innovation 
will increase at an accelerating rate until 50 percent adoption achieved, this is attained at t 
= -(α/β). Thereafter, the adoption will increase at a decelerating rate and 100 percent 
adoption is approached asymptotically. 
If equation 9 is correct, it can be shown that the rate of imitation is governed 
by only one parameter ijβ . Assuming that the unspecified terms in (7) is uncorrelated 
with πij and Sij and that it can be treated as a random error term, then it follows from 9 
)10.......(........................................)1(ln tP
P
it
it βα +=


−
 
where Pit is the ratio of OBS items (in nominal terms) to the nominal value of 
total assets (defined as on-balance sheet assets + OBS items) of bank i at time t. this 
definition follows Jagtiani et al. (1995) which enables us to counter for the scale on 
which bank introduce OBS items. 
3.3.2. The Empirical Model: 
Starting from equation (10), I will add two factor vectors; the first to control 
for bank-specific characteristics and the other to capture the macroeconomic conditions. 
The choice of these factors is based on both theoretical literature and from policy 
discussions. Accordingly, equation (11) is the modified econometric model from equation 
(10). 
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where i = 1,2,3,….,N denotes the number of banks and t = 1,2,3,…T denotes 
the number of time periods. The dependent variable, LGTDERVit is the logistic 
transformation of Pit, where Pit is the ratio of OBS derivatives items (in nominal terms) to 
the nominal value of total assets (defined as on-balance sheet assets + OBS items) of 
bank i at time t. This definition follows Jagtiani et al (1995) which enables us to control 
for the scale on which banks introduce OBS items. The explanatory variables are shown 
below. (Refer to table 3 for a summary of the variables and their proxies, predicted signs, 
and the rational of the relation). 
i-The time trend (t) accounts for the autonomous diffusion. 
ii-Xit is a vector of bank-specific characteristics. 
iii-Yit is a vector of general macroeconomic conditions. 
iv-The intercept α is a bank-specific constant. 
The bank-specific characteristics are classified into regulatory and non-
regulatory variables. The non-regulatory factors are bank size, loan ratio, profitability, 
and net charge-off. The anticipated effect of bank size has a two-sided effect and the net 
effect of these two determines the net impact of firm size on OBS derivatives activities. 
On the one hand, a bank has to be of a certain size in order to get involved in OBS 
derivatives activities and get the benefit of the economies of scale. Moreover, large banks 
may be the only banks that have the high qualified risk management and specialized staff. 
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Also, sophisticated clients who are more likely to engage in OBS derivatives activities 
may not consider the small-sized banks as an option as they believe that large banks are 
too big to fail. On the other hand, as bank size gets bigger the bank is likely more risk-
diversified and there will be fewer incentives to engage in OBS derivatives activities. 
The impact of the loan ratio (the ratio of loans to total assets) on the usage of 
OBS derivatives activities is expected to be positive and significant. Angbazo (1997) 
shows that a higher loan ratio will increase the interest rate risk which will create an 
incentive for banks to hedge using OBS derivatives activities. Another reason for this 
positive relation is in the process of approving loans; banks get access to their customers’ 
investment information which will facilitate the offer of relevant OBS derivatives risk 
management tools. 
A positive relation is expected between profitability and OBS derivatives 
activities. Profitability is considered as a measure of the creditworthiness viewed by 
customers. Profitability will increase the customer valuation for a bank which in turns 
will give more incentives to work with profitable banks rather than a non-profitable (less-
profitable) one. 
The net charge-off is a proxy for non-performing loans that banks assign for 
bad debt loans. The predicted impact of non-performing loans is negative, so as the 
amount of non-performing loans increases the bank’s creditworthiness decreases, and that 
will decrease the amount of OBS derivatives activities. One may argue that as the charge-
off amount increases that means the default risk for that bank is high and then a risk 
management instrument might be needed to hedge against this risk and generate another 
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income source to compensate for the bad loans loss. Therefore an increase in the charge 
off amount might have a positive impact on OBS derivatives activities. 
With respect to regulatory factors, following Jacques and Nigro (1997), I 
consider the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) as a proxy for capital requirements regulations. 
CAR is a measure of a bank’s capital, used to protect depositors and promote the stability 
and efficiency of financial systems around the world13. There are two possible effects of 
the CAR on the diffusion pattern of OBS derivatives items. On the one hand, a higher 
CAR increases a bank’s creditworthiness, which in turn will increase the incentives of 
bank’s customers to work with this bank’s OBS derivatives risk managements items. On 
the other hand, a higher CAR reduces a bank’s marginal gain from increasing the risk in 
the asset portfolio (Furlong and Keeley, 1989). As bank capital increases, the ability to 
assume risks increases, but the need for OBS derivatives products to hedge risk exposure 
may decrease. I also examine the response of banks to the 8% well capitalized total risk-
based capital (RBC) standards on the capital ratio. I classify the banks into two groups 
CARL, CARH as a signal to the degree of regulatory pressure brought about by the risk-
based capital standards on capital ratio, because banks with total CAR above and below 
the 8 percent regulatory minimum may react differently. Specifically, the low regulatory 
pressure variable (CARL) equals the difference between the inverse of the bank’s actual 
CAR and the inverse of the regulatory stipulated CAR of 8 percent, i.e., CARL equals 
(1/CAR-1/8) for all banks with a total risk-based capital ratio less than 8 per cent, and 
                                                
13 CAR can be expressed as
edAssetsRiskWeight
talTierIICapialTierICapitCAR += . It is also called the capital to risk 
weighted assets ratio (CRAR). 
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zero otherwise14. The high regulatory pressure variable (CARH) equals the difference 
between the inverse of the regulatory stipulated CAR of 8 percent and bank’s actual 
CAR, i.e.,  CARH equals (1/8-1/CAR) for all banks with a total risk-based capital ratio 
greater than 8 per cent, and zero otherwise. High regulatory pressure with respect to 
capital implies low creditworthiness and can be expected to translate into lower OBS 
activity. On the other hand, low regulatory pressure, as implied by CRAL, signifies a 
comfortable capital position and (accompanied with a high credit rating) makes a bank an 
active supplier of OBS products (Koppenhaver and Stover, 1991). Alternatively, low 
regulatory pressure reduces the marginal propensity of a bank to increase the risk in its 
asset portfolio (Furlong and Keeley, 1989). Therefore, banks with high capital ratios 
(implying low regulatory pressure) can be expected to take less OBS risk and hence, 
supply a smaller volume of OBS items. 
The macroeconomic vector includes four categories; first, general economic 
performance measure (the real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP)), second, price level 
measures (shares price, consumer price index), the shares price having measured by the 
S&P price index, third, interest rates measures (the difference between the long and the 
short-term interest rate (INTSPRD)15, short-term interest rate, mid-term interest rate, and 
long-term interest rate), and fourth, balance of payment measures (total trade in goods, 
total trade in services, total trade income, total transfers, and total capital transactions). 
                                                
14 Risk – Based Assessment System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC. They specified three 
groups in terms of RBC standards, Group 1 - "Well Capitalized." Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio equal to 
or greater than 10 percent. Group 2 - "Adequately Capitalized." Not Well Capitalized and Total Risk-Based 
Capital Ratio equal to or greater than 8 percent. Group 3 - "Undercapitalized" Neither Well Capitalized nor 
Adequately Capitalized.  
15 The long-term interest rate is proxied as the interest rate on long term Government bonds. The short-term 
interest rate is proxied as the interest rate the short term Treasury Bills. 
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Real GDP captures the effects caused by fluctuations in general economic 
activity. Two arguments can be made about the impact of the real GDP and the usage of 
OBS activities. First, the demand for OBS products reacts positively to the business cycle 
due to a transactions motive. Second, business risk decreases in economic boom periods 
which lead to less demand for risk management techniques (OBS activities). The interest 
rate spread also encounters two arguments. First, a high and positive interest rate spread 
signals a high degree of uncertainty about future interest rates and that short-term interest 
rates are expected to rise in the future. High interest rate risk and future interest rate 
increase imply a relatively high demand for OBS products. Second, when the spread 
between short term and long term is high and positive, then bank’s managers have 
incentives to engage in traditional on-balance sheet activities and take the advantage of 
low short-term interest rate funding and high long - term interest rate lending. As a result 
a bank’s manager will be less attracted to engaging OBS activities. The effect of the 
interest rate variables (short, mid, and long–term rates) will depend on the side we are 
considering, whether it is the customer’s point of view or the bank’s point of view, and 
also on the investment horizon for both of them (short term or long term). For example, 
short term investors-the word investors can be viewed as a bank or individual-will 
increase their lending when the short term rate increases and that will affect OBS 
activities negatively, while long term investors will prefer not to lend on the current 
interest rate and will prefer to go to OBS activities.  
The CPI variable may affect OBS activities negatively as it will affect the 
purchasing power of the economy and then the saving level in the economy and all the 
banks activities in general (on and off balance sheet). And also when the purchasing 
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power of customers decrease, aggregate demand in the economy decreases which in turn 
reduces all trade transactions domestically and internationally, which will affect OBS 
activities negatively. The shares price effect may include two arguments. One is positive, 
and the other one is negative. The positive one is that when share prices increase then the 
corporation in the country market value will increase and then it will expand its operation 
and that will increase OBS transactions. The negative impact is that when the shares price 
increases the investors will increase their investment in the stock market and will reduce 
saving, banks activities including OBS activities. All balance of payments variables are 
expected to increase the usage of OBS activities as more international transactions will 
increase the need for OBS activities. 
3.4. Data Sources: 
The data set is drawn from the report of income and condition reported to the 
Federal Depository Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for all commercial banks in the United 
States of America during the period of March 1996 to December 2005, i.e. there will be a 
40 quarters data set. Balanced data sets are constructed in a panel data format; banks with 
discontinuous data were omitted from the data sets which will reduce the noise in the 
estimate. The number of banks is mainly based on the availability of OBS derivatives 
items data, we have 67, 62, 20, 19 banks included in the data sets for Swaps, Options, 
Forwards, and Futures, respectively.  
Off-Balance Sheet Derivatives Variables include four items chosen from the 
report of income and condition-schedule RC-L. The four items are Swaps, Options, 
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Forwards, and Futures16. OBS Derivatives items are calculated as the ratio of the notional 
amount of each OBS item to the total assets then taking the logistic transformation as 
indicated in the model specification previously. Total assets are defined as the summation 
of the on-balance sheet total assets and OBS total asset. This is to counter for the scale on 
which banks introduce OBS items. 
The On-Balance Sheet Variables are also collected from the call reports by the 
banks with the FDIC. The macroeconomic variables are collected from the IFS data base. 
The interest rate spread represents the difference between the 10-year Treasury bond 
yield rate and the 3–month Treasury bill yield rate. The short term rate is measured by the 
short term Treasury bill, mid-term rate is measured by the mid-term, 3-year treasury bond 
rate, and the long term rate is measured by the long term Treasury bill rate. The share 
prices are the S&P price index. The total trade in goods is the sum of the total exports and 
imports of goods, the total services is the total exports and imports of services, total trade 
income is the sum of the total credit and debit income, and total transfers is the sum of 
the total credit and debit transfers, and the total capital is also the sum of the credit and 
debit sides of the capital account. 
3.5. Empirical Results: 
In this section we present the results of our estimates of the logistic diffusion 
model for OBS Derivatives. Tables (4 - 7) present the estimates for the logistic diffusion 
model for four OBS derivatives contracts (Swaps, Options, Forwards, Futures)17. It is 
                                                
16 Please refer to table (3-8) for detailed components and definition for each one of these items. 
 
17 Please refer to table (3-8) for detailed components and definition for each one of these items. 
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interesting that none of the included factors are significant in determining futures usage 
by U.S. commercial banks. This may be because a relatively small number of banks 
participated in futures activity. 
Time Diffusion Speed: There are significantly positive coefficients for the 
swaps, options, and forwards activities; this implies that these two activities follow the 
financial innovation diffusion model over time. And OBS derivatives have taken place 
over OBS guarantees. 
Non-Regulatory Bank Specific Factors: There is a higher significance of these 
factors on derivatives activities more than guarantees activities. Specifically, a bank’s 
size has a significantly positive impact on swaps and options contracts. This implies that 
there is an economy of scale impact on the use of swaps and options that can be justified 
as they are more complicated contracts and need more qualified staff to manage these 
contracts which are more likely available in large-size banks. There is a negative impact 
on forward contracts which seems to be more related to a bank’s risk that should decrease 
with size level. 
Banks’ Loan Ratios have a significantly positive impact on the usage of the 
swaps, which indicates an informational economy of scope between loans and OBS 
derivatives activities, and banks will participate more in OBS activities to reduce their 
risk resulting from loans. However, it is statistically insignificant for futures. But it is 
significantly negative for options and forwards which indicate they are substitutes for 
banks’ traditional activities (loans) and not used to decrease the risk arising from lending 
activities. 
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Banks’ Profitability is statistically insignificant for all OBS derivatives 
contracts. The charge–off ratio has a significantly negative impact on all OBS derivatives 
activities except for forwards. The negative charge-off coefficients imply that banks with 
more non-performing loans (proxied by the charge-off ratio) may have been 
disadvantaged in adopting derivatives due to a lack of credibility. 
Regulatory Banks’ Specific Factors: the CAR has no significant effect in 
determining the usage of OBS derivatives. This implies, consistent with some recent 
trend, that capital regulations are not considered as a major factor in OBS derivatives 
usage decision-making. However, we have significantly positive coefficients for forwards 
and options contracts for the low regulatory pressure banks. This can be explained as the 
bank’s capital position is more comfortable, they have a high credit rating which implies 
that banks will increase the issuance of forwards. We also have a significantly negative 
coefficient for swaps and futures contracts for the high regulatory pressure banks which 
can be explained as high regulatory pressure with respect to capital implies low 
creditworthiness and can be expected to translate into lower derivatives activities. In 
other words, as banks are capital constrained and have higher regulatory pressure then 
they are required to either increase their risk weighted capital or decrease their capital. 
Swaps and forwards seems to be used to achieve this purpose. 
Macroeconomic Factors have no significant impact on OBS derivatives 
activities. This suggests that OBS derivatives do not follow economic growth and the 
business cycle and that there are other factors affecting the usage of derivatives. More 
specifically, Real GDP coefficients are statistically insignificant for all OBS derivatives 
activities except for options contracts where it is significantly negative. This indicates 
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less need for the risk management instruments when an economy is in a high growth 
phase and vice-versa. Interest rate variables play no important role in the usage of OBS 
derivatives activities. The interest rate spread has a statistically insignificant impact on 
OBS derivatives activities except for the forward contracts. This suggests that banks do 
not value the uncertainty about future interest rates when they consider OBS contracts 
decisions. The significantly negative impact of the interest rate spread on forward 
contracts can be explained by the substitution effect between traditional banks activities 
and OBS activities. Short–term treasury bills and mid-term treasury bills are insignificant 
for derivatives while long-term treasury bill rates are significantly negative for options 
and forwards. This can be explained by the fact that banks prefer to deal with the long-
term lending activities when the interest rates are high.  Price level variables also have a 
role in determining OBS derivatives activities. There is a negative relation between share 
prices and both options and futures, and a negative relation between the CPI and both 
swaps and forwards. The balance of payments variables unexpectedly have no significant 
role in determining the usage of OBS derivatives. However there is a significantly 
negative impact of the total trade level on options and the total transfers level has a 
negative impact on forward OBS contracts. 
3.6. Concluding Remarks:  
The results indicate that OBS derivatives usage is increasing over time and 
follows the financial innovation trend in the banking industry. I conclude that regulatory 
factors are not a major factor in determining the usage of OBS derivatives activities, 
while bank’s non-regulatory factors and macroeconomic factors are at work in 
determining OBS derivatives usage.  
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Banks specific factors affect OBS derivatives but in different directions. The 
relationship between a bank’s size and OBS derivatives is positive which is consistent 
with the economies of scale notion since derivatives require higher qualifications than 
other OBS activities and that they are more likely available in large size banks. The 
substitution effect is dominant in the case of OBS derivatives and the loan-ratio factor. 
Non-performing loans will decrease the usage of OBS derivatives activities in general 
due to a lack of credibility. The results also suggest that OBS derivatives do not follow 
the business cycle and the usage decision does not depend on economic conditions. OBS 
derivatives are more likely to be an innovation and are determined by some other factors 
like technology and learning. 
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Table (3-8): OBS Items’ Definitions 19: This table represents OBS derivatives activities 
by products and brief definitions. It includes four derivatives products (Swaps, Option, 
Forwards, and Futures). 
V. Swaps Contracts: Includes the following 
1-Interest Rate Swaps: Is a transaction in which two parties agree to exchange payment streams based on a 
specified notional amount for a specified period. Forward starting swap contracts are reported as swaps. 
The notional amount of a swap is the underlying principal amount upon which the exchange of interest, 
foreign exchange or other income or expense is based. The notional amount to be reported for a swap 
contract with a multiplier component is the contract's effective notional amount. In those cases where the 
reporting entity is acting as an intermediary, both sides of the transaction are reported.  
2-Foreign Exchange Swaps: Is a transaction in which two parties agree to exchange principal amounts of 
different currencies, usually at the prevailing spot rate, at the inception of an agreement which lasts for a 
certain number of years. At defined intervals over the life of the swap, the counter parties exchange 
payments in the different currencies based on specified rates of interest. When the agreement matures, the 
principal amount is re-exchanged at the same spot rate. The notional amount of a cross-currency interest 
rate swap is generally the underlying principal amount upon which the exchange is based. 
3-Equity Exchange Swaps: Includes the notional amount of all outstanding equity or equity index swaps, 
whether the swap is undertaken by the reporting entity to hedge its own equity-based risk, in an 
intermediary capacity, or to hold in inventory. 
4- Commodity Exchange Swaps: Includes the notional principal value of all other swap agreements that are 
not reportable as either interest rate or foreign exchange rate contracts. 
VI. Futures Contracts: Includes the following 
1- Interest rate Futures: Futures contracts represents agreements for delayed delivery of financial 
instruments or commodities in which the buyer agrees to purchase and the seller agrees to deliver, at a 
specified future date, a specified instrument at a specified price or yield. Futures contracts are standardized 
and are traded on organized exchanges that act as the counterparty to each contract. 
2- Foreign Exchange Future Contracts: A currency futures contract is a standardized agreement for 
delayed delivery of a foreign currency or U.S. dollar exchange in which the buyer agrees to purchase and 
                                                
19 These definitions are taken from the FDIC. 
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the seller agrees to deliver, at a specified future date, a specified amount at a specified exchange rate. 
3- Equity Exchange Futures Contracts: Includes futures contracts committing the reporting entity to 
purchase or sell equity securities or instruments based on equity indexes such as the Standard and Poor's 
500 or the Nikkei. 
4- Commodity Exchange futures contracts: Includes the contract amount for all futures contracts 
committing the reporting entity to purchase or sell commodities such as agricultural products (e.g., wheat, 
coffee), precious metals (e.g., gold, platinum), and non-ferrous metals (e.g., copper, zinc). Also included is 
any other futures contract that is not reportable as an interest rate, foreign exchange, or equity derivative 
contracts. 
VII. Forwards: Includes the following 
1- Interest rate Forwards contracts: represents agreements for delayed delivery of financial instruments or 
commodities in which the buyer agrees to purchase and the seller agrees to deliver, at a specified future 
date, a specified instrument or commodity at a specified price or yield. Forward contracts are not traded on 
organized exchanges and their contractual terms are not standardized. 
2- Foreign Exchange Forwards Contracts: is an agreement for delayed delivery of a foreign (non-U.S.) 
currency or U.S. dollar exchange in which the buyer agrees to purchase and the seller agrees to deliver, at a 
specified future date, a specified amount at a specified exchange rate. 
3- Equity Exchange Contracts: Includes forward contracts committing the reporting entity to purchase or 
sell equity instruments. 
4- Commodity Exchange Contracts: Includes the contract amount for all forward contracts committing the 
reporting entity to purchase or sell commodities such as agricultural products (e.g., wheat, coffee), precious 
metals (e.g., gold, platinum), and non-ferrous metals (e.g., copper, zinc). Also included is any other forward 
contract that is not reportable as an interest rate, foreign exchange, or equity derivative contract. 
VIII. Options: Includes the following 
1- Written Exchange-Traded Interest Rate Option Contracts: Option contracts convey either the right or the 
obligation, depending upon whether the reporting entity is the purchaser or the writer, respectively, to buy 
or sell a financial instrument or commodity at a specified price by a specified future date. Some options are 
traded on organized exchanges. The buyer of an option contract has, for compensation (such as a fee or 
premium), acquired the right (or option) to sell to, or purchase from, another party some financial 
instrument or commodity at a stated price on a specified future date. The seller of the contract has, for such 
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compensation, become obligated to purchase or sell the financial instrument or commodity at the option of 
the buyer of the contract. A put option contract obligates the seller of the contract to purchase some 
financial instrument or commodity at the option of the buyer of the contract. A call option contract 
obligates the seller of the contract to sell some financial instrument or commodity at the option of the buyer 
of the contract. 
2- Written Exchange-Traded Foreign Exchange Option Contracts: Includes the gross amount (stated in 
U.S. dollars) of foreign (non-U.S.) currency and U.S. dollar exchange that the reporting entity has, for 
compensation, obligated itself to either purchase or sell under exchange-traded option contracts whose 
predominant risk characteristic is foreign exchange risk. In the case of option contracts obligating the 
reporting entity to either purchase or sell a foreign exchange futures contract, the gross amount (stated in 
U.S. dollars) of the foreign (non-U.S.) currency underlying the futures contract is reported. Exchange-
traded options on major currencies such as the Japanese Yen, British Pound Sterling and French Franc and 
options on futures contracts of major currencies are examples of such contracts. 
3- Written Exchange-Traded Equity Derivative Option Contracts: Includes the contract amount for those 
exchange-traded option contracts where the reporting entity has obligated itself, for compensation, to 
purchase or sell an equity instrument or equity index. 
4- Written Exchange-Traded Commodity And Other Exchange-Traded Option Contracts: Includes the 
contract amount for those exchange-traded option contracts where the reporting entity has obligated itself, 
for compensation, to purchase or sell a commodity or product. Also included is any other written, 
exchange-traded option that is not reportable as an interest rate, foreign exchange, or equity derivative 
contract. 
5- Purchased Exchange-Traded Interest Rate Option Contracts: For exchange-traded option contracts 
giving the reporting entity the right to either purchase or sell an interest rate futures contract and whose 
predominant risk characteristic is interest rate risk, the par value of the financial instrument underlying the 
futures contract is reported. An example of such a contract is a Chicago Board Options Exchange option on 
the 13-week Treasury bill rate. 
6- Purchased Exchange-Traded Foreign Exchange Option Contracts: Includes the gross amount (stated in 
U.S. dollars) of foreign (non-U.S.) currency and U.S. dollar exchange that the reporting entity has, for a 
fee, purchased the right to either purchase or sell under exchange-traded option contracts whose 
predominant risk characteristic is foreign exchange risk. In the case of option contracts giving the reporting 
entity the right to either purchase or sell a currency futures contract, the gross amount (stated in U.S. 
dollars) of the foreign (non-U.S.) currency underlying the futures contract is reported. Exchange-traded 
options on major currencies such as the Japanese Yen, British Pound Sterling and French Franc and options 
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on futures contracts of major currencies are examples of such contracts. 
 
7- Purchased Exchange-Traded Equity Derivative Option Contracts: Includes the contract amount for 
those exchange-traded option contracts where the reporting entity has, for a fee, purchased the right to 
purchase or sell an equity instrument or equity index. 
8- Purchased Exchange-Traded Commodity And Other Exchange-Traded Option Contracts: Includes the 
contract amount for those exchange-traded option contracts where the reporting entity has, for a fee, 
purchased the right to purchase or sell a commodity or product. Also included is any other purchased, 
exchange-traded option that is not reportable as an interest rate, foreign exchange, or equity derivative 
contract. 
9- Written OTC Interest Rate Option Contracts: Option contracts conveys either the right or the obligation, 
depending upon whether the reporting bank is the purchaser or the writer, respectively, to buy or sell a 
financial instrument or commodity at a specified price by a specified future date. Options can be written to 
meet the specialized needs of the counterparties to the transaction. These customized option contracts are 
known as over-the-counter (OTC) options. Thus, over-the-counter option contracts include all option 
contracts not traded on an organized exchange. The buyer of an option contract has, for compensation (such 
as a fee or premium), acquired the right (or option) to sell to, or purchase from, another party some 
financial instrument or commodity at a stated price on a specified future date. The seller of the contract has, 
for such compensation, become obligated to purchase or sell the financial instrument or commodity at the 
option of the buyer of the contract. A put option contract obligates the seller of the contract to purchase 
some financial instrument or commodity at the option of the buyer of the contract. A call option contract 
obligates the seller of the contract to sell some financial instrument or commodity at the option of the buyer 
of the contract. 
10- Written OTC Foreign Exchange Option Contracts: A written currency option contract conveys the 
obligation to exchange two different currencies at a specified exchange rate. Includes the gross amount 
(stated in U.S. dollars) of foreign (non-U.S.) currency and U.S. dollar exchange that the reporting entity 
has, for compensation, obligated itself to either purchase or sell under OTC option contracts whose 
predominant risk characteristic is foreign exchange risk. 
11- Written OTC Equity Derivative Option Contracts: Includes the contract amount for those OTC option 
contracts where the reporting entity has obligated itself, for compensation, to purchase or sell an equity 
instrument or equity index. 
12- Written OTC Commodity And Other OTC Option Contracts: Includes the contract amount for those 
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OTC option contracts where the reporting entity has obligated itself, for compensation, to purchase or sell a 
commodity or product. Included are any other written OTC option that is not reportable as an interest rate, 
foreign exchange, or equity derivative contract. 
13- Purchased OTC Interest Rate Option Contracts: Interest rate options includes options to purchase and 
sell interest-bearing financial instruments and whose predominant risk characteristic is interest rate risk as 
well as contracts known as caps, floors, collars, corridors, and swaptions. Included is the notional principal 
amount for interest rate caps and floors that the reporting entity purchases. 
14- Purchased OTC Foreign Exchange Option Contracts: Includes the gross amount (stated in U.S. 
dollars) of foreign (non-U.S.) currency and U.S. dollar exchange that the reporting entity has, for a fee, 
purchased the right to either purchase or sell under OTC option contracts whose predominant risk 
characteristic is foreign exchange risk. 
15- Purchased OTC Equity Derivative Option Contracts: Includes the contract amount of those OTC 
option contracts where the reporting entity has, for a fee, purchased the right to purchase or sell an equity 
instrument or equity index. 
16- Purchased OTC Commodity And Other OTC Option Contracts: Includes the contract amount for those 
OTC option contracts where the reporting entity has, for a fee, purchased the right to purchase or sell a 
commodity or product. Included are any other purchased OTC option that is not reportable as an interest 
rate, foreign exchange, or equity derivative contract. 
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Chapter Four 
 
The Determinants of World Commercial Banks’ Off-Balance Sheet 
Activities: World Regions Comparison 
 
 
Abstract 
This study tries to fill the gap in the literature by examining the determinants 
of OBS activities in major world regions. Based on a logistic diffusion model 
we have formed two models; one includes only quantitative variables (QVM) 
and the other one (QLVM) includes qualitative variables in addition to the 
quantitative ones. The model considers OBS activities as a financial 
innovation following a time diffusion curve. The results suggest that OBS 
activities are no longer a financial innovation in the developed regions; 
however, they are in less developed regions. Second, bank non-regulatory 
variables are major factors in determining the usage of OBS activities in 
almost all regions. Bank size, bank loans, and non-performing loans are 
significant in six regions and insignificant in three regions. OBS activities are 
not profit driven hence the profitability factor was insignificant for six 
regions. The macroeconomic variable is at work with other variables in 
determining OBS existence in the banking systems’ activities. Consistent with 
recent research, our results reject the regulatory tax hypothesis except for 
Africa, the Far East and Central Asia. More interestingly, Financial Systems, 
Economy Endowments and Political Environments are all factors to explain 
the extensive usage of OBS activities in the world and should not be neglected. 
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The Determinants of Commercial Banks’ Off-Balance Sheet Activities: 
World Regions Comparison 
 
4.1. Introduction: 
Financial systems around the globe always try to move in the same trend, 
especially when we consider the revolution of globalization. As an important part of 
globalization, financial systems for each party must, directly or indirectly, follow the 
innovative trend in the system, otherwise they will not be able to get at least the 
minimum globalization benefits. One of these innovations that we have seen in the last 
two decades is off-balance sheet (OBS) activities which have been adopted by almost all 
financial systems in the world. Financial institutions around the world have made 
extensive use of OBS activities, though below the level of those in the U.S. The reasons 
that foreign banks are engaging in OBS activities are the same as those for U.S. 
commercial banks. Banks engage in OBS activities hoping to earn additional fee income 
to compensate for declining margins or spreads on their traditional lending business 
or/and to avoid regulatory costs or taxes since reserve requirements and deposit insurance 
premiums are not levied on OBS activities.  
Given the fact that OBS activities are being used extensively in almost all 
banking systems in the world, and given that each region in the world has its own 
political, technological, economic characteristics, we believe that the determinants of a 
bank’s OBS activities will be different from one region to another based on the 
distinguishing characteristics for each region. For example, we should not expect that the 
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banking system in Africa is designed in the same way as the banking system in Europe 
and that the same factors will affect the decisions of OBS bank’s activities in both 
regions.  
Table (2) shows some statistical evidence about OBS usage in the banking 
systems of different regions. The ratio of the aggregated OBS activities to aggregated 
total assets for each region is significantly different. For example, the aggregated amount 
of OBS activities in Eastern Europe, South and Central America, Africa and The Far East 
and Central Asia equals 15%, 12%, 18%, 12% of the total assets in 2005, respectively, 
compared to 60%, 63%, 41% for North America, NAFTA, and G7 countries, 
respectively. Also, the low OBS/Total Assets ratio is associated with a relatively higher 
total assets value when compared to the regions with higher OBS/Total Assets ratio. That 
indicates that low OBS/Total Assets ratio regions prefer to rely on traditional banking 
activities instead of OBS activities and this difference might be a result of a region’s 
specific characteristics. 
Figure (1) reports OBS/TA ratios. As seen in the diagram there is wide 
variation in the ratio from one region to another. More specifically, the OBS/TA ratio is 
higher for those regions that include developed countries than those with less developed 
countries. The highest OBS/TA ratio exists in the G7 region with an average of 121.2% 
during the period between 1992 and 2005; the G7 region also exhibits extremely high 
year-to-year variation in this ratio. For example, in 1992 the ratio was 267%, it then 
dropped to 87% in 1995, jumping up a little higher at 92% in 1998. It increased to 119% 
in 2001 followed by a period of decline to 41% in 2005. The European Union has a 
relatively moderate ratio level; however, the year 2001 has an extreme high ratio of 
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around 350% while the average during the period of consideration was around 27% 
(excluding 2001). The ratio for North America and NAFTA was stable over this time 
period and was around an average of 59%, which is the second highest ratio. The 
OBS/TA ratio is relatively small and relatively stable for the remaining regions: Eastern 
Europe, South and Central America, Africa, The Far East and Central Asia, and The 
Middle East. The average ratio for these regions was moving in the range of 6.8% - 
44.4% in the time period under study. The lowest ratio is seen in The Far East and 
Central Asia and interestingly, the highest ratio among these regions was The Middle 
East. This is probably caused by the oil exports agreements in these countries. Also it is 
worth mentioning that this ratio varies widely from year to year which can possibly be 
due to oil supply and demand shocks. 
Our research will try to determine the motivation behind the usage of OBS 
activities in banking system in different regions of the world. To our knowledge no one 
has attempted to study this wide range of investigation. There will be two levels to this 
study, first we check the determinants of OBS activities in each region, and second we 
examine the impact of other qualitative variables such as political environments and 
technological endowments for each region in deciding to use OBS banking activities. The 
research is designed as follows. In the next section, we present our empirical model and 
the following section will discuss our empirical results. The last section will be the 
conclusion. 
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4.2. The Logistic Diffusion Model: 
Mansfield (1961) introduced a deterministic model to answer two questions: 
Why firms were so slow to install some innovations and so quick to install others? What 
factors seem to govern the rate of imitation? His model assumes that the number of firms 
adopting an innovation between time t and time t+1 depends on several factors. First, the 
number of firms that have previously adopted the innovation. The increases in the 
proportion of firms already using an innovation would increase λij(t). As more 
information and experience accumulate, it becomes less risky to begin using it. 
Moreover, competitive pressures mount and “bandwagon” effects occur. Second, the 
profitability of installing the innovation would also be expected to have an important 
influence on λij(t). the more profitable this investment is relative to others that are 
available, the greater is the chance that a firm’s estimate of the profitability will be high 
enough to compensate for whatever risks are involved and that it will seem worthwhile to 
install the new technique rather than to wait. Third, for equally profitable innovations, 
λij(t) should tend to be smaller for those requiring relatively large investments. One 
would expect this on the grounds that firms tend to be more cautious before committing 
themselves to such projects and that they often have more difficulty in financing them. 
Finally, for equally profitable innovations requiring the same investment, λij(t) is likely to 
vary among industries (depending on the risk aversion attitude in each industry). Below is 
the formal derivation of Mansfield (1961) model. 
Let nij be the total number of firms which adopted the jth innovation in the ith 
industry, mij(t) be the number of these firms having introduced the innovation at time t, πij 
be the profitability of installing this innovation relative to that of alternative investments, 
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and Sij be the investment required to install this innovation as a per cent of the average 
total assets of these firms. λij(t) is the proportion of “hold-outs” (firms not using this 
innovation) at time t that introduced it by time t+1, i.e., 
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Assume that the number of firms having introduced an innovation can vary 
continuously rather than only one integer value, and assume that λij(t) can be 
approximated adequately within the relevant range by Taylor’s expansion that drops third 
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Assuming that time is measured in fairly small units, we can use as an approximation the 
corresponding differential equation 
 84
( ) )5(..............................)()()( 



+−=
ij
ij
ijijijij
ij
n
tm
tmn
dt
tdm βθ  
The solution of which, 
)6.(....................
1
)( )(
)(
t
ij
ijt
ij
ij ijijij
ijijij
e
en
tm βθα
βθα
β
θ
++
++
+


 


−
=  
Where ijα is a constant of integration, ijθ is the sum of all terms in (3) not 
containing
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Add another assumption, as we go backward in time, the number of firms having 
introduced the innovation must tend to zero, i.e., 
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Thus, the growth over time in the number of firms having introduced an 
innovation should conform to a logistic function. The logistic time curve, equation (9), 
predicts that the proportion of the population which has already adopted the innovation 
will increase at an accelerating rate until 50 percent adoption achieved, this is attained at t 
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= -(α/β). Thereafter, the adoption will increase at a decelerating rate and 100 percent 
adoption is approached asymptotically. 
If equation 9 is correct, it can be shown that the rate of imitation is governed 
by only one parameter ijβ . Assuming that the unspecified terms in (7) is uncorrelated 
with πij and Sij and that it can be treated as a random error term, then it follows from 9 
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where Pit is the ratio of OBS items (in nominal terms) to the nominal value of total assets 
(defined as on-balance sheet assets + OBS items) of bank i at time t. this definition 
follows Jagtiani et al. (1995) which enables us to counter for the scale on which bank 
introduce OBS items. 
4.3. The Empirical Models: 
Equation (10) is modified in two fashions; the first includes a set of 
quantitative variables in both the bank specific characteristics and macroeconomic 
variables. Let us call this model the quantitative variables model (QVM). The second 
includes qualitative variables in addition to the same quantitative variables. Let us call 
this model the qualitative variables model (QLVM). The first model will be applied to 
nine separate world regions, while the second model will be applied on a world wide data 
set. 
4.3.1. The Quantitative Variables Model (QVM) [World Regions Analysis]: 
4.3.1.1. The Model: 
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The choice of the included explanatory factors is based on both theoretical 
literature and on policy discussions. A bank-specific characteristics vector will include 
both regulatory and non-regulatory variables. Accordingly, equation (11) represents 
banks’ OBS activities diffusion model for each region. 
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where i = 1,2,3,….,n denotes the number of banks and t = 1,2,3,…T denotes 
the number of time periods. The dependent variable, LGTOBSit is the logistic 
transformation of Pit, where Pit is the ratio of OBS items (in nominal terms) to the 
nominal value of total assets (defined as on-balance sheet assets + OBS items) of bank i 
at time t. This definition follows Jagtiani et al (1995) which enables us to control for the 
scale on which banks introduce OBS items. The explanatory variables are as follows: 
v-The time trend (t) accounts for the autonomous diffusion. 
vi-Xit is a vector of bank-specific characteristics. 
vii-Yit is a vector of general macroeconomic conditions. 
viii-The intercept α is a bank-specific constant. 
The bank-specific characteristics are classified into regulatory and non-
regulatory variables. The non-regulatory factors are bank size, loan ratio, profitability, 
and net charge-off. The anticipated effect of bank size has a two-sided effect and the net 
effect of these two determines the net impact of firm size on OBS derivatives activities. 
On the one hand, a bank has to be of a certain size in order to get involved in OBS 
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derivatives activities and get the benefit of the economies of scale. Moreover, large banks 
may be the only banks that have the high qualified risk management and specialized staff. 
Also, sophisticated clients who are more likely to engage in OBS derivatives activities 
may not consider the small-sized banks as an option as they believe that large banks are 
too big to fail. On the other hand, as bank size gets bigger the bank is likely more risk-
diversified and there will be fewer incentives to engage in OBS derivatives activities. 
The impact of the loan ratio (the ratio of loans to total assets) on the usage of 
OBS activities is expected to be positive. Angbazo (1997) shows that a higher loan ratio 
will increase the interest rate risk, which will create an incentive for banks to hedge using 
OBS activities. Another reason for this positive relation lies in the process of approving 
loans; banks get access to their customers’ investment information which will facilitate 
the offer of relevant OBS risk management tools. 
A positive relation is expected between profitability and OBS activities. 
Profitability is considered a measure of the creditworthiness viewed by customers. 
Profitability will increase the customer valuation for a bank, which in turn will give more 
incentives to work with profitable banks rather than non-profitable (less-profitable) ones. 
The net charge-off is a proxy for the non-performing loans that banks assign 
for the bad debt loans. The predicted impact of the non-performing loans is negative, so 
as the amount of the non-performing loans increase the bank’s creditworthiness decreases 
and that will decrease the amount of OBS activities. One may argue that as the charge-off 
amount increases that means the default risk for that bank is high and then a risk 
management instrument might be needed to hedge against this risk and generate another 
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income source to compensate for the bad loans loss. Therefore an increase in the charge 
off amount might have a positive impact on OBS activities. 
With respect to regulatory factors, following Jacques and Nigro (1997), I 
consider the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) as a proxy for capital requirements regulations. 
CAR is a measure of a bank’s capital, used to protect depositors and promote the stability 
and efficiency of financial systems around the world20. There are two possible effects of 
the CAR on the diffusion pattern of OBS derivatives items. On the one hand, a higher 
CAR increases a bank’s creditworthiness, which in turn will increase the incentives of 
bank’s customers to work with this bank’s OBS derivatives risk managements items. On 
the other hand, a higher CAR reduces a bank’s marginal gain from increasing the risk in 
the asset portfolio (Furlong and Keeley, 1989). As bank capital increases, the ability to 
assume risks increases, but the need for OBS derivatives products to hedge risk exposure 
may decrease. I also examine the response of banks to the 8% well capitalized total risk-
based capital (RBC) standards on the capital ratio. I classify the banks into two groups 
CARL, CARH as a signal to the degree of regulatory pressure brought about by the risk-
based capital standards on capital ratio, because banks with total CAR above and below 
the 8 percent regulatory minimum may react differently. Specifically, the low regulatory 
pressure variable (CARL) equals the difference between the inverse of the bank’s actual 
CAR and the inverse of the regulatory stipulated CAR of 8 percent, i.e., CARL equals 
(1/CAR-1/8) for all banks with a total risk-based capital ratio less than 8 per cent, and 
                                                
20 CAR can be expressed as
edAssetsRiskWeight
talTierIICapialTierICapitCAR += . It is also called the capital to risk 
weighted assets ratio (CRAR). 
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zero otherwise21. The high regulatory pressure variable (CARH) equals the difference 
between the inverse of the regulatory stipulated CAR of 8 percent and bank’s actual 
CAR, i.e.,  CARH equals (1/8-1/CAR) for all banks with a total risk-based capital ratio 
greater than 8 per cent, and zero otherwise. High regulatory pressure with respect to 
capital implies low creditworthiness and can be expected to translate into lower OBS 
activity. On the other hand, low regulatory pressure, as implied by CRAL, signifies a 
comfortable capital position and (accompanied with a high credit rating) makes a bank an 
active supplier of OBS products (Koppenhaver and Stover, 1991). Alternatively, low 
regulatory pressure reduces the marginal propensity of a bank to increase the risk in its 
asset portfolio (Furlong and Keeley, 1989). Therefore, banks with high capital ratios 
(implying low regulatory pressure) can be expected to take less OBS risk and hence, 
supply a smaller volume of OBS items. 
We include the interest rate spread as a proxy for macroeconomic conditions. 
The interest rate spread seems to be the most important macroeconomic factor for OBS 
activities, since it will reflect directly on the status of monetary policy and indirectly the 
status of the fiscal policy. Following prior research, we use the net interest margin 
(NIMR) on a bank level basis to proxy for the interest rate spread. The interest rate 
spread also encounters two arguments. First, a high and positive interest rate spread 
signals a high degree of uncertainty about future interest rates and that short-term interest 
                                                
21 Risk – Based Assessment System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC. They specified three 
groups in terms of RBC standards, Group 1 - "Well Capitalized." Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio equal to 
or greater than 10 percent. Group 2 - "Adequately Capitalized." Not Well Capitalized and Total Risk-Based 
Capital Ratio equal to or greater than 8 percent. Group 3 - "Undercapitalized" Neither Well Capitalized nor 
Adequately Capitalized.  
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rates are expected to rise in the future. High interest rate risk and future interest rate 
increases imply a relatively high demand for OBS products. Second, when the spread 
between short-term and long-term rates is high and positive, then bank managers have an 
incentive to engage in traditional on-balance sheet activities and take advantage of low 
short-term interest rate funding and high long-term interest rate lending. As a result a 
bank’s manager will be less inclined to engage in OBS activities. 
4.3.1.2. Data Source and Analysis: 
The data used in this study is bank-level data for world-wide commercial 
banks. The countries included in this study are classified into nine regions, namely, North 
America, The European Union, Europe excluding Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, The 
Middle East, Africa, The Far East and Central Asia, NAFTA, and G7 countries22. The 
data were collected from the Bank Scope database during the period of 1995 - 2005. The 
datasets include all commercial banks that engaged in OBS activities during the period 
studied, i.e., commercial banks with zero OBS activities were omitted from the sample. 
As a result of this process the resulting number of banks in each set is as follows, North 
America: 391 banks, The European Union: 200 banks, Europe excluding Eastern Europe: 
216 banks, Eastern Europe: 100 banks, The Middle East: 54 banks, Africa: 38 banks, The 
Far East and Central Asia: 223 banks, NAFTA: 539 banks, and G7: 665 banks. Tables 
(3.a, 3.b, 3.c, 3.d, and 3.e) represent descriptive statistics for each data set. The highest 
OBS activities appear in the European countries with average OBS activities of 
$18,310,795 thousand, followed by Europe excluding Eastern Europe at $16,426,951 
thousand. The second group ranked according to OBS activities includes North America, 
                                                
22Please refer to table one for the countries included in each region. 
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NAFTA, and G7 where OBS activities ranged between $12,121,100 thousand and 
$9,272,137 thousand. The third group with the lowest OBS activities formed out of four 
world regions, the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Far East and Central 
Asia, where OBS activities ranged between $3,056,339 thousand and $195,181 thousand. 
World regions can also be classified according to banks’ total assets into the same three 
groups. As classified, the regions are in almost the same groups with the exception of the 
Far East and Central Asia region which is a member of lowest OBS group but a member 
of the highest total assets group. Banks form the same three groups according to loans 
average. 
It is interesting that the group of seven (G7) has the highest average capital and 
highest average charge-off between all other regions and the lowest average risk-
weighted assets between the groups. The other groups can be classified according to the 
risk-weighted assets into a high average group, including The Far East and Central Asia 
and Europe excluding Eastern Europe, a middle average group, including North America 
and NAFTA, and a low average group including Africa, the Middle East, The European 
Union, and Eastern Europe. According to the average net income, all groups follow OBS 
grouping except for the Far East and Central Asia. 
4.3.1.3. Empirical Results for QVM model: 
This section presents the empirical results of the regression model. We apply 
the OBS determinants model, equation (11), to the nine selected regions separately to 
determine what factors are relevant to decisions regarding OBS activities usage. Tables 
4-A, 4-B and 4-C report the estimate for each region separately. The time diffusion speed 
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is statistically significant for North America, Africa, the Middle East, as well as the Far 
East and Central Asia. The positive sign for North America and Africa suggests that OBS 
activities represent a financial innovation in the banking system for these two regions, 
while the negative sign for the Middle East and the Far East and Central Asia suggests 
that OBS activities are not a financial innovation and the traditional banking activities 
represents the major activities for these regions. However, the group of seven (G7), 
NAFTA, The European Union, Western Europe and Eastern Europe all have an 
insignificant relation between the time diffusion speed and OBS activities suggesting that 
OBS usage in the most developed regions are determined by some other factors other 
than the time diffusion and OBS is no longer a financial innovation. 
The impact of bank non-regulatory factors is different from one region to 
another. Generally speaking these factors seem to be the major factors that influence OBS 
activities in most of the regions. Bank size is statistically significant for six regions 
(Africa, the Middle East, NAFTA, the Far East and Central Asia, North America, and 
The European Union) and statistically insignificant for three regions (G7, Western 
Europe, and Eastern Europe). The negative sign for bank size suggests that as bank size 
increases then the total bank’s risk will decrease, which implies that the need for OBS 
instruments will decrease. 
 Loan ratio has a significant effect on OBS activities usage for the same six 
regions as bank size and is insignificant for the same three regions. While the negative 
sign holds for the case of Africa there is a positive impact of loan ratio for the other five 
regions. The negative sign of the African bank loans indicates that banks do not take 
advantage of the economies of scope since African banks are relatively small. On the 
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other hand, the positive impact of loans on the usage of OBS activities in other regions 
indicates that these regions take advantage of economies of scope, and higher levels of 
loans will increase their ability to handle these relatively complicated activities. Also 
with a higher level of loans, banks will face a higher level of risk and then OBS activities 
will be used as a risk management instrument. However, loan ratios do not play a role in 
OBS activities decision-making for the European regions (East and West) and the group 
of seven (G7). 
OBS activities do not seem to derive from profitability consideration in six 
regions (Africa, NAFTA, the Far East and Central Asia, North America, The European 
Union, and Western Europe) since we find the net income variable to be statistically 
insignificant. On the other hand, the Middle East, the Eastern Europe, and G7 have a 
positive and significant impact on OBS activities. The positive relation implies that as 
banks’ profits increase, the creditworthiness of the banks, from the investors’ point of 
view, will increase and the demand for OBS activities will increase in creditworthy 
banks. 
Charge-offs have an insignificant impact on OBS bank’s activities in four 
regions (Africa, The Middle East, North America, and The European Union) which imply 
that bank’s charge-offs play no role in decisions regarding OBS activities. In the other 
five regions there is a significantly positive relation between charge-offs and bank’s OBS 
activities. The positive impact can be interpreted as being due to the higher credibility in 
the view of investors and thus banks are less risky by taking account unpredictable non-
performing loans. 
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On the macroeconomic side we include the net interest margin as a proxy for 
the net interest rate spread. Empirical results suggest that macroeconomic factors are at 
work in determining a bank’s OBS activities. Net interest margin is statistically 
significant in six regions (Africa, G7, NAFTA, North America, The European Union, and 
Eastern Europe) and statistically insignificant in The Middle East, The Far East and 
Central Asia, and Western Europe. There is a negative impact of net interest margin on 
banks’ OBS activities in both The European Union, and Eastern Europe, suggesting that 
banks engage in more traditional banking activities instead of OBS activities when 
margins are high, i.e., they will benefit from lending at the high long-term interest rates 
and borrowing at the low short-term rates. On the other hand, in the other four significant 
regions net interest margin is positive, which suggests that as the uncertainty about future 
interest rates increases, the future interest rate risk will increase, pushing these banks to 
engage in more OBS activities as risk management instruments. 
In order to control for bank regulation, we include three variables: the capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR), low regulatory pressure ratio (CARL), and high regulatory 
pressure ratio (CARH). Interestingly, bank regulations have no effect on OBS activities 
in all of the major regions (Europe’s three regions, North America, NAFA, G7, and The 
Middle East) which is consistent with recent literature regarding U.S. commercial 
banks23. Regulatory factors have a statistically significant effect on African banks’ OBS 
activities; positive for low regulatory pressure banks and negative for the high regulatory 
pressure banks. The positive sign can be explained that the bank’s capital position is 
more comfortable; it then has a high credit rating, implying that banks will increase their 
                                                
23 Jagtinai,J., A.Saunders And G.Udell, “The Effect of Bank Capital Requirements on Bank Off-Balance 
Sheet Financial Innovations”, Journal Of Banking And Finance, 1995, 19, 647-658. 
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issuance of OBS instruments. On the other hand, the negative sign can be explained that 
as high regulatory pressure with respect to capital implies low creditworthiness, this can 
be expected to translate into lower levels of OBS activities. In other words, as banks are 
capital constrained and have higher regulatory pressure, then they are required to either 
increase their risk-weighted capital or decrease their capital, and OBS activities seem be 
used to achieve this purpose. 
4.3.2. The Qualitative Variables Model (QLVM) [World Wide Analysis]: 
4.3.2.1. The Model: 
The previous analysis has given us the determinants of OBS activities in the 
world banking system divided into nine regions. In this section we try to analyze OBS 
phenomenon in the world as one banking system. Moreover, we want to shed light on the 
qualitative factors that are not included in our original model. As reported in figure (1), 
the volume of OBS usage varies significantly from one region to another. We have 
answered part of the question as to why this would occur in the previous section by 
analyzing the quantitative variables that may affect this phenomenon. We conclude that 
the differences in bank level regulatory and non-regulatory factors and macroeconomic 
conditions from region to region justify this variation in OBS usage. However, we still 
believe that there are other qualitative variables, which are not included in our previous 
model like political environment, technological endowments and freedom of the financial 
system, which cause this variation from region to region. 
In order to account for these non-quantitative variables, we need to modify our 
model by including a third vector of dummy variables. The dummy variables vector 
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represents the regional location of each bank included in the data set; therefore, we 
include ten indicator variables: the USA, NAFTA, the Middle East, Africa, The Far East 
and Central Asia, G7, The European Union, Eastern Europe, Europe excluding Eastern 
Europe and South and Central America. These variables are used to estimate the impact 
of the political environment, technological endowments and freedom of the financial 
system. We expect that highly developed financial and technological systems should have 
a different level of OBS activities than poor financial and technological systems; also, 
political stability should have some influence on variation in OBS usage. Accordingly, 
our model is modified into equation (12): 
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where j (j=1,2,…..10) stands for the world specific regions, and i (i = 
1,2,3,……,N) is the number of banks in each specific region, and t ( t = 1,2,3,….,T) is the 
number of time periods. The dependent variable, LGTOBSijt is the logistic transformation 
of OBS activities for bank i located in region j. Pijt is the ratio of OBS items (in nominal 
terms) to the nominal value of total assets (defined as on-balance sheet assets + OBS 
items) of bank i in region j at time t. The explanatory variables vectors include the 
autonomous diffusion (t), where β is the speed of adoption and depends on the 
characteristics of the innovation and firms in the industry. The second explanatory vector 
Xijt controls for bank-specific characteristics and it will also include the same regulatory 
and non-regulatory variables. The expected sign for each variable will hold the same as 
discussed in the previous section. As an attempt to control for macroeconomic conditions, 
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we use the net interest margin to proxy for the interest rate spread in the economy, and 
the same theoretical arguments can be made about the expected impact of this variable on 
OBS banking activities. The intercept αj is a bank specific constant of integration for 
region j. 
The third vector included in this model are the dummy variables (DUMj), 
including ten dummies for each selected region. These important differences between 
regions should impact the banking systems of these regions and thus will have a role in 
determining the diffusion model of any innovation in the financial system. For example, 
we don’t expect Africa’s banking system to have the same diffusion model as Europe’s 
banking system because of differences in political environment and technological 
endowments, which will directly affect customer motivation and bank productivity. In 
summary, in this section we intend to test a new hypothesis which is the political, 
technological, social, and freedom hypothesis.  
4.3.2.2. Data Source: 
We formed an unbalanced, bank-level dataset from the Bank Scope database 
during the period 1995 - 2005. The dataset includes 1,080 world-wide commercial banks 
from all regions. We include banks in the top size quartile and OBS issuers. Because of 
bank inconsistency from region to region in terms of total assets and OBS values we 
normalized the data variables by dividing each variable data by total assets in each bank. 
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4.3.2.3. Empirical Results for the (QLVM) model: 
In this part of our empirical work, we form a set of 1080 commercial banks 
that operate in different regions of the world. Having established the determinants of 
OBS activities in each region of the world in the previous part, our concern here is to 
check the effects of other qualitative variables that are not included in our prior model, 
such as the level of technology, political environment, and level of economic 
development. We proxy for these factors by adding twelve dummy variables representing 
each of the twelve regions where the banks are located. 
Tables 5-A, 5-B and 5-C report the results as follows. The time diffusion speed 
has no significant impact on OBS activities in the world’s commercial banks. Bank size 
has a weak negative impact on OBS activities, while loan ratios and charge-offs have a 
positive effect on commercial bank OBS activities. Net income has an insignificant 
relationship with OBS. Net interest margin has a positive effect on OBS activities, so as 
the interest rate spread grows higher banks will engage in more OBS activities. 
Regulatory factors have a significant role in determining OBS activities in high 
regulatory pressure commercial banks and no impact on the low regulatory pressure 
commercial banks. 
Level of technology, political environment, and level of economic 
development are positive factors in determining OBS usage in six regions, U.S.A., 
NAFTA, G7, the European Union, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe. These regions 
are the most economically and technologically developed countries. The financial system 
in these regions is an open system and more globalized than any other region in the 
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world. These regions also have a stable political environment which provides an 
opportunity to improve the financial system and foster financial innovation such as OBS 
activities. Technological and political environments have affected OBS activities 
negatively in The Far East and Central Asia and South and Central America. These two 
regions are generally less developed than the first set of regions and the financial system 
does not encourage OBS activities as a financial innovation. The Middle East and Africa 
are the regions with ongoing political problems, particularly The Middle East. They also 
are less developed countries, and their financial systems do not support new financial 
innovations. In other words, being a Middle Eastern or African bank does not affect a 
bank’s OBS usage.  
4.4. Conclusions: 
Our results suggest the OBS activities are no longer considered a financial 
innovation in the majority of the developed regions of the world. However, OBS 
activities are financial innovations in less developed regions. Second, bank non-
regulatory variables are the main factors in determining the usage of OBS activities in 
almost all regions. Bank size and bank loans are significant in six regions and 
insignificant in the remaining three. OBS activities are not profit driven. Increased bank 
profits do not affect the decisions regarding OBS usage. Non-performing loans is a major 
factor in OBS decision-making for most of the regions in our study. Third, the 
macroeconomic variables are at work with other variables in determining OBS existence 
in the banking systems’ activities. 
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Fourth, consistent with recent research, our results reject the regulatory tax 
hypothesis and suggest that bank regulations have no major role in OBS activities in the 
banking system for all the regions except for Africa and The Far East and Central Asia. 
This suggests that alternate hypotheses may better explain the OBS phenomenon, such as 
the technology hypothesis or market discipline hypothesis. Finally, financial system 
development, economic size, economic openness, and political environment are all 
factors explaining extensive usage of OBS activities in the world. 
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Table (4-1): Countries Included in each region, as reported by Bank Scope Data bas
Africa 
The Far East 
and Central 
Asia 
The European 
Union Eastern Europe 
The Middle 
East  
Algeria Sao Tome &Principe Afghanistan Austria Yugoslavia Afghanistan 
Angola Senegal Armenia Belgium CROATIA Bahrain 
Benin Seychelles Azerbaijan Denmark Slovenia Iran 
Botswana Sierra Leone Bangladesh Finland Macedonia Rep. Of Iraq 
Burkina Faso Somalia Bhutan France 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Israel 
Burundi South Africa Brunei Darussalam Germany Albania Jordan 
Cameroon Sudan Cambodia Greece Bulgaria Kuwait 
Cape Verde Swaziland China-People's Rep. Ireland Czech Republic Lebanon 
Central African 
Rep.  Tanzania Georgia Rep. Of Italy Slovakia Oman 
Chad Togo Hong Kong Luxembourg Hungary Qatar 
Comers Tunisia India Netherlands Poland Saudi Arabia 
Congo Rep. Of Uganda Indonesia Portugal Romania Syria 
Congo Zambia Japan Spain Russian Federation United Arab Emirates 
Cote D'ivoire Zimbabwe Kazakhstan Sweden Armenia Yemen 
Djibouti  Korea Rep. Of United Kingdom Azerbaijan  
Egypt  Korea, Dpr. Europe Exc. Eastern Europe Belarus G7 
Equatorial 
Guinea  Kyrgyzstan Andorra Estonia Canada 
Ethiopia  Laos Austria Georgia Rep. Of France 
Gabon  Macau Belgium Kazakhstan Germany 
Gambia  Malaysia Cyprus Kyrgyzstan Italy 
Ghana  Maldives Denmark Latvia Japan 
Guinea  Mongolia Finland Lithuania United Kingdom 
Guinea-Bissau  Myanmar (Union 
Of) 
France Moldova Rep. Of USA 
Kenya  Nepal Germany Tajikistan  
Lesotho  Pakistan Gibraltar Turkmenistan North America 
Liberia  Philippines Greece Ukraine USA 
Libya  Singapore Iceland Uzbekistan Canada 
Madagascar  Sri Lanka Ireland   
Malawi  Taiwan Italy  NAFTA 
Mali  Tajikistan Liechtenstein  USA 
Mauritania  Thailand Luxembourg  Canada 
Mauritius  Turkmenistan Malta  Mexico 
Morocco  Uzbekistan Monaco   
Mozambique  Vietnam Netherlands   
Namibia   Norway   
Niger   Portugal   
Nigeria   Spain   
Reunion   Sweden   
Rwanda   Switzerland   
   Turkey   
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Table 4-3 (A): Data Statistics 
 
Africa (Thousands $)  The Middle East 
(Thousands $) 
 Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. 
Tot. asset 1721419 208528 5719525 7632454 2553277 13528479
Int. Margin 9.4296 17735 2938023 3.0835 2.9700 1.0092
Loans 1145050 103059 4426393 4724316 1376937 9265672
OBS 195181 8.25 7.9935 1940667 491755 3253629
Net Income 22367 6505 66537 63673 18109 107312
Capital 453081 24350 553680 643355 231468 1056695
Charge off 6971 501 28328 22344 3408 55165
Risk Assets 1321256 110241 4943555 5476908 1727379 10388903
 
 
 
 
Table 4-3 (B): Data Statistics 
 
The Far East and Central 
Asia (Thousands $) 
North America (Thousands $) 
 Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. 
Tot. asset 61213654 16395102 141224793 17520866 3737800 55949567 
Int. Margin 1.9374 1.9300 1.0135 4.3651 4.2100 1.7620 
Loans 37717263 10731725 86132397 9861705 2153950 28805874 
OBS 3056339 425753 7874606 12121100 744850 45392702 
Net Income -84843 13216 929601 197583 42800 592310 
Capital 4058437 904039 9845781 1563634 337100 4832837 
Charge off 492414 137684 863235 81784 7200 316193 
Risk Assets 51801515 14363533 117887898 14084954 3263450 41101273 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-3 (C): Data Statistics 
 
The European Union 
(Thousands $) 
Eastern Europe (Thousands $) 
 Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. 
Tot. asset 105374259 24047785 195336630 2693015 1231050 3678329 
Int. Margin 2.4303 2.4900 1.2136 5.3188 4.4100 3.8373 
Loans 50460274 14285236 85211780 1232657 622187 1585693 
OBS 18310795 2760927 39338267 2674487 190900 8583791 
Net Income 435201 95315 1149273 53130 6489 490151 
Capital 6464314 1568785 12018198 209811 117265 267998 
Charge off 309268 34419 644570 119344 6525 237222 
Risk Assets 587799 141983 1224488 1505858 691814 2003495 
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Table 4-3 (D): Data Statistics 
 
Europe Excluding Eastern 
Europe (Thousands $) 
NAFTA (Thousands $) 
 Mean Median St. Dev. Mean Median St. Dev. 
Tot. asset 66143190 8449220 152852325 13463461 2253900 48853767 
Int. Margin 2.6306 2.5700 1.3224 4.5987 4.2200 10.4378 
Loans 31018297 4669956 60569208 7577689 1349000 25203252 
OBS 16426951 1163378 40685361 9272137 401600 39496383 
Net Income 306442 40219 850040 151283 24600 518343 
Capital 3890981 621674 8638925 1201371 203500 4220554 
Charge off 821593 76767 2295632 97066 5700 312771 
Risk Assets 45123595 6129036 94631505 10806502 2009900 35959774 
 
 
 
 
Table 4-3 (E): Data Statistics 
 
G7 (Thousands $) 
 Mean Median St. Dev. 
Tot. asset 34955532 5773700 102280718 
Int. Margin 3.6321 3.7000 1.8852 
Loans 19822964 3601800 55619115 
OBS 11024921 614100 40174472 
Net Income 135096 31500 737353 
Capital 2505295 463100 7099989 
Charge off 11024921 614100 40174472 
Risk Assets 317949 13700 1193933 
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Table (4-4 (A)): Random Effect Estimation for the Quantitative variables model 
(QVM) 
)4.......(....................)1(ln ittitiit
it
it YXtP
PLGTOBS εδγβα ++++=


−
=
 
Note: 1)*, **, ^ represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.  
          2) Refer to table 6 for list of explanatory variables. 
 
 
Table (4-4 (B)): Random Effect Estimation for the Quantitative variables model 
(QVM) 
)4.......(....................)1(ln ittitiit
it
it YXtP
PLGTOBS εδγβα ++++=


−
=
 
 
 The European 
Union 
Eastern Europe Western Europe G7 
Variables Coefficient S.D Coefficient S.D Coefficient S.D Coefficient S.D 
Constant -2.65545* .80224 -5.05438* 1.0469 -4.12262* .62006 -4.89402* .26827 
Time .00990924 .01076 .041316 .02779 .010584 .00994 -.00691248 .00561 
LTA -.616993* .15180 .184390 .22833 .073649 .10150 -.056816 .04953 
LLR .661399* .14254 -.038016 .20367 .00792512 .09783 .020748 .04380 
LNI .00972595 .07210 .154461^ .08450 .00839075 .05924 .357448* .03776 
LCOFF .038791 .02851 .188645* .07215 .107373** .04336 .097952* .02081 
LNIMR -.239781** .12184 -.306666** .13062 .042677 .07682 .826237* .04242 
CAR -.00984703 .00500 -.618941 .53357 -.00311753 .00343 -.00476^ .00258 
CARL -.00145564 .01765 -.00001744 .00002 -.00410640 .00292 -.0083462* .00198 
CARH .017580 .01765 .035468 .03507 .047616* .01510 .169843* .00837 
 
R2 .094015 .319359 .060338 .454299 
L.M 071973 [.788] .199473 [.655] 12.6949 [.000] 8.92569 [.003] 
D.W .075871 [.000,.000] .232429 [.000,.000] .151401 [.000,.000] .359346 [.000,.000] 
Note: 1) *, **, ^ represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.  
          2) Refer to table 6 for list of explanatory variables. 
 Africa The Middle East Far East &  
Central Asia 
North America 
Variables Coefficient S.D Coefficient S.D Coefficient S.D Coefficient S.D 
Constant 4.67920* .49233 -2.75290* .93241 -1.74987** .71907 -3.60758* .31644 
Time .026915* .01022 -.045847* .01465 -.047564* .00795 .013214* .00476 
LTA -1.06013* .09698 -.417187** .17605 -.621191* .13400 -.117822** .04984 
LLR -.355220* .10612 .470234* .15880 .540287* .12643 .222989* .04194 
LNI .088481 .05923 .167284** .08583 -.019190 .03017 -.030578 .04248 
LCOFF .00342977 .02458 -.015571 .05417 .062368* .01602 .024108 .02164 
LNIMR .210448* .07718 .161886 .17026 .072005 .05187 .318241* .04815 
CAR -.017380* .00389 -.00001365 .61435 -.753497     .70423 -.208932** .09102 
CARL .00060792* .00015 -.00001365 .00006 -.0010257 .00107   -.00770639 .01605 
CARH -.057521* .01974 .026269 .02884 .097767* .02098   .075487* .00783 
 
R2 .938083 .168183 .147619 .311145 
L.M 9.59212 [.002] 2.86866 [.082] 20.5702 [.000] 60.2950 [.000] 
D.W .074854 [.000,.000] .236963 [.000,.000] .088611 [.000,.000] .096691 [.000,.000] 
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Table (4-4 (C)): Random Effect Estimation for the Quantitative variables model 
(QVM) 
)4.......(....................)1(ln ittitiit
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
−
=
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 1) *, **, ^ represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.  
          2) Refer to table 6 for list of explanatory variables. 
 
 
 
 NAFTA 
Variables Coefficient S.D 
Constant -4.92411* .26388 
Time -.00111819 .00432 
LTA -.245969* .04796 
LLR .423858* .04108 
LNI .034863 .03570 
LCOFF .022369^ .01384 
LNIMR .317120* .03771 
CAR -.11981^ .07005 
CARL -.021280 .01366 
CARH .065226* .00723 
 
R2 .249994 
L.M 20.4929 [.000] 
D.W .140638 [.000,.000] 
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Table (4-6): List of Explanatory variables used in both the QVM and QLVM models  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables  Explanations 
CONSTANT Constant 
TIME Time 
LTA Natural Logarithm of  bank’s Total Assets 
LLR Natural Logarithm of  bank’s Net Loans 
LNI Natural Logarithm of  bank’s Net Income 
LCOFF Natural Logarithm of  bank’s Net Charge-off 
LNIMR Natural Logarithm of bank’s Net Interest Margin 
CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio 
CARL Low Regulatory pressure 
CARH High Regulatory pressure 
DUSA Dummy for USA 
DNAFTA Dummy for NAFTA 
DMIDEST Dummy for The Middle East 
DAFRI Dummy for Africa 
DFCASIA Dummy for The Far East and Central Asia 
DG7 Dummy For the Group of Seven (G7) 
DEURO Dummy for The European Union 
DESTRN Dummy for Eastern Europe 
DEUEXC Dummy for Europe Exclude Eastern Europe 
DSCAMERI Dummy for South & Central America 
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Chapter Five 
 
Guarantees Bank Holding Companies’ Systematic and 
Unsystematic Risks: Contingent and Non-Contingent Claim 
Models 
 
 
Abstract 
This study employs both contingent and non-contingent claim models to test 
for evidence of the market discipline hypothesis for OBS guarantees 
contracts in the banking industry. In addition to the CAPM systematic risk 
measure and the standard deviation of bank’s equity return we apply the 
Ronn-Verma options pricing model to see whether market participants 
account for guarantees positions when they value banks’ market risk. The 
benefit of using the contingent claim model is that the traditional linear 
models seem to be inadequate to estimate the non-linear relation between 
OBS guarantees and bank’s risks. We conclude that (1) OBS guarantees are 
generally considered in market risk valuations, and they are being viewed as 
risk reducers according to the three risk measures (Beta, equity return risk, 
and implied asset volatilities); (2) except CLCs contracts, all OBS guarantees 
are risk reducers for larger bank holding companies (BHCs); (3) market 
participants generally view OBS guarantees as more potential risk 
diversification tools, (4) big BHCs have different marginal propensity to risk 
(MPR) than both medium and small BHCs. (5) more capital requirements 
and regulations on bank’s guarantees activities may distort the large banks 
market positions. 
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Guarantees Bank Holding Companies’ Systematic and Unsystematic 
Risks: Contingent and Non-Contingent Claim Models 
 
5.1. Introduction: 
This chapter deals with the risk exposure of OBS guarantees by large bank 
holding companies (BHCs) in the United States of America. OBS guarantees are 
contingent contracts which obligate banks to fulfill some contractual terms in a certain 
date in future at given circumstances. Examples of OBS guarantees could be 
commitments, standby letters of credits (SLCs), commercial letters of credits (CLCs), and 
participations (PARTI). Prior literature suggests many hypotheses to justify why banks 
engage in these activities. No matter the reason behind these activities, it is a fact now 
that almost all banking firms engage in these activities very extensively. However, we 
believe that as a result of this extensive usage of OBS guarantees, a bank’s market risk 
exposure may affected directly or indirectly by these activities as a risk reducer or as a 
risk enhancer. 
Extant theory about how a bank’s risk is affected by OBS activities suggests 
that OBS activities may be related to bank risk in three ways. First, OBS activities are an 
obligation against a bank and the bank’s customers to make a payment in the future under 
certain circumstances in which the banks and their customers would prefer not to make 
the payment. Thus OBS activities will increase the bank’s risk. Second, OBS activities 
will reduce a bank’s customer risk, in sense that there will be more professional 
management. Third, Avery and Berger (1988) claim that OBS activities may reduce 
banks risk if they are used to hedge rather than to speculate. 
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In this study a two-stage analysis has been developed, in stage one we have 
estimated our dependent variables, which include three market risk measures (1) the 
systematic market risk (from CAPM, β), (2) the standard deviation of bank’s equity 
return (σE), and (3) the implied asset volatility from the Ronn-Verma option model (σV). 
In the second stage we regress these dependent variables on the on and off balance sheet 
risk variables using a panel econometric technique for the bank holding companies 
(BHCs) sector. The study is organized as follows; a discussion of the methodology is 
next; in section three we describe the data and we present the empirical results in section 
four; conclusions and policy implications are presented in section five. 
5.2. Methodology: 
In this section we intend to test a bank’s risk level that might be affected by on 
and off-balance-sheet bank activities. Our analysis is compromised of two stages, the first 
stage is to estimate BHCs market risk from the perspective of the equity holders. Three 
different risk measures are used to estimate BHCs market risk; the first one is market 
systematic risk (beta), derived from CAPM, second is the standard deviation of bank’s 
equity return ( Eitσ ), daily return data is used to estimate the yearly BHCs risk, and thirdly 
we use a contingent option pricing model to estimate the BHCs implied asset volatility 
( Vitσ ) as a measure of BHCs risk. (More detailed discussion will follow). The second 
stage is to regress these three estimated risk measures (beta, standard deviation of equity 
return ( Eitσ ), and implied asset volatility (
V
itσ )) as the dependent variables on off- and on-
balance-sheet risk measures. Following is a discussion of each of these risks. 
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5.2.1 Market Risk Measures: 
1)Beta or Systematic Risk itβ : in the CAPM framework, risk is measured by the variance 
of possible returns. However, variance is not a universal measure of riskiness. Our first 
risk measure is derived from the CAPM return generating process according to the 
following equation:  
)1......(........................................itMtitiit RR εβα ++=  
where Rit = rit-Rft is the holding period return (rit) for the ith  over the period t  in excess of 
the risk-free rate of interest (Rft). Rmt = rmt-Rft is the holding period return (rmt) for the 
market portfolio over period t in excess of the risk-free rate of interest (rft). iα is the 
intercept, and itε is the i
th bank-specific factor which is independent of Rmt. c represents 
the systematic risk which measures the security's sensitivity to market-wide events which 
cannot be diversified away. It reflects differing investor expectations about the 
relationship between each bank’s return and the market return. 
2)Standard Deviation of Equity Return Eitσ : We are using the standard deviation of 
bank’s equity return as a measure for the market risk which will include both the market 
risk and bank-specific risk. The standard deviation of bank’s equity return will be 
estimated using the following formula: 
)2...(..................................................)(
1
2∑
=
−=
n
t
AvgtRE KKσ  
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tK is the Ex-post equity return in period t, AvgK  is the average annual return during the 
year. 
3)Contingent Claim Models: The standard linear approaches to estimate the bank’s 
market risk might be inadequate because not all the risk measures are neither linear nor 
monotonic functions of a bank’s risk. The contingent claim models correct for this 
nonlinearity of a bank’s risk. Ronn and Verma (1986) introduced a contingent claim 
model nested from Black and Sholes (1973) option pricing model; following is an 
explanation of this model. 
Ronn and Verma introduce the risk-based deposit insurance measure that can 
be estimated from the market value of a bank’s equity and the instantaneous equity’s 
standard deviation. They state that the empirical estimation of risk and deposit insurance 
premium is measurable when time series data on the market value of a bank’s equity and 
the book value of its debt are available. The equity of a bank can be written as: 
)3......(..............................).........()( TXBNXVNE vσρ −−=  
Where: 
)5......(............................................................
)(
)4.(............................................................
2
ln
2
XVN
E
T
T
b
V
X
Ev
v
v
σσ
σ
σ
ρ
=


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
+
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where, E is the market value of equity, σE is the instantaneous standard 
deviation of equity return, V is the unobserved post-insurance value of bank assets, B is 
the book value of debt liabilities, σv is the instantaneous standard deviation of asset 
return, N( ~ ) is the univariate cumulative normal distribution function, and T represents 
the time until the next audit of bank assets. Equations (4 and 5) can be solved 
simultaneously for two unknowns, V and σv, for each observed E and σE. An 
exogenously determined closure rule is required to solve these simultaneous equations. 
Banks are audited each year, and at audit time banks are closed if VT is less than ρB 
where VT is the terminal value of assets at time T, and ρ ≤ 1 is a policy parameter; 
therefore, the maturity of debt is assumed to be 1.  
5.2.2. On-Balance-Sheet Accounting Risk Factors:  
1)Leverage Risk (LEV):  Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes (1970) indicate that as additional 
debt is added the equity holder’s estimate of return volatility is increased. Hamada (1972) 
reports that approximately one quarter of systematic risk is explained by the degree of 
financial leverage. On the other hand, Mandelker and Rhee (1984) find that both 
operating and financial leverage jointly determine systematic risk. Therefore, if these 
leverage ratios increase, it may lead to higher variability of bank’s equity returns and 
therefore its market risk. Financial leverage is constructed by taking a ratio of total 
liabilities and total assets. 
2)Diversification Risk (DIV): a heavy investment in one category of assets will generate a 
diversification risk. In other words, as banks concentrate their loan operations on one 
type of clients then the bank will be considered less diversified and the diversification 
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risk will increase and it will directly and indirectly affect the market risk. The Herfindahl 
Index (HI) can be used to measure the degree of loan portfolio diversification, an 
increased levels of loan concentration associated with large HI values (i.e. less loan 
diversification) will increase a bank’s risk. Hence, greater diversification is expected to 
cause less variability in earnings. Thus, the HI measure of loan concentration should be 
positively related to systematic and unsystematic market risk measures. In this study we 
will use the inverse of the HI to translate it from a concentration index to a diversification 
index.  
)6(............................................................1
1
2∑
=
= n
i
iL
HI     Where n = number of loans types. 
3)Credit Risk (LOSS): this type of risk is the risk associated with the quality of a bank's 
earning assets, namely its loans. Low quality bank assets (loans) cause high probability of 
future defaults that may be expected to reduce earnings and dividends; in other words it 
will increase the bank’s risk. Since banks are highly leveraged, Brewer and Lee (1986) 
conclude that large nonperforming loans or large security losses can bring about 
insolvency. Furthermore, major fluctuations in interest rates can greatly influence the 
market value of long-term fixed rate assets. Similarly, a decline in asset quality can lead 
to write-offs and reduced earnings from the loan portfolio. Thus, LOSS is expected to 
affect the market measures of risk positively. The credit measure used in this study is 
calculated by dividing loan loss provision by total assets. 
4)The Interest Rate Risk (GAP): This type of risk arises because the maturity composition 
of assets and liabilities may be different, and therefore banks may be affected negatively, 
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as changing market interest rates may have a differentiated impact on the value of assets 
and liabilities. French, Ruback, and Schwert (1983) introduce the nominal contracting 
hypothesis to explain the sensitivity of commercial bank stock returns. Nominal contracts 
are those assets which have cash flows that are fixed in nominal terms. On the other hand, 
cash flows generated by real assets fluctuate with the price level. Overall, most of the 
assets and liabilities of depository financial institutions can be postulated to be nominal 
contracts. Thus, according to the nominal contracting hypothesis, a firm’s holding of 
nominal assets is important in order to achieve the objective of maximizing stockholder's 
wealth. Studies by Fama (1975, 1976), and Fama and Gibbons (1982), establish that 
unexpected changes in interest rates are directly related to inflationary expectations. 
Hence, the nominal contracting hypothesis supports the notion that unanticipated changes 
in the interest rate would affect a bank’s equity value depending on the duration of 
nominal assets and liabilities held by the firm. The greater the amount of net nominal 
assets and the longer the duration of these assets, the higher would be the interest rate 
sensitivity of a bank's common stock. In other words, the greater the absolute value of 
GAP, the more the bank is exposed to unexpected changes in interest rates. Therefore, 
GAP is expected to be positively related to market-related risk measures. 
5)Operating Risk (Bank’s Size Risk) (SIZE): According to Saunders, Strock, and Travlos 
(1990), the larger the size of a bank holding company the greater its ability to diversify 
away its asset risk. Furthermore, the "too big to fail" doctrine enables large banking firms 
to maximize the value of implicit failure guarantees associated with deposit insurance and 
bank closure policy. The larger the bank is, the more analysis will be conducted about the 
bank’s equity and debt, thus low risk. Investors may also believe that larger banking 
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firms may be protected by some regulatory rules than the small banking firms. All these 
reasons together suggest a negative relation between bank size and market risk measures 
for BHCs. 
6)Dividend Payout Variability Risk (POR): According to Brewer and Lee (1986), bank 
equities are affected by the earning power of bank assets. Therefore, a bank's stock price 
is negatively related to the variability of its rate of return. BHCs will always want to keep 
a stable dividend policy after it is established, and it will be reluctant to cut down the 
dividend payout ratio. Furthermore, a higher dividend payout ratio may be considered as 
a sign of higher earning levels. Also stability in the dividend payout ratio suggests 
stability in the bank’s earning levels, implying a lower level of market risk. Thus, a high 
dividend payout ratio is associated with low risk and POR is expected to affect market 
risk measures negatively. 
5.2.3. Off-Balance Sheet Guarantees Risk Factors:   
Off-balance sheet (OBS) items are contingent assets and liabilities that may 
affect the future status of a financial institution’s balance sheet.  Although OBS activities 
are now an important source of fee income for almost all BHCs, they have the potential 
to produce positive as well as negative future cash flows. Some OBS activities may 
involve risks that add to the banking firm’s overall risk exposure; others may hedge or 
reduce their interest rate, credit, and foreign exchange risks. Following is a discussion of 
the impact of OBS activities on banking firm’s risk. 
1)Commitments Risk: A loan commitment agreement is a contractual commitment by a 
bank to loan a customer a certain maximum amount at given interest rate terms. The 
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commitment contract also defines the period over which the customer will be able to 
utilize his contracted loan. It is true that the bank will generate fee income by making 
these commitments to the borrowers, but it will also generate more credit and liquidity 
risks. Bennett (1986) claims that off-balance-sheet activities lead to credit risk since these 
activities provide an opportunity to increase leverage significantly without additional 
regulatory requirements. Cates and Davis (1989) suggest that credit risk due to off-
balance sheet activities may be transferred to other bank assets. As an example, if a bank 
buys an option, interest rate risk may be reduced but credit risk can increase. Of the 
activities that are likely to contribute significantly to credit risk, loan commitments may 
be the largest contributor. Bennett (1986) identifies liquidity risk as another element that 
may contribute to the riskiness of the banking firm when exposed to off-balance-sheet 
activities. Nevertheless, the bank is exposed to liquidity risk due to these loan 
commitments. Liquidity risk arises because of the possibility that many customers may 
decide to borrow from the bank at the same time. This will be especially true in the event 
that alternative sources of funds may be unavailable. In order to satisfy this unexpected 
need of funds, banks may have to compete for funds aggressively. All the points 
discussed so far about the loan commitments were increasing risk factors but not 
decreasing risk factors. Loan commitments can be viewed as risk management tools that 
reduce a bank’s risk when these contracts are added to the diversified bank’s activities 
portfolio. This is especially true when there is extensive competition with the other non-
banking financial firms, and more importantly, when we consider the competition 
internationally. In other words, instead of having only the traditional banking activities, 
there will be a more diversified portfolio to invest a bank’s assets. 
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Letters of Credit (LC): banks deal with two types of LC, Commercial Letters 
of Credit (CLCs) and the Standby Letters of Credit (SLCs).  LCs are essentially 
guarantees to underwrite performance that a depository institution sells to the buyers of 
guarantees for fees while at the same time adding to its contingent future liabilities. 
Although both CLCs and SLCs have the same type of risk exposure, default risk, they are 
different in the severity of the risk exposure. In the case of CLCs, the bank’s role is to 
provide a formal guarantee that payment for goods shipped or sold internationally or 
domestically will be forthcoming regardless of whether the buyer of the good defaults on 
payment. With SLCs, the bank’s role is to provide a formal guarantee of payment to 
cover contingencies that are potentially more severe and less predictable, like bond 
performance. SLCs mean a higher level of default risk exposure. At the same time, LCs 
may have a risk-reducing impact through the diversification effect. 
5.3. Data and Empirical Analysis 
Data comes from three different sources: CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and FDIC. 
Our sample includes 54 bank holding companies (BHCs) during the period 2000 - 2005. 
We are limited to this number of BHCs and the time span because we have restricted our 
study to those BHCs that are available in the CRSP database. There is a trade-off between 
including more time-series points but less cross-section points, or less time-series points 
with more cross-section points. Given this trade-off we chose to have more cross-section 
points since our primary interest is in the impact of the off-and on-balance-sheet 
measures on BHCS’s market risks between the largest number of BHCs. However, a six 
year period should be reasonable relative to recent research in this area. 
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First, we collected the following data from CRSP; daily return for our sample 
BHCs, equally weighted return to proxy for the market portfolio’s return, and daily rate 
of return for one month treasury bills to proxy for the risk free rate. Then we estimated 
the yearly value of the systematic risk measure (β), equation (1), using the ordinary least 
square (OLS) method for each BHC. Second, using the daily rate of return for each BHC, 
we calculated the standard deviation of equity return (σRE), equation (2), to get our 
second measure of market risk. Yearly average rate of return is computed from the daily 
rate of return for each BHCS. 
Third, we have collected data about market value of equity (E) and book value 
of debt (B) from COMPUSTAT, used along with the data collected from CRSP to solve 
equation (4) and (5) simultaneously to get the value of the unobserved implied asset 
volatility ( Vitσ ) and the unobserved post-insurance value of bank assets (V). We used a 
numerical routine to get the simultaneous solution of our two unknowns. Following Ronn 
and Verma (1986), the initial estimate that we used for the value of V was the sum of 
market value of equity and the face value of the debt, while that for σV was σE scaled 
down by the leverage ratio. The values of the cumulative normal probability distribution 
N(--) were obtained using the polynomial approximation as follows 
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a3 = 1.781477937; a4 = -1.821255978; a5 = 1.330274429.   
From the first stage we estimated our dependent variables, the three market 
risk measures β, σE, and σV. The second stage of our study was to regress these 
dependent variables on the on and off balance sheet variables as they appear in the 
following equations. 
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where the dependent variables are: 
itβ : Is the systematic risk measure for bank i at time t. 
E
itσ : Is the standard deviation of equity returns for BHCS i at time t. 
V
itσ : Is the implied asset volatility from estimated from the Ronn-Verma model for bank i 
at time t. 
We collected the data required to compute the independent variables, both on-and off-
balance sheet, from the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for the same 
54 BHCs during the same period of time. On-balance sheet variables are used primarily 
as control variables as we are interested in examining the relation between OBS 
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guarantees contracts and bank’s market risk from the equityholder point of view. 
Following is brief definition of the variables in equation 8-9. 
K
itGURN : represent the notional value of OBS guarantees contracts for bank i at time t, K 
represent the type of OBS guarantees contracts, unused commitments, SLCs, 
CLCS, and participations. Each one of these types includes the notional value of 
the interest rate contracts, exchange rate contracts, commodity exchange 
contract, and equity exchange contracts.  
LEVit: Leverage variable is computed as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
DIVit: Diversification variable is computed using seven different types of loans, as 
reported in schedule HC-C of the report of income for BHCs, employing the 
inverse of Herfindahl Index (HI) reported in equation (6). 
LOSSit: Credit risk variable is calculated as the ratio of loan loss provision to total assets. 
GAPit: Interest rate risk variable is calculated as the difference between the total 
market rate assets and the total market rate liabilities divided by the total assets. 
SIZEit: Operational risk variable is computed by taking the natural logarithm of banks 
assets to avoid the linearity problem. 
PORit: The earning variability risk is calculated by dividing the cash dividend by the total 
assets. 
Equations 8-9 have been regressed on the independent variables using panel data 
collected for the BHCs in the U.S. banking industry. We employ the random-effects 
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methodology, as it appears to be better estimate than the fixed-effects model from 
Husman test ( 2χ values are reported in the table results). 
A dummy variable technique has been employed to test OBS guarantees 
strength on a bank’s market risk given a bank’s size group. To achieve this we estimate 
the regression equations (11-13) using panel data methodology employing all of the 
BHCs in our sample (54 BHCs) during the study period 2000-2005. We imposed dummy 
variables to represent bank’s size, in other words, OBS guarantees contracts are inserted 
in the regression as three variables one is [(SIZE_DUM=1 if big, and 0 otherwise) * 
GURN], second [(SIZE_DUM=1 if medium, and 0 otherwise) * GURN], and third 
[(SIZE_DUM=1 if small, and 0 otherwise) * GURN].  
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This will estimate, not only the directional impact of OBS guarantees on 
market risk in a given size group, but also the strength impact of these activities given the 
size group. Therefore, the size group may enhance the effect of OBS guarantees contracts 
on a bank’s risk, or discourage the effect of OBS guarantees contracts on a bank’s risk. 
5.4. Result Analysis 
5.4.1. Size separation analysis: 
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Here we report the empirical results of the random effect estimations. Our 
analysis is designed in a way to capture the differences in the marginal propensity to risk 
(MPR) which might be affected by the operational size differences between BHCs. We 
believe that the operation size of each BHCs should be an important factor in determining 
the marginal propensity to risk factors (on- and off-balance-sheet), in other words, large 
BHCs should react differently than small BHCs or medium size BHCs. In order to test 
this hypothesis, we divide our BHCS sample into three groups, big, medium, and small. 
This size classification should not interfere with the SIZE factor included in the 
regression model. The independent variable SIZE is included as a control variable in 
order to measure the impact of OBS guarantees contracts on the market overall risk, 
while the three size classifications are to see the differences in the MPR between the 
three size groups. It may also be viewed as a statistical smoothing process in order to 
eliminate some of the outliers from of our sample. A simple investigation of the BHCs 
sample will reveal that there is a significant difference between the sizes of the BHCs 
(there are upper outliers and lower outliers). The number of BHCs with total assets less 
than $100 trillion is in the range of 30-40 BHCs during our study period while only about 
10-20 BHCs are greater than $100 trillion. Also, within the less than $100 trillion bracket 
there are about 15-20 BHCs ranging between $20 million and $100 million, and about 
15-30 BHCs have less than $20 trillion in total assets value. This significant difference in 
the distribution of the BHCs total assets may suggest that there is a significant difference 
in the marginal propensity to risk (MPR) which implies that significant differences in risk 
management policies for each group of the BHCs. Therefore, each group will include 18 
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BHCs. The 18 big BHCs count for at least 80% of total assets of all BHCs in our sample 
with about 12% for the 18 medium BHCs and only 2% for the 18 small BHCs. 
We employ a panel data model (random effects), instead of a simple time-
series OLS or cross-section OLS for two main reasons. First, neither one of these two 
(time-series or cross-section) methods alone will yield sufficient degrees of freedom in 
regression analysis. Second, regressions based on cross-section cannot be used to account 
for shifts in market measures of risk and accounting data through time; also time series 
analysis alone cannot be used easily to study inter-bank relationships and comparisons. 
Following is the result of the econometric analysis for each group and each risk measure. 
5.4.1.1 OBS guarantees contracts:  
Unused Commitments: The results reported demonstrate that unused 
commitments contracts are statistically significant for all the risk measures for the big 
BHCs group. The market participants value these activities as risk-reducing factors for 
both systematic and the unsystematic risk measures. Figure (5-1) reports that unused 
commitments form 21% of the overall amount of OBS guarantees positions held by 
BHCs which might be viewed as a reason why market participants consider these type of 
guarantees in their risk valuations. In both the medium- and the small-sized groups, 
unused commitments positions are statistically insignificant on all risk measures included 
in our analysis (systematic CAPM risk (Beta), the standard deviation of equity return 
measure ( Eitσ ) and the implied asset volatility measure (
V
itσ )). This insignificant relation 
between unused commitments and the risk measures imply that investors do not price the 
risk of these contracts that BHCs may incur by having these positions in the case of 
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medium- and small-sized BHCs. The reasons for this insignificance might be because of 
the small portion of the unused commitments contracts relative to BHCs total assets. 
Moreover, unused commitments seem to add a good deal to the diversification position of 
big banks’ asset portfolios while there is no impact on the diversification positions for 
both medium and small BHCs.  
Standby Letters of Credi: The results propose that SLCs are viewed as a risk-
reducing factor for both the standard deviation of equity return measure ( Eitσ ) and the 
implied asset volatility measure ( Vitσ ); while it is statistically insignificant in the case of 
systematic risk measure (BETA) for the three BHCs size groups. The negative impact 
between SLCs and two of the risk measures ( Eitσ ,
V
itσ ) imply that market participants 
view standby letters of credit as risk-reducing factors in the risk measures where both 
systematic and unsystematic risk is represented; however it has no impact on the 
unsystematic risk measure (beta). In other words, SLCs are a successful way to diversify 
a bank’s specific risk measure while it has no significant role in the level of market 
systematic risk. Moreover, the negative relation may come from the nature of the standby 
letters of credit positions since it includes a portion that guarantees some bond issuance, 
commercial or municipal bonds, which might be viewed as a safe guarantees and will be 
fulfilled by these municipals and it is not a high risk source.  
Commercial Letters of Credit, unlike SLCs, CLCs are statistically 
insignificant for almost all the risk measures across the three BHCs groups. However, 
there exists a significant negative relation between the Beta measure and CLCs in the 
case of big and small BHCs groups. The insignificant relation between CLCs and the risk 
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measures imply that investors do not price the risk of these contracts that BHCs may 
incur by having these positions. The reasons for this insignificance might be because of 
the small portion of these contracts relative to other OBS guarantees positions. Moreover, 
CLCs seem to add no impact on the diversification position of a bank’s asset portfolios. 
Interestingly, CLCs are considered a risk reducing factor in the case of the systematic risk 
which can be interpreted from the nature of CLCs since they are used as a facilitator to 
the general trade environment in the market which will affect the overall level of risk in 
the market negatively.  
Participations: This type of guarantees activity is a risk-reducing factor in the 
case of the big BHCs for the three risk measures (both the systematic and the 
unsystematic) and it is statistically insignificant for both the medium and small BHCs. 
The negative relation can be viewed as market participants value this position in their 
required rate of return, and they consider it as a risk-reducing factor according to the 
three risk measures (Beta, Eitσ , 
V
itσ ) for the big BHCS group. This means that 
participations positions are a concern for the well-diversified investors. Although 
participations contracts are significantly risk-reducing factors for big BHCs, they are 
statistically insignificant for both the medium BHCs and the small BHCs. This 
insignificant impact might be interpreted as meaning the market participants believe that 
the medium and small BHCS are not able to deal with these contracts that need highly 
qualified skills and risk management tools that might not be available in the small BHCs. 
We also find a significant positive relation between participations and beta risk measure 
in the medium BHCs sample, which might be a result of hetroskedasticity, seen from the 
LM multiplier reported at the bottom of each table. 
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5.4.1.2. On-Balance-Sheet Accounting Measures: 
Generally the on-balance-sheet accounting measures hold their expected sign 
as suggested by theory explanation although they are not always. However, for 
completeness we will discuss each of them separately. 
Leverage (LEV): There is a significant positive impact on two risk measures 
( Eitσ , and 
V
itσ ) for large and small size BHCs and it is statistically insignificant for the 
Beta risk measure. Interestingly, it is insignificant for the equity risk and the implied asset 
risk ( Vitσ ) for the medium BHCs and significantly negative for the Beta risk measure. The 
positive significant relation indicates that as a bank’s leverage increases the market 
includes this in their risk valuation, suggesting that OBS guarantees contracts will 
contribute to the total leverage of BHCs and thus will increase their risk. 
Diversification (DIV): This variable carries a significant negative relation to 
the equity risk ( Eitσ ) and the implied asset risk (
V
itσ ) for the three groups, which is 
expected. Nevertheless, it carries a significant positive relation with the systematic bank’s 
risk (Beta) for the small-sized and insignificant positive sign for the big and medium size 
groups. The negative sign suggest that as banks become more diversified they will be 
able to eliminate that portion of the unsystematic risk. The positive sign, in the Beta 
model, suggests that diversification will not eliminate/reduce the systematic market risk. 
Thus, guarantees contracts will diversify the unsystematic risk but they will not diversify 
the systematic risk. Figure (2) indicates that our sample BHCs are not well diversified 
and they are using mainly participations and commitments in addition to other non-
traditional activities as diversification tools.  
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Credit Risk (LOSS): This factor has a significant and positive influence on all 
market risk measures for the big BHCs, as expected. It is also significantly positive on 
both the equity return risk ( Eitσ ) and the implied asset risk (
V
itσ ), but statistically 
insignificant on the Beta measure for medium BHCs. It is insignificant for almost all risk 
measures for the small BHCs. The positive sign supports our theoretical considerations 
and it suggests that as banks’ default risk increases, market participants will reflect this in 
their evaluation. It also suggests that when OBS guarantees positions are held by banks 
more default risk will be expected by the market. 
Interest rate risk (GAP): As expected, this variable holds the positive sign on 
two market measures of risk, equity return risk ( Eitσ ) and implied asset risk (
V
itσ ), for the 
three BHCS groups, which suggests that the greater the absolute value of the interest rate 
gap the greater the bank’s risk. The results however report an inverse relation on the Beta 
risk measure, which may be explained by the fact that banks use high gap values to hedge 
their asset portfolios and hence reduce risk. 
Operational Risk (SIZE): The results indicate a significant negative relation 
between size and two of the risk measures, equity return risk ( Eitσ ) and implied asset risk 
( Vitσ ), for the three bank group.  For the Beta risk measure the sign is unexpectedly 
positive for the big and small-sized BHCs, and insignificantly positive for the medium 
BHCs. The positive relation between size and Beta risk can be viewed as security from 
increases in operations. Consequently the market will translate this expansion as a 
transitory period which will include more risk since banks may hold more assets than 
they can manage. The insignificant relation can be justified as the Beta measure of risk 
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includes only market systematic risk which can’t be diversified by increasing a bank’s 
operations. 
Earning Variability Risk (POR): This variable carries the expected sign for 
both the big and medium BHCs on both equity return risk, Eitσ  and implied asset risk 
( Vitσ ), and it is insignificant for the Beta measure. It also has insignificant impact on the 
three risk measures in the case of medium BHCs. 
5.4.2. Size interactions analysis: 
Tables 5-14 to 5-17 report the results of regression equations 11-13, where we 
examine the interaction between bank’s size and OBS guarantees contracts on market risk 
measures. The OBS guarantees coefficients generally carry the same directional relation 
with banks’ market risk. However, the quantitative relation is higher, in other words the 
BHCs size increase the sensitivity level between the percentage changes in these OBS 
guarantees and the market risk behavior. For example, SLCs contracts are found to be a 
significant risk reducing factor ( Eitσ ,
V
itσ ) for the three size BHCs groups in our separate-
groups analysis. Although SLCs hold the same significant risk reducing impact for the 
same groups, the sensitivity is different when guarantees activities interact with the size 
dummy variables. Moreover, the market participants’ valuation of OBS guarantees 
contracts on banks market risk is different from one size group to another. For instance, if 
we consider three banks, the first one is from the big BHCs group, the second one is from 
the medium BHCs group, and the third one is from the small BHCs group, and all of 
them decide to increase their position on SLCs in the market by the same amount, then 
we should expect that the impact of these on the banks’ market risk valuation to be 
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different from one group to another. Generally speaking, the risk sensitivity is higher in 
the case of the small-sized banking firms than the medium-sized. The smallest impact 
will be on the largest banking firms, i.e., the bank’s size is adversely related to bank’s 
risk sensitivity of guarantees contracts. 
The interaction analysis suggests that unused commitments contracts are 
significant risk-reducer factors for the three BHCs size groups, while this type was a 
significant risk reducer for only the big BHCs group in the separate-groups analysis. 
Moreover, the on-balance-sheet factors generally hold their expected impact on market 
risk. 
5.5. Summary Conclusion and Policy Implications: 
This research aims to test the market discipline existence of OBS guarantees 
contracts and bank holding companies’ market risk. In addition to the traditional market 
risk measures, we employ a contingent claim model that accounts for the non-linear 
relationship between OBS guarantees and the market risk. Therefore, we have three risk 
measures, systematic risk (Beta), standard deviation of equity return, and the implied 
asset volatility (from the contingent claim model). We include four OBS guarantees 
contracts, unused commitments, SLCs, CLCs, and participations, and six on-balance-
sheet risk measures as control variables. 
Our analysis is designed in a way to capture the differences in the marginal 
propensity to risk (MPR) which might be affected by the operational size differences 
between BHCs. We believe that the operation size of each BHCs should be an important 
factor in determining the marginal propensity to risk factors (on- and off-balance-sheet). 
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In other words, large BHCs should react differently from small BHCs or medium-size 
BHCs. In order to test this prediction, we divide our BHCS sample into three groups, big, 
medium, and small. 
Several conclusions may be drawn from these results. First, unused 
commitments, SLCs, and participations contracts are all significant players on market 
risk valuation in big BHCs, and they are being viewed as risk-reducers according to the 
three risk measures. Secondly, SLCS contracts are also a significant risk-reducing factor 
for both medium- and small-sized BHCs. Third, unused commitments, CLCs, and 
participations do not seem to have much influence on the valuation of banks three market 
risk measures (Beta, Eitσ , and 
V
itσ ) for the three BHCs groups. Fourth, market participants 
generally view OBS guarantees as potential risk-diversification tools. Fifth, small BHCs 
have different MPR than both big and medium BHCs, which may follow the economies 
of scope concept and the “big to fail” doctrine. Sixth, the on-balance-sheet variables are 
consistent with the existing literature and they do have an impact on the pricing process 
of a bank’s equity. To a certain extent, the relation between these accounting risk 
variables and different market risk measures varies among the BHCs groups. Therefore, 
more capital requirements and regulations on banks OBS guarantees activities may 
distort the large banks market positions. 
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Table (5-6): The interactions of size dummies with UNUSED COMMITMENTS 
 
 
 β E
itσ  
V
itσ
UCD1 -.097535 [.016] 
-.00203421 
[.007] 
-.0422800 
[.007] 
UCD2 1.10306 [.243] 
-.035102 
[.047] 
-.68879 
[.044] 
UCD3  26.3997 [.000] 
-.398247 
[.002] 
-.966323 
[.002] 
LEV -3.26797 [.036] 
.136143 
[.000] 
.328525 
[.000] 
DIV .691703 [.143] 
-.029810 
[.001] 
-.32834 
[.001] 
LOSS 1.00677 [.917] 
.745215 
[.000] 
1.0814393 
[.000] 
GAP -17.9108 [.003] 
.574678 
[.000] 
.842658 
[.000] 
POR .00204593 [.870] 
-.000740351 
[.002] 
-.00802199 
[.002] 
R2 .411460 .500234 .522928 
LM 2.17850  [.140] 
10.0034 
[.002] 
8.82957 
[.003] 
DW .829674 [.000,.000] 
1.42525 
[.000,.000] 
1.43597 
[.000,.000] 
 
 
 
Notes:  
(1) The dependent variables show in the first row, the independent variables show in the first column. 
(2) The numbers between parentheses are P-values. 
(3) UCD1 = [(1 if big BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * Unused commitments (where unused commitments=              
notional value/total assets)]. 
UCD2 = [(1 if medium BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * Unused commitments (where Unused commitments= 
notional value/total assets)]. 
     UCD3 = [(1 if small BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * Unused commitments (where Unused commitments=        
notional value/total assets)]. 
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Table (5-7): The interactions of size dummies with SLCS 
 
 
 β E
itσ  
V
itσ
SLD1 -.176114 [.610] 
-.028950 
[.000] 
-.31640 
[.000] 
SLD2 8.96800 [.079] 
-.406420 
[.000] 
-.645497 
[.000] 
SLD3  110.077 [.001] 
-2.80647 
[.000] 
-3.08430 
[.000] 
LEV -2.79117 [.086] 
.098838 
[.000] 
.87715 
[.004] 
DIV .932537 [.047] 
-.033542 
[.000] 
-.36957 
[.000] 
LOSS 1.79920 [.856] 
.727600 
[.000] 
.795673 
[.000] 
GAP -16.5487 [.007] 
.466741 
[.000] 
.523788 
[.000] 
POR .00119501 [.925] 
-.000824687 
[.000] 
-.00895056 
[.000] 
R2 .389452 565915 .595891 
LM 2.58479 [.108] 
8.89850 
[.003] 
7.61118 
[.006] 
DW .836148 [.000,.000] 
1.45846 
[.000,.000] 
1.47159 
[.000,.000] 
 
 
 
Notes:  
(1) The dependent variables show in the first row, the independent variables show in the first column. 
(2) The numbers between parentheses are P-values. 
(3) SLD1 = [(1 if big BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * SLD (where SLD = notional value/total assets)]. 
     SLD2 = [(1 if medium BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * SLD (where SLD = notional value/total assets)]. 
     SLD3 = [(1 if small BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * SLD (where SLD = notional value/total assets)]. 
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Table (5-8): The interactions of size dummies with CLCS 
 
 
 β E
itσ  
V
itσ
CLD1 -11.7427 [.015] 
-.182236 
[.043] 
-.698669 
[.044] 
CLD2 10.0244 [.933] 
-1.62913 
[.465] 
-1.85962 
[.470] 
CLD3  -428.334 [.294] 
-1.49238 
[.844] 
-1.97384 
[.829] 
LEV -4.56148 [.004] 
.160570 
[.000] 
.255332 
[.000] 
DIV 1.03736 [.029] 
-.038081 
[.000] 
-.41928 
[.000] 
LOSS -1.64480 [.870] 
.796147 
[.000] 
.870458 
[.000] 
GAP -21.9764 [.000] 
.648802 
[.000] 
.723807 
[.000] 
POR .00662415 [.610] 
-.000781158 
[.001] 
-.00847569 
[.001] 
R2 .374609 .471570 .493421 
LM 2.20855 [.137] 
8.93473 
[.003] 
7.63747 
[.006] 
DW .846359 [.000,.000] 
1.38935 
[.000,.000] 
1.39903 
[.000,.000] 
 
 
 
Notes:  
(1) The dependent variables show in the first row, the independent variables show in the first column. 
(2) The numbers between parentheses are P-values. 
(3) CLD1 = [(1 if big BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * CLCS (where CLCS = notional value/total assets)]. 
      CLD2 = [(1 if medium BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * CLCS (where CLCS = notional value/total assets)]. 
      CLD3 = [(1 if small BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * CLCS (where CLCS = notional value/total assets)]. 
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Table (5-9): The interactions of size dummies with PARTICIPATIONS 
 
 
 β E
itσ  
V
itσ
PAD1 -.134560 [.214] 
-.00642814 
[.001] 
-.0702428 
[.001] 
PAD2 -.166867 [.735] 
-.00865669 
[.330] 
-.0969371 
[.319] 
PAD3  -2.69181 [.490] 
-.179410 
[.011] 
-.385222 
[.016] 
LEV -4.15470 [.009] 
.153285 
[.000] 
.347681 
[.000] 
DIV .988024 [.040] 
-.039029 
[.000] 
-.42962 
[.000] 
LOSS -.214669 [.983] 
.735475 
[.000] 
.903653 
[.000] 
GAP -23.6925 [.000] 
.581815 
[.000] 
.651721 
[.000] 
POR .00106588 [.934] 
-.000857270 
[.000] 
-.00630265 
[.000] 
R2 .363012 .496372 .517401 
LM 2.57204 [.109] 
3.27809 
[.070] 
3.11747 
[.077] 
DW .835254 [.000,.000] 
1.38815 
[.000,.000] 
1.39673 
[.000,.000] 
 
 
 
Notes:  
(1) The dependent variables show in the first row, the independent variables show in the first column. 
(2) The numbers between parentheses are P-values. 
(3) PAD1 = [(1 if big BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * Participations (where Participations = notional value/total 
assets)]. 
      PAD2 = [(1 if medium BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * Participations (where Participations = notional value/total 
assets)]. 
      PAD3 = [(1 if small BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * Participations (where Participations = notional value/total 
assets)]. 
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Table (5-10): List of sample BHCs. 
 
Big BHCS Small BHCS 
A B N AMRO HOLDING N V AMCORE FINANCIAL INC 
AMSOUTH BANCORPORATION BANCORPSOUTH INC 
B B & T CORP FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 
BANK NEW YORK INC FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES INC NC 
BANK OF AMERICA CORP FIRST TENNESSEE NATIONAL CORP 
CITY NATIONAL CORP FIRSTMERIT CORP 
COMMERCE BANCORP INC NJ FULTON FINANCIAL CORP PA 
FIRST BANCORP NC H S B C HOLDINGS PLC 
FIRSTMERIT CORP KEYCORP NEW 
INVESTORS FINANCIAL SERVS CORP NATIONAL CITY CORP 
M & T BANK CORP NEW YORK COMMUNITY BANCORP INC 
NATIONAL PENN BANCSHARES INC P N C BANK CORP 
OLD NATIONAL BANCORP REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP 
POPULAR INC SKY FINANCIAL GROUP INC 
SUNTRUST BANKS INC SOUTH FINL GROUP INC 
U S BANCORP DEL U M B FINANCIAL CORP 
WACHOVIA CORP NEW VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP 
WELLS FARGO & CO NEW WASHINGTON TRUST BANCORP INC 
A B N AMRO HOLDING N V AMCORE FINANCIAL INC 
Medium BHCS 
ASSOCIATED BANC CORP 
B O K FINANCIAL CORP 
COMERICA INC 
COMMERCE BANCSHARES INC 
COMPASS BANCSHARES INC 
CULLEN FROST BANKERS INC 
FIRST MEDIUMWEST BANCORP DE 
MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP 
MELLON FINANCIAL CORP 
MERCANTILE BANKSHARES CORP 
NORTH FORK BANCORPORATION NY INC 
NORTHERN TRUST CORP 
PROVIDENT BANKSHARES CORP 
REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP 
SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP 
T C F FINANCIAL CORP 
UNIONBANCAL CORP 
ZIONS BANCORP 
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Chapter Six 
 
Systematic and Unsystematic Risk of Derivative Activities in Bank 
Holding Companies: Contingent and Non-Contingent Claim Analysis  
Abstract 
This study employs both contingent and non-contingent claim models to test 
for the existence of the market discipline hypothesis for OBS derivative 
contracts in the banking industry. In addition to the CAPM systematic risk 
measure and the standard deviation of a bank’s equity return, we applied the 
Ronn-Verma option pricing model to see whether the market participants 
account for derivatives positions when they a value bank’s market risk. The 
benefit of using the contingent claim model is that the traditional linear 
models seem to be inadequate to estimate the non-linear relation between 
OBS derivatives and bank risks. In order to capture the differences in the 
marginal propensity to risk (MPR) between banks in different size groups we 
divide our bank holding company (BHC) sample into three groups, big, 
medium, and small. The conclusions are as follows (1) Among the derivatives 
contracts, swaps are the major player on the market risk valuation, and it is 
being viewed as risk reducer according to the three risk measures (Beta, 
equity return risk, and implied asset volatilities) for both big and medium 
BHCs. (2) Futures, forwards, and options do not seem to be a major 
influencers on the valuation of bank market risk measures for the three 
BHCs groups. However, we found a positive significant relation between 
these three types of derivatives on market systematic risk (Beta). (3) 
Generally, market participants view OBS derivatives, measured by swaps 
positions, as more potential risk diversification tools. (4) Small BHCs have a 
different MPR than both big and medium BHCs. (5) More capital 
requirements and regulations on bank derivatives activities may distort the 
large banks market positions.  
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Derivatives Bank Holding Companies’ Systematic and Unsystematic 
Risks: Contingent and Non-Contingent Claim Models 
 
6.1. Introduction: 
During the period 1990-2006 the banking industry faced many types of 
regulations and risk - credit risk, interest rate risk and foreign exchange risk - which has 
forced banking firms to extend their operations to include off-balance-sheet (OBS) 
activities in addition to on-balance-sheet activities. OBS activities have both risk-
reducing as well as risk-increasing attributes, and when used appropriately, they can 
reduce market risk. Recently, the 1997-1998 Asian crisis left banks that had large 
positions in the Asian derivatives securities markets with large losses. Other examples are 
the failure of the U.K. investment bank Barings and the bankruptcy of Orange County in 
California in the 1990s, also linked to OBS activities in derivatives25.  
Theory about how a bank’s risk is affected by OBS activities suggests that 
OBS activities may be related to bank risk in three ways. First, OBS activities are an 
obligation against a bank and the bank’s customers to make a payment in the future under 
certain circumstances in which the banks and their customers would prefer not to make 
the payment. Thus OBS activities will increase a bank’s risk. Second, OBS activities will 
reduce a bank’s customer risk, in sense that there will be more professional management, 
a size factor, and other factors. Third, Avery and Berger (1988) claim that OBS activities 
may reduce risk if they are used to hedge rather than to speculate. 
                                                
25 Saunders, Anthony and Cornett, Marcia; “Financial Markets and Institutions: a Modern Perspective”, 
second edition,  Mc Graw Hill, 2004. 
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The use of derivatives contracts accelerated during the 1992-2005 period and 
accounted for much of the growth in OBS activities. Examples of these contracts would 
be futures, forward, options, and swaps. These financial products, in addition to 
providing fee income, manage to hedge interest rate risk and foreign exchange risk. Also, 
use of these instruments have led to an excess of different types of risks for banking 
institutions. In this study a two-stage analysis has been developed; in stage one we have 
estimated our dependent variables, which include three market risk measures (1) the 
systematic market risk (from CAPM, β), (2) the standard deviation of a bank’s equity 
return (σE), and (3) the implied asset volatility from the Ronn-Verma option model (σV). 
The second stage has been to regress these dependent variables on the on- and off-
balance-sheet risk variables using a panel econometric technique for the bank holding 
companies (BHCs) sector. The study is organized as follows. Section three presents the 
methodology of analysis. Section three includes data and empirical analysis. The 
empirical results are in section four and conclusions and policy implications are presented 
in section five. 
6.2. Methodology: 
In this section we intend to test a bank’s risk level that might be affected by on 
and off-balance-sheet bank activities. Our analysis is compromised of two stages, the first 
stage is to estimate BHCs market risk from the perspective of the equity holders. Three 
different risk measures are used to estimate BHCs market risk; the first one is market 
systematic risk (beta), derived from CAPM, second is the standard deviation of bank’s 
equity return ( Eitσ ), daily return data is used to estimate the yearly BHCs risk, and thirdly 
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we use a contingent option pricing model to estimate the BHCs implied asset volatility 
( Vitσ ) as a measure of BHCs risk. (More detailed discussion will follow). The second 
stage is to regress these three estimated risk measures (beta, standard deviation of equity 
return ( Eitσ ), and implied asset volatility (
V
itσ )) as the dependent variables on off- and on-
balance-sheet risk measures. Following is a discussion of each of these risks. 
6.2.1. Market Risk Measures: 
4)Beta or Systematic Risk itβ : in the CAPM framework, risk is measured by the variance 
of possible returns. However, variance is not a universal measure of riskiness. Our first 
risk measure is derived from the CAPM return generating process according to the 
following equation:  
)1......(........................................itMtitiit RR εβα ++=  
where Rit = rit-Rft is the holding period return (rit) for the ith  over the period t  in excess of 
the risk-free rate of interest (Rft). Rmt = rmt-Rft is the holding period return (rmt) for the 
market portfolio over period t in excess of the risk-free rate of interest (rft). iα is the 
intercept, and itε is the i
th bank-specific factor which is independent of Rmt. c represents 
the systematic risk which measures the security's sensitivity to market-wide events which 
cannot be diversified away. It reflects differing investor expectations about the 
relationship between each bank’s return and the market return. 
5)Standard Deviation of Equity Return Eitσ : We are using the standard deviation of 
bank’s equity return as a measure for the market risk which will include both the market 
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risk and bank-specific risk. The standard deviation of bank’s equity return will be 
estimated using the following formula: 
)2...(..................................................)(
1
2∑
=
−=
n
t
AvgtRE KKσ  
tK is the Ex-post equity return in period t, AvgK  is the average annual return during the 
year. 
6)Contingent Claim Models: The standard linear approaches to estimate the bank’s 
market risk might be inadequate because not all the risk measures are neither linear nor 
monotonic functions of a bank’s risk. The contingent claim models correct for this 
nonlinearity of a bank’s risk. Ronn and Verma (1986) introduced a contingent claim 
model nested from Black and Sholes (1973) option pricing model; following is an 
explanation of this model. 
Ronn and Verma introduce the risk-based deposit insurance measure that can 
be estimated from the market value of a bank’s equity and the instantaneous equity’s 
standard deviation. They state that the empirical estimation of risk and deposit insurance 
premium is measurable when time series data on the market value of a bank’s equity and 
the book value of its debt are available. The equity of a bank can be written as: 
)3......(..............................).........()( TXBNXVNE vσρ −−=  
Where: 
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where, E is the market value of equity, σE is the instantaneous standard 
deviation of equity return, V is the unobserved post-insurance value of bank assets, B is 
the book value of debt liabilities, σv is the instantaneous standard deviation of asset 
return, N( ~ ) is the univariate cumulative normal distribution function, and T represents 
the time until the next audit of bank assets. Equations (4 and 5) can be solved 
simultaneously for two unknowns, V and σv, for each observed E and σE. An 
exogenously determined closure rule is required to solve these simultaneous equations. 
Banks are audited each year, and at audit time banks are closed if VT is less than ρB 
where VT is the terminal value of assets at time T, and ρ ≤ 1 is a policy parameter; 
therefore, the maturity of debt is assumed to be 1.  
6.2.2. On-Balance-Sheet Accounting Risk Factors:  
7)Leverage Risk (LEV):  Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes (1970) indicate that as additional 
debt is added the equity holder’s estimate of return volatility is increased. Hamada (1972) 
reports that approximately one quarter of systematic risk is explained by the degree of 
financial leverage. On the other hand, Mandelker and Rhee (1984) find that both 
operating and financial leverage jointly determine systematic risk. Therefore, if these 
leverage ratios increase, it may lead to higher variability of bank’s equity returns and 
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therefore its market risk. Financial leverage is constructed by taking a ratio of total 
liabilities and total assets. 
8)Diversification Risk (DIV): a heavy investment in one category of assets will generate a 
diversification risk. In other words, as banks concentrate their loan operations on one 
type of clients then the bank will be considered less diversified and the diversification 
risk will increase and it will directly and indirectly affect the market risk. The Herfindahl 
Index (HI) can be used to measure the degree of loan portfolio diversification, an 
increased levels of loan concentration associated with large HI values (i.e. less loan 
diversification) will increase a bank’s risk. Hence, greater diversification is expected to 
cause less variability in earnings. Thus, the HI measure of loan concentration should be 
positively related to systematic and unsystematic market risk measures. In this study we 
will use the inverse of the HI to translate it from a concentration index to a diversification 
index.  
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HI     Where n = number of loans types. 
9)Credit Risk (LOSS): this type of risk is the risk associated with the quality of a bank's 
earning assets, namely its loans. Low quality bank assets (loans) cause high probability of 
future defaults that may be expected to reduce earnings and dividends; in other words it 
will increase the bank’s risk. Since banks are highly leveraged, Brewer and Lee (1986) 
conclude that large nonperforming loans or large security losses can bring about 
insolvency. Furthermore, major fluctuations in interest rates can greatly influence the 
market value of long-term fixed rate assets. Similarly, a decline in asset quality can lead 
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to write-offs and reduced earnings from the loan portfolio. Thus, LOSS is expected to 
affect the market measures of risk positively. The credit measure used in this study is 
calculated by dividing loan loss provision by total assets. 
10)The Interest Rate Risk (GAP): This type of risk arises because the maturity 
composition of assets and liabilities may be different, and therefore banks may be 
affected negatively, as changing market interest rates may have a differentiated impact on 
the value of assets and liabilities. French, Ruback, and Schwert (1983) introduce the 
nominal contracting hypothesis to explain the sensitivity of commercial bank stock 
returns. Nominal contracts are those assets which have cash flows that are fixed in 
nominal terms. On the other hand, cash flows generated by real assets fluctuate with the 
price level. Overall, most of the assets and liabilities of depository financial institutions 
can be postulated to be nominal contracts. Thus, according to the nominal contracting 
hypothesis, a firm’s holding of nominal assets is important in order to achieve the 
objective of maximizing stockholder's wealth. Studies by Fama (1975, 1976), and Fama 
and Gibbons (1982), establish that unexpected changes in interest rates are directly 
related to inflationary expectations. Hence, the nominal contracting hypothesis supports 
the notion that unanticipated changes in the interest rate would affect a bank’s equity 
value depending on the duration of nominal assets and liabilities held by the firm. The 
greater the amount of net nominal assets and the longer the duration of these assets, the 
higher would be the interest rate sensitivity of a bank's common stock. In other words, the 
greater the absolute value of GAP, the more the bank is exposed to unexpected changes 
in interest rates. Therefore, GAP is expected to be positively related to market-related 
risk measures. 
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11)Operating Risk (Bank’s Size Risk) (SIZE): According to Saunders, Strock, and Travlos 
(1990), the larger the size of a bank holding company the greater its ability to diversify 
away its asset risk. Furthermore, the "too big to fail" doctrine enables large banking firms 
to maximize the value of implicit failure guarantees associated with deposit insurance and 
bank closure policy. The larger the bank is, the more analysis will be conducted about the 
bank’s equity and debt, thus low risk. Investors may also believe that larger banking 
firms may be protected by some regulatory rules than the small banking firms. All these 
reasons together suggest a negative relation between bank size and market risk measures 
for BHCs. 
12)Dividend Payout Variability Risk (POR): According to Brewer and Lee (1986), bank 
equities are affected by the earning power of bank assets. Therefore, a bank's stock price 
is negatively related to the variability of its rate of return. BHCs will always want to keep 
a stable dividend policy after it is established, and it will be reluctant to cut down the 
dividend payout ratio. Furthermore, a higher dividend payout ratio may be considered as 
a sign of higher earning levels. Also stability in the dividend payout ratio suggests 
stability in the bank’s earning levels, implying a lower level of market risk. Thus, a high 
dividend payout ratio is associated with low risk and POR is expected to affect market 
risk measures negatively. 
6.2.3. Off-Balance Sheet Guarantees Risk Factors:   
Off-balance sheet (OBS) items are contingent assets and liabilities that may 
affect the future status of a financial institution’s balance sheet.  Although OBS activities 
are now an important source of fee income for almost all BHCs, they have the potential 
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to produce positive as well as negative future cash flows. Some OBS activities may 
involve risks that add to the banking firm’s overall risk exposure; others may hedge or 
reduce their interest rate, credit, and foreign exchange risks. Following is a discussion of 
the impact of OBS activities on banking firm’s risk. 
2)Commitments Risk: A loan commitment agreement is a contractual commitment by a 
bank to loan a customer a certain maximum amount at given interest rate terms. The 
commitment contract also defines the period over which the customer will be able to 
utilize his contracted loan. It is true that the bank will generate fee income by making 
these commitments to the borrowers, but it will also generate more credit and liquidity 
risks. Bennett (1986) claims that off-balance-sheet activities lead to credit risk since these 
activities provide an opportunity to increase leverage significantly without additional 
regulatory requirements. Cates and Davis (1989) suggest that credit risk due to off-
balance sheet activities may be transferred to other bank assets. As an example, if a bank 
buys an option, interest rate risk may be reduced but credit risk can increase. Of the 
activities that are likely to contribute significantly to credit risk, loan commitments may 
be the largest contributor. Bennett (1986) identifies liquidity risk as another element that 
may contribute to the riskiness of the banking firm when exposed to off-balance-sheet 
activities. Nevertheless, the bank is exposed to liquidity risk due to these loan 
commitments. Liquidity risk arises because of the possibility that many customers may 
decide to borrow from the bank at the same time. This will be especially true in the event 
that alternative sources of funds may be unavailable. In order to satisfy this unexpected 
need of funds, banks may have to compete for funds aggressively. All the points 
discussed so far about the loan commitments were increasing risk factors but not 
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decreasing risk factors. Loan commitments can be viewed as risk management tools that 
reduce a bank’s risk when these contracts are added to the diversified bank’s activities 
portfolio. This is especially true when there is extensive competition with the other non-
banking financial firms, and more importantly, when we consider the competition 
internationally. In other words, instead of having only the traditional banking activities, 
there will be a more diversified portfolio to invest a bank’s assets. 
Letters of Credit (LC): banks deal with two types of LC, Commercial Letters 
of Credit (CLCs) and the Standby Letters of Credit (SLCs).  LCs are essentially 
guarantees to underwrite performance that a depository institution sells to the buyers of 
guarantees for fees while at the same time adding to its contingent future liabilities. 
Although both CLCs and SLCs have the same type of risk exposure, default risk, they are 
different in the severity of the risk exposure. In the case of CLCs, the bank’s role is to 
provide a formal guarantee that payment for goods shipped or sold internationally or 
domestically will be forthcoming regardless of whether the buyer of the good defaults on 
payment. With SLCs, the bank’s role is to provide a formal guarantee of payment to 
cover contingencies that are potentially more severe and less predictable, like bond 
performance. SLCs mean a higher level of default risk exposure. At the same time, LCs 
may have a risk-reducing impact through the diversification effect. 
6.3. Data and Empirical Analysis 
Data comes from three different sources: CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and FDIC. 
Our sample includes 54 bank holding companies (BHCs) during the period 2000 - 2005. 
We are limited to this number of BHCs and the time span because we have restricted our 
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study to those BHCs that are available in the CRSP database. There is a trade-off between 
including more time-series points but less cross-section points, or less time-series points 
with more cross-section points. Given this trade-off we chose to have more cross-section 
points since our primary interest is in the impact of the off-and on-balance-sheet 
measures on BHCS’s market risks between the largest number of BHCs. However, a six 
year period should be reasonable relative to recent research in this area. 
First, we collected the following data from CRSP; daily return for our sample 
BHCs, equally weighted return to proxy for the market portfolio’s return, and daily rate 
of return for one month treasury bills to proxy for the risk free rate. Then we estimated 
the yearly value of the systematic risk measure (β), equation (1), using the ordinary least 
square (OLS) method for each BHC. Second, using the daily rate of return for each BHC, 
we calculated the standard deviation of equity return (σRE), equation (2), to get our 
second measure of market risk. Yearly average rate of return is computed from the daily 
rate of return for each BHCS. 
Third, we have collected data about market value of equity (E) and book value 
of debt (B) from COMPUSTAT, used along with the data collected from CRSP to solve 
equation (4) and (5) simultaneously to get the value of the unobserved implied asset 
volatility ( Vitσ ) and the unobserved post-insurance value of bank assets (V). We used a 
numerical routine to get the simultaneous solution of our two unknowns. Following Ronn 
and Verma (1986), the initial estimate that we used for the value of V was the sum of 
market value of equity and the face value of the debt, while that for σV was σE scaled 
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down by the leverage ratio. The values of the cumulative normal probability distribution 
N(--) were obtained using the polynomial approximation as follows 
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P = 0.2316419; a1 = 0.31938153; a2 = -0.356563782;  
a3 = 1.781477937; a4 = -1.821255978; a5 = 1.330274429.   
From the first stage we estimated our dependent variables, the three market risk measures 
β, σE, and σV. The second stage of our study was to regress these dependent variables on 
the on and off balance sheet variables as they appear in the following 
equations.
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where the dependent variables are: 
itβ : the systematic risk measure for bank i at time t. 
E
itσ : the standard deviation of equity returns for BHCS i at time t. 
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V
itσ : the implied asset volatility from estimated from the Ronn-Verma model for bank i at 
time t. 
We collected the data required to compute the independent variables, both on and off 
balance sheet, from the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for the same 
54 BHCs during the same period of time. We discussed earlier the expected relation of 
these on balance sheet variables to market risk measures; however, these on-balance-
sheet variables are used as control variables, and we are interested in checking the 
relation of OBS derivatives contracts with a bank’s market risk from the equity holder’s 
point of view. Following is brief definition of the variables in equation 8-9. 
K
itDERV : Represents the notional value of OBS derivative contracts for bank i at time t, 
K represent the type of OBS derivative contracts, futures, forwards, options, and 
swaps. Each of these types includes the notional value of the interest rate 
contracts, exchange rate contracts, commodity exchange contracts, and equity 
exchange contracts.  
LEVit: The leverage variable is computed as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
DIVit: The diversification variable is computed using seven different types of loans, as 
reported in schedule HC-C of the report of income for BHCs, employing the 
inverse of Herfindahl Index (HI) reported in equation (6). 
LOSSit: The credit risk variable is calculated as the ratio of loan loss provision to total 
assets. 
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GAPit: The interest rate risk variable is calculated as the difference between the total 
market rate assets and the total market rate liabilities divided by the total assets. 
SIZEit: The operational risk variable is computed by taking the natural logarithm of bank 
assets to avoid the linearity problem. 
PORit: The earning variability risk is calculated by dividing the cash dividend by the total 
assets. 
Equations 8-9 have been regressed on the independent variables using a panel data 
collected for the BHCs in the U.S. banking industry. We employed the random effect 
methodology, as it appears to be better estimate than the fixed effect model from the 
Husman test ( 2χ values are reported in the table results). 
Dummy variables have been employed to test OBS derivatives strength on a 
bank’s market risk given a bank’s size group. To achieve this purpose we estimated the 
regression equations (11-13) using panel data methodology employing all the BHCs 
included in our sample (54 BHCs) during the period 2000-2005. We imposed dummy 
variables to represent the bank’s size. In other words, any OBS derivative contracts is 
inserted in the regression as three variables - one is [(SIZEDUM=1 if big, and 0 
otherwise) * DERV], second [(SIZEDUM=1 if medium, and 0 otherwise) * DERV], and 
third [(SIZEDUM=1 if small, and 0 otherwise) * DERV].  
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This way we estimate, not only the directional impact of OBS derivatives on 
market risk in a given size group, but also the strength impact of these activities given the 
size group. Therefore, the size group may enhance the effect of OBS derivative contracts 
on a bank’s risk, or discourage the effect of OBS derivatives contracts on the bank’s risk. 
6.4. Result Analysis 
6.4.1. Size Separation Analysis: 
Here we report the empirical results of the random effect estimations. Our 
analysis is designed in a way to capture the differences in the marginal propensity to risk 
(MPR) which might be affected by the operational size differences between BHCs. We 
believe that the operation size of each BHCs should be an important factor in determining 
the marginal propensity to risk factors (on- and off-balance-sheet), in other words, large 
BHCs should react differently than small BHCs or medium size BHCs. In order to test 
this hypothesis, we divide our BHCS sample into three groups, big, medium, and small. 
This size classification should not interfere with the SIZE factor included in the 
regression model. The independent variable SIZE is included as a control variable in 
order to measure the impact of OBS guarantees contracts on the market overall risk, 
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while the three size classifications are to see the differences in the MPR between the 
three size groups. It may also be viewed as a statistical smoothing process in order to 
eliminate some of the outliers from of our sample. A simple investigation of the BHCs 
sample will reveal that there is a significant difference between the sizes of the BHCs 
(there are upper outliers and lower outliers). The number of BHCs with total assets less 
than $100 trillion is in the range of 30-40 BHCs during our study period while only about 
10-20 BHCs are greater than $100 trillion. Also, within the less than $100 trillion bracket 
there are about 15-20 BHCs ranging between $20 million and $100 million, and about 
15-30 BHCs have less than $20 trillion in total assets value. This significant difference in 
the distribution of the BHCs total assets may suggest that there is a significant difference 
in the marginal propensity to risk (MPR) which implies that significant differences in risk 
management policies for each group of the BHCs. Therefore, each group will include 18 
BHCs. The 18 big BHCs count for at least 80% of total assets of all BHCs in our sample 
with about 12% for the 18 medium BHCs and only 2% for the 18 small BHCs. 
This part of the study reports the empirical results of the random effect 
estimations. Our analysis is designed in a way to capture the differences in the marginal 
propensity to risk (MPR) which might be affected by the operational size differences 
among BHCs. We believe that the operation size of each BHC should be an important 
factor in determining the marginal propensity to risk factors (on- and off-balance-sheet). 
In other words, large BHCs should react differently than the small BHCs or medium size 
BHCs. In order to accomplish this, we divided our BHC sample into three groups, big, 
medium, and small. It is important that to mention that this size classification should not 
interfere with the SIZE factor included in the regression model. The independent variable 
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SIZE is included as a control variable in order to measure the impact of OBS derivative 
contracts on the market overall risk, while the three-size classification is to see the 
differences in the MPR between the three size groups. Also it can be viewed as a 
statistical smoothing process in order to eliminate some of the outliers from of our 
sample. A simple investigation of the BHCs sample will reveal that there is a significant 
difference between the sizes of BHCs (there are upper outliers and lower outliers).  The 
number of BHCs with total assets less than 100 trillion dollars is in the range of 30-40 
BHCs and, during our study period and only about 10-20 BHCs are in the more than 100 
trillions dollars bracket. Also, within the less than 100 trillion bracket there are about 15-
20 BHCs ranging between 20 million to 100 million and about 15-30 BHCs have less 
than 20 trillion total assets value. This significant difference in the distribution of the 
BHCs total assets may suggest that there is a significant difference in the MPR which 
apply significant differences in the risk management policies for each group of the BHCs. 
Therefore, each group includes 18 BHCs. The biggest 18 BHCs account for at least 80% 
of total assets of all BHCs in our sample, about 12% for the 18 medium-size BHCs and 
only 2% for the 18 smallest BHCs. 
We employed a panel data model (random effect), instead of simple time series 
OLS or cross-section OLS for two reasons. First, neither one of these two (time-series or 
cross-section) methods alone will yield sufficient degrees of freedom in regression 
analysis. Second, regression based on cross-section cannot be used to account for shifts in 
market measures of risk and accounting data through time. Also time series alone cannot 
be used easily to conduct inter-bank relationships and comparisons. Following is the 
result of the econometric analysis for each group and each risk measure. 
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6.4.1.1. OBS derivative contracts:  
Futures: Results reported in our tables suggest that futures contracts are 
statistically insignificant for all the risk measures for the big and small-size groups. In the 
medium group case, futures contracts are statistically insignificant on the standard 
deviation of equity return measure ( Eitσ ) and the implied asset volatility measure (
V
itσ ), 
while it is positively significant on the systematic risk measure (BETA). The insignificant 
relation between futures contracts and the risk measures imply that investors do not price 
the risk of these contracts that BHCs may incur by having these positions. The reason for 
this insignificance might be the small portion of the futures contracts relative to other 
OBS derivative positions see figure (6-1). Moreover, futures seem to have no impact on 
the diversification position of bank’s assets portfolios. The significant relation between 
the Beta measure and futures in the medium BHCS group means that market participants 
price the risk of these contracts in the overall market systematic risk and thus it will be 
reflected in the required rate of return. However, this inconsistent relation between 
futures and Beta might be a result of hetroskedasticity as we may see from the LM 
multiplier reported at the bottom of each table. 
Forwards: The results propose that, similar to futures, forward contracts are 
statistically insignificant for all the risk measures for the big and small-size groups. 
Forward contracts are statistically insignificant on the standard deviation of equity return 
measure ( Eitσ ) and the implied asset volatility measure (
V
itσ ), but they are positive and 
significant on the systematic risk measure (BETA) for the medium BHCs group. The 
insignificant relation between forward contracts and the risk measures imply that 
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investors do not price the risk of these contracts that BHCs may incur by having these 
positions. The reasons for this insignificancy might be the small portion of forward 
contracts relative to other OBS derivative positions. Moreover, forwards seem to add no 
further impact on the diversification position of a bank’s assets portfolios. The significant 
relation between the Beta measure and forwards in the medium BHCS group means that 
market participants price the risk of these contracts in the overall market systematic risk 
and thus it will be reflected in the required rate of return. However, this inconsistent 
relation between forwards and Beta might be a result of a hetroskedasticity problem. 
Option: Consistent with futures and forward contracts, option contracts are 
also insignificant for the three size groups according to the three risk measures also. 
However, we do have the same significant positive relation between options and Beta risk 
measure. The similar econometric results between futures, forwards, and options might 
be because of the relatively small portion of the overall notional value of derivative 
positions held by the BHCS sample during our period of study. It seems that market 
participants value the volume effect of this position more than the risk effect. This might 
be true since the amount of each type of contract is small relative to the BHC’s total 
assets. However, we believe that although each one of these types is small relative to the  
BHC’s assets, they are large when they considered together, hence they should be priced. 
Swaps: The swaps contracts form about 61% of the total OBS derivative 
positions. Fortunately, the market participants price this position in their required rate of 
return, and they consider it as a risk-reducing factor according to the three risk measures 
(Beta, Eitσ , 
V
itσ ) for both big BHCs and the medium BHCS groups. This means that 
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swaps positions are a concern for well-diversified investors. This negative relation can be 
viewed that as swaps’ market price increases, the bank’s risk will be affected negatively. 
One can argue about the difference between the price effect and the volume effect of 
these contracts however, we include the swaps notional value which illustrates the net 
effect of these two directions. Although swaps contracts are significantly risk-reducing 
factors for big and medium sized BHCs, they are statistically insignificant for the small 
BHCs. This insignificant impact might be interpreted as meaning that market participants 
believe that small BHCS are not able to deal with these contracts that need highly 
qualified skills and risk managements tools which might not be available to the small 
BHCs. 
6.4.1.2. On-Balance-Sheet Accounting Measures: 
Generally the on-balance-sheet accounting measures hold their expected sign 
as suggested by theory, but that is not always the case. However, for completeness 
purposes we will discuss each of them separately. 
Leverage (LEV): There is a significant positive impact on two risk measures 
( Eitσ , and 
V
itσ ) for large size BHC, and it is statistically insignificant for the Beta risk 
measure. It is also significantly positive on the three risk measures for the small BHCs. 
Interestingly, it was insignificant for the equity risk and the implied asset risk ( Vitσ ) for 
the medium BHCs and significantly negative for Beta risk measure. The positive 
significant relation this indicates that as a bank’s leverage increases, the market includes 
this in its risk valuation, which suggests that OBS derivative contracts will contribute to 
the total leverage of BHCs and thus will increase their risk. 
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Diversification (DIV): This variable carries a significant negative relation on 
the equity risk ( Eitσ ) and the implied asset risk (
V
itσ ) for the three groups, which is 
unexpected. But, it carries a significant positive relation with the systematic bank’s risk 
(Beta) for the three groups. The negative sign suggests that as banks become more 
diversified they are able to eliminate that portion of risk which is unsystematic risk. The 
positive sign, in the Beta model, suggests that diversification will not eliminate/reduce 
systematic market risk. Thus, derivative contracts will diversify the unsystematic risk, but 
they will not diversify the systematic risk. Figure (6-2) indicates that our sample BHCs 
are not well-diversified and, they are using mainly swaps in addition to some other non-
traditional activities as diversification tools.  
Credit Risk (LOSS): This factor has a significant positive influence on all 
market risk measures for the big BHCs, as expected. Also it is significantly positive on 
both the equity return risk ( Eitσ ) and the implied asset risk (
V
itσ ) but statistically 
insignificant on the Beta measure for the medium BHCs. It is insignificant for almost all 
of the risk measures for the small BHCS. The positive sign supports our theoretical 
discussion and it recommends that as banks’ default risk increase, market participants 
will reflect this on their evaluation, which also suggests that when OBS derivative 
positions held by banks more default risk will be expected by the market. 
Interest rate risk (GAP): As expected this variable holds a positive sign on 
two market measures of risk, equity return risk ( Eitσ ) and implied asset risk (
V
itσ ), for the 
three BHCS groups, which suggests that the greater the absolute value of the interest rate 
gap the greater the bank’s risk. The results however report an inverse relation on beta risk 
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measure which can be explained by the fact that banks may use high gap values to hedge 
their asset portfolios and hence reduce risk. 
Operational Risk (SIZE): The results indicate a significant negative relation 
between size and two of the risk measures, equity return risk ( Eitσ ) and implied asset risk 
( Vitσ ), for the three bank groups.  For the Beta risk measure the sign however is 
unexpectedly positive for the medium and small-size BHCs and insignificant for the big 
BHCs. The positive relation between size and Beta risk can be viewed as follows. When 
banks’ operations increase the market will translate this expansion as a transitory period 
which will include more risk since banks may hold more assets than they really can 
manage. The insignificant relation can be justified that Beta measure of risk includes only 
market systematic risk which can’t be diversified by increasing a bank’s operations. 
Earning Variability Risk (POR): This variable carries the expected sign for 
both the big and medium BHCs on both equity return risk, Eitσ , and implied asset risk 
( Vitσ ), and it is insignificant for the Beta measure. It also has an insignificant impact on 
the three risk measures in the case of medium BHCs. 
6.4.2. Size Interaction Analysis: 
Tables (6-6 to 6-9) report the results of regression equations 11-13, where we 
examine the interaction between a bank’s size and OBS derivative contracts on market 
risk measures. The OBS derivative coefficients, generally, carry the same directional 
relation to the bank’s market risk. However the quantitative relation is higher; in other 
words, the BHC’s size determines the sensitivity level between the percentage changes in 
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these OBS derivatives and the market risk behavior. For example, swaps contracts are 
found to be a significant risk-reducer factor for both the big and the medium BHCs 
groups. In our separate-groups analysis, although swaps still hold the same significant 
risk-reducing impact for the same groups, in addition for third group, the sensitivity is 
different when derivative activities interact with the size dummy variables. Moreover, the 
market participants’ valuation of OBS derivative contracts on a bank’s market risk is 
different from size-group to another. For instance, if we consider three banks, the first 
one from the big BHCs group, the second one from the medium BHCs group, and the 
third one from the small BHCs group, and they decide to increase their positions on 
swaps in the market by the same amount, then we should expect that the impact of these 
swaps on the banks’ market risk valuation to be different from one group to another. 
Generally speaking, the risk sensitivity is higher in the case of the small-size banking 
firms than the medium size and the smallest impact will be on the large banking firms, 
i.e., the bank’s size is adversely related to bank’s risk sensitivity to the derivative 
contracts. 
The interaction analysis also suggests that options and futures contracts are 
significantly risk-reducer factors for the big BHCs while they are insignificant in the 
separate-groups analysis. Moreover, the on-balance-sheet factors generally hold their 
expected impact with market risk.   
6.5. Summary Conclusion and Policy Implication: 
This research aims to test the market discipline existence of OBS derivative 
contracts and bank holding companies’ market risk. In addition to the traditional market 
risk measures, we employed a contingent claim model that accounts for the non-linear 
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relationship between OBS derivatives and market risk. Therefore, we have three risk 
measures, systematic risk (Beta), standard deviation of equity return, and implied asset 
volatility (from the contingent claim model). We included four OBS derivative contracts, 
futures, forwards, options, and swaps, and six on-balance-sheet risk measures as control 
variables. 
Our analysis is designed in a way to capture the differences in the marginal 
propensity to risk (MPR) which might be affected by the operational size differences 
between BHCs. We believe that the operational size of each BHC should be an important 
factor to determine the marginal propensity to risk factors (on and off balance sheet), in 
other words, large BHCs should react differently from small BHCs or medium size 
BHCs.  
The results suggest, first, that swaps contracts are the major player in market 
risk valuation, and is viewed as a risk-reducer according to the three risk measures for big 
and medium BHCs. Second, futures, forwards, and options do not have much influence 
on the valuation of banks in the three market risk measures (Beta, SigmaE, and SigmaV) 
for the three BHC groups. This result may be due to the small value of these contracts 
relative to swaps contracts, and thus the market participants do not pay as much attention 
to these positions as risk factors. However, we find a positive and significant relationship 
between these three types of derivatives on market systematic risk (Beta). Third, market 
participants generally view OBS derivatives, measured by swaps positions, as more 
potential risk diversification tools. Four, small BHCs have a different MPR than both big 
and medium BHCs, which may follow the economy of scope concept and the “big to fail” 
doctrine. Generally speaking, the risk sensitivity is higher in the case of the small-size 
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banking firms than the medium-size and the smallest impact on the largest banking firms, 
i.e., the bank’s size is adversely related to bank’s risk sensitivity to the derivative 
contracts. Five, the on-balance-sheet variables are consistent with the existing literature 
and they do have an impact on the pricing process of a bank’s equity. To a certain extent, 
the relation between these accounting risk variables and different market risk measures 
varies between each BHCS group. 
Therefore, more capital requirements and regulations on banks’ OBS 
derivative activity may distort the large banks market position. Moreover, market 
participants do not price futures, forwards, and options in their calculations of market risk 
although these contracts together should have significant impact on the overall bank’s 
risk and therefore should be considered in market valuation. 
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SWAPS
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Figure (6-1): Distribution of Derivatives Contracts
Figure (6-2): Distribution of Loans-to-Assets Ratios
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Table (6-6): The interactions of size dummies with FUTURES 
 
 β E
itσ  
V
itσ
FUD1 -.027560 [.175] 
-.000761225 
[.042] 
-.00827935 
[.043] 
FUD2 1.81148 [.586] 
-.047116 
[.442] 
-.58263 
[.471] 
FUD3  25.6720 [.779] 
-1.77835 
[.291] 
-1.94656 
[.290] 
LEV -3.86980 [.016] 
.160210 
[.000] 
.551302 
[.000] 
DIV 1.04033 [.030] 
-.038099 
[.000] 
-.41963 
[.000] 
LOSS .646463 [.949] 
.832038 
[.000] 
.909791 
[.000] 
GAP -22.2705 [.000] 
.653231 
[.000] 
.728022 
[.000] 
POR .00254330 [.844] 
-.000834434 
[.001] 
-.00905950 
[.001] 
R2 .363392 .473774 .495500 
LM 2.10027 [.147] 
8.35674  
[.004] 
7.11905 
[.008] 
DW .834711 [.000,.000] 
1.38775 
[.000,.000] 
1.39779 
[.000,.000] 
 
 
 
Notes:  
(1) The dependent variables show in the first row, the independent variables show in the first column. 
(2) The numbers between parentheses are P-values. 
(3) FUD1 = [(1 if big BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * Futures (where futures = notional value/total assets)]. 
  FUD2 = [(1 if medium BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * Futures (where futures = notional value/total assets)]. 
  FUD3 = [(1 if small BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * Futures (where futures = notional value/total assets)]. 
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Table (6-7): The interactions of size dummies with FORWARDS 
 
 
 β E
itσ  
V
itσ
FOD1 .010399 [.645] 
-.000441865 
[.288] 
-.00469971 
[.302] 
FOD2 -.180082 [.809] 
-.00161730 
[.906] 
-.0193036 
[.898] 
FOD3  -.401387 [.935] 
-.145399 
[.108] 
-.551447 
[.126] 
LEV -3.95177 [.013] 
.170327 
[.000] 
.166011 
[.000] 
DIV .999312 [.038] 
-.039125 
[.000] 
-.053068 
[.000] 
LOSS 1.86495 [.852] 
.829041 
[.000] 
.9686623 
[.000] 
GAP -22.9076 [.000] 
.628091 
[.000] 
.789967 
[.000] 
POR .000681945 [.958] 
-.000860591 
[.000] 
-.00934502 
[.000] 
R2 .358624 .469596 .480860 
LM 2.94510 [.086] 
6.83855 
[.009] 
5.92601 
[.015] 
DW 827327 [.000,.000] 
1.38447 
[.000,.000] 
1.39261 
[.000,.000] 
 
 
 
Notes:  
(1) The dependent variables show in the first row, the independent variables show in the first column. 
(2) The numbers between parentheses are P-values. 
(3) FOD1 = [(1 if big BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * Forward (where forward = notional value/total assets)]. 
  FOD2 = [(1 if medium BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * Forward (where forward = notional value/total assets)]. 
  FOD3 =[(1 if small BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * Forward (where forward = notional value/total assets)]. 
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Table (6-8): The interactions of size dummies with OPTIONS 
 
 
 β E
itσ  
V
itσ
OPD1 -.010145 [.064] 
-.000220152 
[.031] 
-.00439784 
[.031] 
OPD2 .629390 [.621] 
-.00135437 
[.954] 
.0732958 
[.998] 
OPD3  31.5867 [.081] 
-.115409 
[.732] 
-.531934 
[.720] 
LEV -4.15583 [.009] 
.159380 
[.000] 
.354399 
[.000] 
DIV 1.00431 [.034] 
-.037630 
[.000] 
-.41432 
[.000] 
LOSS 1.05074 [.917] 
.791121 
[.000] 
.863722 
[.000] 
GAP -22.2915 [.000] 
.653424 
[.000] 
.830042 
[.000] 
POR .00197094 [.878] 
-.000828958 
[.001] 
-.00689198 
[.001] 
R2 .374356 .471721 .493585 
LM 2.32772 [.127] 
8.58287
[.003] 
7.33306  
[.007] 
DW .830294 [.000,.000] 
1.38609 
[.000,.000] 
1.39546 
[.000,.000] 
 
 
 
Notes:  
(1) The dependent variables show in the first row, the independent variables show in the first column. 
(2) The numbers between parentheses are P-values. 
(3) OPD1 = [(1 if big BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * Option (where option = notional value/total assets)]. 
  OPD2 = [(1 if medium BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * option (where option = notional value/total assets)]. 
  OPD3 = [(1 if small BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * option (where option = notional value/total assets)]. 
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Table (6-9): The interactions of size dummies with SWAPS 
 
 
 β E
itσ  
V
itσ
SWD1 -.00258876 [.075] 
-.0000737711 
[.004] 
-.00801538 
[.005] 
SWD2 1.93706 [.322] 
-.158649 
[.000] 
-.574533 
[.000] 
SWD3  12.4923 [.169] 
-.333004 
[.039] 
-.655418 
[.044] 
LEV -3.91819 [.013] 
.142115 
[.000] 
.335327 
[.000] 
DIV 1.02242 [.032] 
-.036227 
[.000] 
-.39856 
[.000] 
LOSS 1.47222 [.885] 
.655458 
[.000] 
.715573 
[.000] 
GAP -19.9902 [.001] 
.532876 
[.000] 
.697712 
[.000] 
POR .00149173 [.907] 
-.000831776 
[.000] 
-.00901938 
[.000] 
R2 .372706 .520263 .532933 
LM 2.88194 [.090] 
7.42291 
[.006] 
6.51211 
[.011] 
DW .834158 [.000,.000] 
1.41037 
[.000,.000] 
1.42107 
[.000,.000] 
 
 
 
Notes:  
(1) The dependent variables show in the first row, the independent variables show in the first column. 
(2) The numbers between parentheses are P-values. 
(3) SWD1 = [(1 if big BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * Swaps (where swaps = notional value/total assets)]. 
  SWD2 = [(1 if medium BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * Swaps (where swaps = notional value/total assets)]. 
  SWD3 = [(1 if small BHCS, 0 if otherwise) * Swaps (where swaps = notional value/total assets)]. 
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Table (6-10): List of sample BHCs. 
 
Big BHCS Small BHCS 
A B N AMRO HOLDING N V AMCORE FINANCIAL INC 
AMSOUTH BANCORPORATION BANCORPSOUTH INC 
B B & T CORP FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 
BANK NEW YORK INC FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES INC NC 
BANK OF AMERICA CORP FIRST TENNESSEE NATIONAL CORP 
CITY NATIONAL CORP FIRSTMERIT CORP 
COMMERCE BANCORP INC NJ FULTON FINANCIAL CORP PA 
FIRST BANCORP NC H S B C HOLDINGS PLC 
FIRSTMERIT CORP KEYCORP NEW 
INVESTORS FINANCIAL SERVS CORP NATIONAL CITY CORP 
M & T BANK CORP NEW YORK COMMUNITY BANCORP INC 
NATIONAL PENN BANCSHARES INC P N C BANK CORP 
OLD NATIONAL BANCORP REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP 
POPULAR INC SKY FINANCIAL GROUP INC 
SUNTRUST BANKS INC SOUTH FINL GROUP INC 
U S BANCORP DEL U M B FINANCIAL CORP 
WACHOVIA CORP NEW VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP 
WELLS FARGO & CO NEW WASHINGTON TRUST BANCORP INC 
A B N AMRO HOLDING N V AMCORE FINANCIAL INC 
Medium BHCS 
ASSOCIATED BANC CORP 
B O K FINANCIAL CORP 
COMERICA INC 
COMMERCE BANCSHARES INC 
COMPASS BANCSHARES INC 
CULLEN FROST BANKERS INC 
FIRST MEDIUMWEST BANCORP DE 
MARSHALL & ILSLEY CORP 
MELLON FINANCIAL CORP 
MERCANTILE BANKSHARES CORP 
NORTH FORK BANCORPORATION NY INC 
NORTHERN TRUST CORP 
PROVIDENT BANKSHARES CORP 
REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP 
SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP 
T C F FINANCIAL CORP 
UNIONBANCAL CORP 
ZIONS BANCORP 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
In the last few decades the banking system, in the United States and across the 
globe, has witnessed an increasing usage of OBS activities. There have been many 
hypotheses raised by researchers and policy analysts to justify the existence of these 
activities. These hypotheses include, generating of fee income, avoiding regulatory taxes, 
more flexibility at breakdown points, and risk management tool. This research has aimed 
to analyze OBS activities from these different points of view. We divide OBS activities 
into two types, guarantees contracts and derivatives contracts, and test the hypotheses 
employing panel approaches using representative U.S commercial banks and 
international commercial banks data samples. In this chapter I provide summary 
conclusions and further explanation of results.  
Like many other financial activities represented as a transition in the financial 
system, financial researchers believe that OBS activities are driven by regulatory 
changes, financial innovations, and the technological progress that is accompanying 
them. Banks are just like any other firm in that they aim to maximize their revenues and 
minimize their expenses; the deregulation process during the last few decades has put 
more constraints in bank’s traditional activities which, of course, decreased bank’s 
revenues and increased bank’s expenses, decreasing bank’s profit. As a result of these 
regulatory changes bank’s escaped from the traditional, on-balance sheet activities where 
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the regulations applied, to off-balance sheet activities in order to generate new income 
sources. Although, this hypothesis is true for some new activities and it may be one 
reason to begin engagement in these sophisticated OBS activities. Our results, consistent 
with recent research, reveal that bank’s regulations do not explain much of the reasons 
behind the increasing use of these OBS activities, both guarantees and derivatives. I 
believe, the reasons behind the minimal impact of bank’s regulation in explaining OBS 
activities is that OBS activities are not caused by the new regulations but caused by the 
reasons that forced the federal reserve authority to regulate this sector. The more 
sophisticated relationships between firms, banks, and investors, may have been one of the 
more important reasons for deregulations. Financial institutions provide more services to 
investors, while at the same time they service the firms at different levels; i.e., the nature 
of their relationships has changed in a number of ways.  
Given this sophisticated financial environment and given the fact that banks 
are competing over service fees, OBS activities may be considered as a financial 
innovation where all banks are competing to take advantage of this innovation and 
introduce more diversified financial services portfolio. OBS diffusion patterns follow the 
pattern of financial innovation diffusion over time. Mansfield (1961) has shown that the 
adoption pattern of real innovations often follows a logistic time curve, and these 
innovations will grow over time until it reaches 100% occupancy. He also shown that at 
the beginning stages of the diffusion process the innovation will be spinning in an 
increasing rate and it will slow down at later stages. 
Our results support Mansfield’s model in which we conclude that banks OBS 
guarantees are decreasing over time and it is no longer considered a financial innovation 
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in U.S. banking industry. Further, banks seem to have replaced guarantees with other 
OBS activities like derivatives. However, OBS derivatives usage is increasing overtime 
and it follows the financial innovation trend in the banking industry. These results are 
consistent with Mansfield’s innovation model. Guarantees contracts were found in the 
U.S banking industry in the early 1980s and they were used increasingly during that 
decade and the early 1990s. We may find that almost all banks are engaged in these 
activities; thus the slowing stage of these activities has already started as OBS derivatives 
activities have taken their place. Moreover, derivatives activities are at the early stages of 
the diffusion process and the high growth rate is the characteristic of this stage. 
Nevertheless, the diffusion pattern of derivatives activities seems to be spinning at a 
faster rate than that for guarantees when they were at the same stage. We expect 
increasing competition, high merge rates, globalization, and higher risks to be the reasons 
behind the fast diffusion pattern for banks’ OBS derivatives activities. 
While banks regulatory factors are not a major determinant of OBS activities, 
bank’s non–regulatory factors and macro economic factors are at work to determining 
OBS usage. The results suggest that OBS guarantees follow the business cycle and the 
usage decision might be considered much like traditional bank activities. While in the 
case of derivatives activities, the substitution effect is dominant between OBS activities 
and traditional bank activities. OBS activities are profit driven and they increase with 
banks profit. 
Banks size affects OBS guarantees negatively which is inconsistent with the 
market discipline hypothesis, and the usage of guarantees decrease with bank risk. The 
relation between bank’s size and OBS derivatives is positive, which is consistent with the 
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economy of scale notion since derivatives require higher qualifications than other OBS 
activities and that is more likely available in the large size banks. Finally, a lack of 
credibility presented as the non-performing loans will decrease the usage of OBS 
activities in general. The results also suggest that OBS derivatives do not follow the 
business cycle and the usage decision does not depend on economic conditions, however, 
OBS guarantees do tend to follow the business cycle. 
OBS activities are taking place not only in the U.S. but abroad. We shed light 
on these activities in the major regions of the world. Our results demonstrate that OBS 
activities are no longer considered a financial innovation in the majority of the developed 
regions; however, OBS activities are a financial innovation in the less developed regions. 
Following our previous explanation in the case of U.S. banks, OBS activities started in 
the developed regions long before the developing regions that give OBS activities an 
increasing rate characteristic in the developing regions. Bank’s non-regulatory variables 
are the main factors in determining the usage of OBS activities in almost all regions. 
Banks size and Banks Loans are significant in six regions and insignificant in the 
remaining three. OBS activities are not profit driven and when banks’ profit increase due 
to OBS activities or traditional bank’s activities does not affect the decision of OBS 
usage, hence the profitability factor was insignificant for six regions. The non-performing 
loans is a major factor in OBS decision, it was significant for most of the regions. The 
macroeconomic variable is at work with other variable to determine OBS existence in the 
banking systems’ activities. 
The level of technology, political environment, and economic development 
seem to be a positive factor in OBS usage in six regions, USA, NAFTA, G7, The 
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European Union, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe. These regions are the most 
developed countries economically and technologically. The financial system in these 
regions is an open system and more globalized than any other region in the world. These 
regions are also more stable political environments which also gives the opportunity to 
improve the financial system and consider more financial innovation, e.g., OBS activities. 
The technological and political environments have affected OBS activities negatively in 
The Far East and Central Asia and South & Central America. These two regions are 
generally less developed than the first set of regions and the financial system does not 
encourage OBS activities as a financial innovation. The Middle East and Africa are 
regions with continuous political problems, especially The Middle East. They are also 
less developed countries, and their financial systems are not supportive of new financial 
innovations. In other words being a Middle Eastern or African bank does not affect 
bank’s OBS usage. 
Consistent with the U.S. banking system, our results reject the regulatory tax 
hypothesis and suggest that banks’ regulations have no major role in OBS activities in the 
banking system for all the regions except for Africa and The Far East and Central Asia. 
This suggests that there are alternative hypotheses to explain OBS phenomenon, like 
technology hypothesis and market discipline hypothesis. Financial system development, 
economy size, economy openness, Political environment stability are all factors to 
explain the extensive usage of OBS activities in the world and should not be neglected. 
In a further investigation of this phenomenon we have tested the market 
discipline existence of OBS activities and the bank holding companies market risk. In 
addition to the traditional market risk measures, we employed a contingent claim model 
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that account for the non-linear relationship between OBS guarantees and the market risk. 
Therefore, we have three risk measure, systematic risk (beta), standard deviation of 
equity return, and the implied asset volatility (from the contingent claim model). We 
included four OBS guarantees contracts (unused commitments, SLCs, CLCs, and 
participations), and four OBS derivative contracts (futures, forward, options, and swaps), 
in addition to six on balance sheet risk measures as control variables. 
Our analysis is designed in a way to capture the differences in the marginal 
propensity to risk (MPR) which might be affected by the operational size differences 
between BHCs. We believe that the operation size of each BHCs should be an important 
factor to determine the marginal propensity to risk factors (on and off balance sheet), in 
other word, large BHCS should react differently than the small BHCS or the medium size 
BHCS. In order to achieve this investigation we divide our BHCS sample into three 
groups, big, medium, and small, we also imposed dummy variables analysis in a separate 
regression. 
The results suggest, first, unused commitments, SLCs, and participations 
contracts are all significant player on market risk valuation in big BHCs, and they are 
being viewed as risk reducer according to the three risk measures. Second, SLCS 
contracts are significant risk reducing factor for both the medium and small sized BHCs, 
in addition to the big group. Third, unused commitment, CLCs, and participations seem 
to be not major influencer on the valuation of banks three market risk measures 
(Beta, Eitσ , and 
V
itσ ) for the three BHCs groups. Fourth, generally the market participants 
view OBS guarantees as more potential risk diversification tools. Fifth, small BHCs have 
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different MPR than both big and medium BHCs, which may follow the economy of 
scope concept and the big to fail doctrine. Sixth, the on balance sheet variables are 
consistent with the existing literature and they do have impact on the pricing process of 
bank’s equity. To a certain extent, the relation between these accounting risk variables 
and different market risk measures varies between each BHCS group. Therefore, more 
capital requirements and regulations on bank’s OBS guarantees activities may distort the 
large banks market positions. 
The results in the derivative section of the study suggest, swaps contracts are 
the major player on the market risk valuation, and it is being viewed as risk reducer 
according to the three risk measures for the big and medium BHCs. However it is 
insignificant for the small sized BHCs. In the contrast, futures, forwards, and options 
seem to be not major influencer on the valuation of banks the three market risk measures 
(Beta, SigmaE, and SigmaV) for the three BHCs groups. This result may be due to the 
small value of these contracts relative to the swap contracts, and the market participants 
do not pay attention to these positions as risk factors. However, we found a positive 
significant relation between these three types of derivative on the market systematic risk 
(Beta). Generally the market participants view OBS derivatives, majored by swaps 
positions, as more potential risk diversification tools.  
Small BHCs have different MPR than both big and medium BHCs, which may 
follow the economy of scope concept and the big to fail doctrine. Generally speaking, the 
risk sensitivity is higher in the case of the small sized banking firms then the medium 
sized and the smallest impact will be on the largest banking firms, i.e., the bank’s size is 
adversely related to bank’s risk sensitivity of the derivative contracts. Finally, on-balance 
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sheet variables are consistent with the existing literature and they do have impact on the 
pricing process of bank’s equity. To a certain extent, the relation between these 
accounting risk variables and different market risk measures varies between each BHCS 
group. 
Therefore, more capital requirements and regulations on bank’s OBS 
derivatives activities may distort the large banks market positions. Moreover, the market 
participants do not price futures, forwards, and options in their calculations of market risk 
although these contracts together should have a significant impact on the overall bank’s 
risk and should be considered in market valuation. 
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